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CREATIVE CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE RING AND THE BOOK
CHAPTER I 
"DO YOU SEE THIS RING?"
1 .
For Robert Browning, it'was not a question of man's 
being essentially rational or irrational. There was no one 
word or series of words which properly he could use to ex­
plain how he felt about the "pure crude facts" of human 
existence. At least, no words taken at their denotative 
value would serve. He consciously searched for a poetic 
method which would enable him to render his multi-lateral 
and often perplexing view of life into a new reality. To 
Browning, creating a new reality was both symbolic and real-- 
symbolic in the sense that he achieved it through one of the 
imitative arts; real in the sense that poetry itself is real, 
a living and growing part of human experience for the reader.
The purpose of this dissertation is to describe 
Browning's growing concept of the creative consciousness 
which he believed lay in the capabilities of each of us. 
Brpwning believed that the individual, as Professor E.D.H. 
Johnson pointed out.
engenders truths on the world, that he does so by 
rebelliously asserting his will in opposition to 
the evil which he perceives, and that through the 
resulting conflict he not only grows in moral stat­
ure but also acts as a redemptive agent in the cause 
of humanity.!
Thus the purpose of exercising one's creative consciousness-- 
one's complex imaginative abilities— is a moral one; it is 
to help to create the truth that one seeks in reality.
Browning searched for different levels of reality.
The object of his search was personal and spiritual ful­
fillment. Philosophically, as Professor Johnson's article 
indicates. Browning was closely allied with the Pluralism 
of William James. Like James, Browning was interested in 
the psychological implications of pluralism. Again like 
James, Browning attempted to break through the relativistic 
limitations of Pluralism in his quest for a more unified 
structuring of reality. James attempted the quest through 
religion. Browning through art.
In his art. Browning searched for a new level of 
reality through myth. Myth figuratively describes the inter­
action which occurs within an individual's total personality, 
and between the individual and his world. It describes more 
than that which "exists." Concepts, words, things--these 
do not necessarily order experience. These do not always
^"Robert Browning's Pluralistic Universe: A Reading 
of The Ring and the Book," TQ, 3I (October, I96I), 20-41.
3explain. But inside a myth, the individual's response is 
total. He knows what the myth is talking about the moment 
he sees the action depicted. Such a response is common to 
readers of The Ring and the Book,
Myth in The Ring and the Book is not the subject of 
this thesis,1 The source of myth— the creative conscious­
ness that Browning believed existed in us all— is the subject. 
The more Browning explored the possibilities of the figurative 
world of art, the more it was obvious to him that such a 
world was itself real and part of life and an area where 
many of the truths of human experience reposed. Such an 
idea is not a novel discovery by any means. It is a dis­
covery repeated time and again by many great artists. 
Browning's greatness lies in his attempt to disclose new 
levels of poetic reality. It was an aesthetic as well as 
an ethical discovery. In The Ring and the Book he did not 
want simply to resurrect the truth, "What was called for 
was a process of recreation," He apparently believed that 
"the artist's approach to his subject must be that of the 
Jamesian pluralist for whom the given facts of existence 
are not intractable, but malleable, awaiting the act of human 
violence which will engender truth on them,"2
^The subject is currently being undertaken by my col'
league, Robert Stevens,
2Johnson, p. 39,
4Arnold and Tennyson also made the attempt to re­
create by exercising the "poet's ability to impose his own 
will to believe through the resources of an art which does 
not simply enunciate, but which actually becomes the vital 
form of that b e l i e f . H o w e v e r ,  neither was concerned with 
developing new realities out of new materials. In Emped- 
odes on Etna Arnold examined an old myth, and later on was 
convinced that all the old myths were dead, and that it was 
not possible in his own time for new myths to evolve.
Tennyson was concerned with mythic elements in Idylls of the 
King and demonstrated that they had meaning in the shifting 
values of the Victorian Compromise.
Browning turned, in The Ring and the Book, to an 
obscure murder in late seventeenth-century Rome. From the 
point of view of the world of everyday affairs, the murder was 
not a myth but a fact. There are documents to prove that it 
actually happened. It has historical validity. For Browning, 
however, the history of the murder was not so important. As 
history, the murder was a "truth" of a sort because it was a 
fact and supposedly intractable. That is, it had truth in 
the sense that the incident itself was fixed and could not 
be taken away. But the murder gave Browning the materials 
he needed to evolve other truths, as real in life as in 
poetry, more felt imaginatively than known empirically. 
Browning's artistic problem was to ground his vision of these
^Johnson, p. 4l.
5truths in the empirically established facts of human exist­
ence .
Browning desired to help create that very reality 
of which he was a part. The characters in The Ring and the 
Book are aware— sometimes vaguely, sometimes acutely— that 
they too are helping to engender the reality in which they 
live. Such an awareness was--or so at any rate will this 
thesis contend— the conscious artistic intention of Browning.
If we can suppose that Browning believed that the 
principle of the creative consciousness was part of the 
capabilities of each individual, then we are well on our 
way to comprehending the central concept which governs The 
Ring and the Book. This concept is love, or more broadly, 
universal sympathy. Love is not an entity, whole and com­
plete in itself. It is a living, growing, changing "myth" 
or "truth" which is engendered upon this world by the people 
who search actively and creatively for it.
It is, in short, a reality which is made, not given. 
As a "truth"' love is a "mythic" absolute perhaps, but not a 
theological or philosophical one. In fact, to speak of it, 
or any of the other "truths" in the world of The Ring and 
the Book as absolute is to speak in terms which are beside 
the point. Unlike Shelley, Browning was not bedazzled with 
the permanence or lack of permanence of his own visions of 
reality. But he was vitally concerned with demonstrating 
that in a multi-faceted world of conflicting beliefs and
6values, we can only establish the "truth" by becoming in­
volved with the "pure crude facts," the data, the objects, 
the things, of human existence.
To be sure, a part of reality is "given." We are 
born into a world we never made. But Browning would argue 
that, by exploring and exploiting our own imaginative and 
"mythic" capabilities we can help to re-order and re-shape 
and in fact help create this "given" reality. Why bother 
with this attempt? Because we are concerned, like Capon­
sacchi in Book VI of this poem, with establishing the truth, 
and through the establishment of truth we realize a sense of 
personal fulfillment. Today, we might perhaps call this the 
existential virtue of self-realization. We have contributed 
and shared— in a dynamic interaction--with the creative 
processes of reality.
2 ,
Ever since the publication of William 0. Raymond's 
The Infinite Moment ,^ students and critics of Robert Browning 
have been engaged in a search for a hypothesis which will 
provide us with the means of organizing new concepts in an 
approach to re-reading and re-analyzing Browning's poetry. 
This renewed interest in Browning is part of a general re­
vival in the study of Victorian literature, a revival which 
has been ceaselessly reevaluating this period in our literary
^(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, I950).
7and cultural history, Raymond detected the beginnings of
this revival, both in Browning and in the Victorian period
generally, when he remarked that
Browning has suffered, along with Tennyson, from 
the general reaction inimical to Victorianism and 
all its works which has characterized the opening 
decades of the twentieth century. There are signs 
that the nadir has been reached, and that a juster 
and truer appreciation of the Victorian epoch is at 
hand.l
Raymond himself has helped contribute to this new 
approach to Browning. In the opening essay of his book, 
also entitled "The Infinite Moment," Raymond desires to 
center his estimate of Browning on the letter’s "artistic 
quality." Other aspects, he says, such as Browning’s 
dramatic gift, and his style and diction, have been thor­
oughly: studied . But what Raymond seeks to identify is 
basic— the "elemental spirit of Browning’s art.*^
Although Raymond does not settle this matter with 
as much success as he raises it, he nevertheless draws 
some early guidelines in the new approach to Browning, He 
notes that Browning himself spoke of his poetry "as momentary 
escapes of a bright and alive inner power." In a figure of 
speech. Browning compared this power to "flashes of light he 
had seen at sea leaping out at intervals from a narrow chink 
in a Mediterranean pharos."
^Raymond, p. 3.
^Ibid., p. 6.
8Raymond adds that Browning's favorite medium is 
"the dramatic monologue, which in his best work is the 
distillation of a crucial moment of human experience,"^ 
Raymond remarks that "the relation between the form and the 
content of the poetry of Browning is often a tension rather 
than a harmony.','2 Browning had once written to Ruskin that 
all poetry is the problem of "putting the infinite within the 
finite." And it is clear, Raymond continues, "that the crux 
of the struggle in his life as an artist was the difficulty 
of bodying forth the content of his imagination and intellect 
in adequate poetic forms." Browning was "striving to make 
his diction suitable for the new type of analytic poetry 
he was writing."3
Raymond contends that Browning's genius lies in the 
"Dionysiac fire of romantic art," of the "'moment one and 
infinite' of electrically charged emotion."^ But Raymond's 
contention falters when, in attempting to lend support to 
his thesis, he falls back on a technique, similar to that 
of Arnold, of citing passages of Browning's poetry as examples 
of the "incomparable gusto" and the "flash of life" which 
he has attempted to single out as "the essential quality of 
[Browning's! poetry."5
Perhaps feeling that he had not really resolved the
^Raymond, p. 7. ^Ibid., p. 10.
3lbid. ^Ibid., p. 12.
^Raymond, passim., p. 15, l8.
9issue that he had raised> Raymond explored further the pro­
blem of the "elemental spirit" of Browning’s art in an 
important article which he published in 1955.  ^ His point 
of departure is again Browning’s own figure of speech, 
wherein, in his second letter to Elizabeth Barrett, Browning 
contrasts the "white light" of her lyric poetry with the 
"prismatic hues" which he believed best represented the 
"partial and oblique refraction of his own personality in 
the medium of the dramatic m o n o l o g u e . Raymond links "the 
imagery of the prism, the rainbow, the broken and deflected 
light, with the humanism of Browning’s poetry." And Raymond 
contends that although the "white light" of Browning’s 
transcendentalism is important, it is secondary to the 
"’prismatic hues’ of his humanism." In fact. Browning told 
Elizabeth Barrett, "I. . .fear the pure white light, even 
if it is in me."
In contrasting Browning to Shelley, Raymond points 
out that Shelley’s "life and poetry are, in a sense, all of 
one piece." Browning, on the other hand, was motivated by 
his consciousness of the necessity of reconciling the absolute 
claims of the ideal with the concrete realities of man’s 
existence on earth."3 Though Browning views the aspiration 
of the soul as infinite and its destiny immortal, he holds
’The Jewelled Bow’: A Study In Browning’s Imagery 
and Humanism," PMLA, TO (March, 1955), 115-131.
2lbid., p. 115. 3Ibid.
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"that it must stoop to conquer." Browning views the incar­
nation of Christ in a similar fashion, and this view is 
part of his idea of the nature and function of love: "The
divine condescension to human weakness and imperfection is 
conceived of by Browning as flowing from the very essence 
of God as a being of infinite love. And, Raymond maintains, 
it is through "the sovereign virtue of love" that the two 
basic attitudes or dispositions of Browning's mind and 
spirit--transcendental and humanistic--are reconciled. In 
this view, the deepest meaning of love stems from an innate 
sympathy for the weakness and imperfection of human nature. 
Browning viewed the facts of knowledge skeptically and was 
convinced that "God and man are in communion through the 
sovereign instrumentality of love.
Raymond summarizes the basic difference between
Browning and Shelley by stating that
For Shelley the limitations of man's life on earth, 
the finitude of his lot, are "stains"; they dim and 
obscure "the white radiance of Eternity." For 
Browning, they are material for transmutation and 
transfiguration.3
Thus, from Browning's view, man's finite experiences 
"may tee not stains, but Jewels, enriching the white light by 
mellowing and humanizing it into prismatic hues."^ And he 
concludes that, "It is 'the prismatic hues' of Browning's
^Ibid.. p. 117. ^Ibid., p. 123.
3lbid., p. 126. ^Ibid.
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humanism which constitute his most important contribution 
to English poetry.
As Browning saw it, these prismatic hues were like 
a jewelled rainbow, variecolored, alternately clouded and 
brilliant. It was at the heart of his artistic as well as 
his moral and spiritual make-up. And it is one of the rays 
of this "jewelled bow" with which this thesis will be con­
cerned.
3.
The body of comtemporary critical opinion in Browning 
and in Victorian literature generally represents the results 
of studies which have worked up to an analysis of individual 
poems. The tools generally used in this approach are quite 
often identified with New Criticism, and the method is 
generally referred to as "close reading," "practical criti­
cism," or perhaps more accurately, "interpretive analysis." 
Today, this method is, of course, only one among many em­
ployed by modern Victorian critics--as indeed by most modern 
critics--who, while apparently having been trained in the 
methods of interpretive analysis, tend to be eclectic in 
the critical methods they employ and, as was suggested above, 
are even now seeking to go beyond any particular method in 
an effort to find some new approach towards the reading and 
understanding of Victorian poetry, and of individual poets
llbid., p. 131.
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of the Victorian period. It is hoped that this present 
study will follow in the lines established toward this new 
approach.
In Browning's case, the most significant studies of 
recent years indicate two important facts; (l) that Browning 
criticism has become sophisticated enough to re-establish 
serious Browning study, and (2) that Browning critics who 
are recognized for their abilities and their critical in­
sights all seem to be slowly converging upon the same goal: 
namely, that of discovering a new level of criticism upon 
which to read and study this most complex and elusive poet.
Robert Langbaum stated recently that throughout the 
decade of the nineteen-fifties young scholars "have been 
trying to make out a new case for Browning according to the 
rigorous analytic methods of modern criticism.^ Langbaum 
himself is one of the more important of the "young scholars" 
to whom he refers. Langbaum's book. The Poetry of Experience,' 
a generic analysis of Browning's dramatic monologue, repre­
sents the complex critical approach to Browning which the 
letter's work demands.
The central chapter in Langbaum's study--it is 
located in almost the exact center of the book--is a chapter
^Review of Browning's Characters, VS, 5 (March, 1962),
269.
2
'(New York: Random House, 1957).
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devoted to The Ring and the Book and entitled "The Ring and 
the Book! A Relativist Poem.
In calling it s relativist poem, Langbaum does not 
mean that the judgments of the poem are intended to be rela- 
tive--that is, indefinite or a matter of opinion. It is 
relativist, he says, "in that the social and religious 
absolutes are not the means for understanding the right and 
wrong of the poem." In fact, he adds, "they are for the most 
part barriers to understanding.Langbaum points out that 
in the poem, those established institutions which have tra­
ditionally distinguished right from wrong— "the law, the 
Church, the authority of parents and husband"--have been 
either completely wrong or have been unable to see the main 
point— "Pompilia’s absolute goodness and Guido's badness. 
During the unfolding of the murder case, "the courts, the 
lawyers, the representative of the impartial line of Roman 
opinion," demonstrate one peculiar attribute in common; they 
have all "committed the 'relativist' fallacy of supposing 
that there must be righ,t and wrong on each side."^
Pompilia is constantly misled by these authorities, 
but in spite of all these external influences and with every­
thing against her, she "finds the right way because her in­
stinct is right."5 Caponsacchi, precisely because he was
^Robert Langbaum, The Poetry of Experience, (New York: 
Random House, 1957), 109-3^
2Ibid., p. 113. 3ibid. ^Ibid. ^ lh±à. ■
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a society priest, a dandy, a gallant, was In a position be­
cause of "his fresh ear to hear the contrasting moral cry of 
Pompilia, while pious Christians had grown 'too obtuse/ Of 
ear, through Iteration of command,'" (X, 1198-99)^
The judgments of Pompilia, Caponsacchi and the Pope 
are not only "independent of official morality," but they 
are also "in conflict with It and In this sense relative to 
the particular conditions of the poem and to the motives and
p
quality of the characters." Langbaum points out that all 
the Incidental speakers In the poem had their own motives for 
speaking. We as readers, therefore, "must judge what Is 
being said by who Is saying It,"^ Truth In the case comes 
to depend upon what Is being theorized about and who Is doing 
the theorizing. Thus, the Incidental speakers--Half-Rome,
Other Half-Rome, Tertium Quid and the two lawyers--do not 
have strong enough motives for finding the truth, "in con­
trast to the Inadequate motives of the 'world' we have the 
Pope's high seriousness,*^ Caponsacchi's heroic Impulses and 
Pompilia's "white light," In short, these figures might prove 
to be mistaken In their actions, but their motives are pure.
The Pope's judgments, says Langbaum, are not judgments 
of fact "but judgments of character." Although the Pope reviews 
the facts and arguments carefully, he Is able to cut through 
them to the "motives and essential moral qualities behind
^Ibld., p. 114, ^Ibld. 3lbld,, p, 115,
^Ibld,. p, 120,
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the d e e d s . I n  this sense, facts nor any other external 
yardstick— "whether legal, Christian, or conventional"—  
yield the truth. The moral Judgments that Caponsacchi and 
the Pope make are definite and extreme. The reader thus 
arrives at "not the truth, but truth as the worthiest charac­
ters of the poem see it." In this way, Langbaum says that 
the truth is "psychologized"--that is, it is induced from 
the psychological make-up of the characters in the poem.
Truth is also "historicized," says Langbaum. The 
facts of the murder and the arguments offered by the lawyers 
do not reveal the basic moral struggle between Guido and 
Pompilia. In the same manner, "the legal and ecclesiastical 
machinery of the time proves inadequate to reveal and Judge 
the moral i s s u e . T h e  Pope, as he is reviewing the case, 
is distressed that in his own time "The machinery of Chris­
tianity showed itself to be...almost completely at odds 
with the meaning of Christianity." However, the Pope is 
encouraged because, in spite of all the wrong external guid­
ance, Pompilia kept the essential meaning of Christianity 
alive through sheer right instinct. The Pope perceives that 
in the new age that is ahead— an age where Christianity and 
the Church will no longer be the uncontested authority to 
decide "heresies"— men like Caponsacchi "will reject dogma 
and declare themselves a law unto themselves."^
llbid., p. 121. ^Ibid., p. 122. P* 123.
^Ibid.
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In this way, the Pope understands that truth is other 
than "the machinery by which people try to understand it."
In any given age, the machinery we use to "prove" truth 
shifts— regardless of whether or not that proof is found in 
myth or dogma. Truth itself always seems to remain--this 
is the assumption and there is no getting behind it--and is 
never in equilibrium with the machinery that is supposed to 
understand it; at times it is in direct conflict with it. It 
thus becomes a "necessary disequilibrium, for injustice shows 
up the old machinery as inadequate."^ When man attempts to 
adapt the machinery of understanding to the truth— and the 
truth is always in advance of the machinery— he "advances 
his moral understanding." Thus, historically, "truth is 
larger and in advance of the formulations and institutions 
of any age.
The conclusion to be drawn from the Pope’s observa­
tions is that "fixed principles and the institutions which 
embody them can never be adequate to Judge the truth."
Judgment depends on the "essential moral quality of the Judge."
Thus, as Langbaum sees it, truth on psychological 
grounds is relative. It is relative to "the nattneeofi:-thë 
Judge and person being Judged." Truth is also relative 
historically. It is relative to the amount of disequilibrium 
which exists in any given age, "between truth and the insti­
tutions by which truth is understood."3 Caponsacchi and
llbid. 2ibid., p. 124. 3lbid., p. 125.
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Pompilia prove that, psychologically, their right instincts 
are a "guarantee that truth maintains itself in the human 
heart in spite of history, of external change." On the other 
hand, historically, the Pope comes to believe that "the murder 
case shows that truth maintains itself by means of history."^ 
That is, the disequilibrium that exists between the truth 
and the machinery that is supposed to apprehend it is 
historically necessary. The injustice that is committed 
exposes the corruption of the old order and helps to bring 
out the moral qualities of men seeking new machinery to 
establish a new order.
It is Langbaum's belief that Browning wrote The Ring
and the Book by starting with Goethe's condition that a poem
is not to derive its meaning "from any external standard
of judgment, but is to be the empiric ground giving rise
2
to its own standard of judgment." Browning fruther imposed 
a still harder condition: he chose not to write on the basis 
of traditional categories, or, like Goethe, to give "meaning 
to an old myth"; instead. Browning draws "his meaning out 
of 'pure crude fact.'" To be sure, his poem has an his­
torical basis, but it is one that reveals the life that 
goes on below the level of history— in this case an obscure 
Roman murder case in the late seventeenth century.
In his discussion, Langbaum does not come to grips 
with the "end" values for Browning, nor for the reader.
llbid., p. 128. ^Ibid., p. 132.
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Perhaps Langbaum has carried too far his emphasis on rel­
ativistic judgment. Judgment which Is "psychologized and 
historicized" on a relaclve basis.
Indeed, It Is not doing Browning justice to limit 
his vision to the modern conditions of psychological and 
historical relativism. He was, after all, trying to establish 
a basis for absolute judgment. In The Ring and the Book 
we do not judge the characters so much as they judge each 
other and themselves. However, we judge ourselves as read­
ers and we judge our responses to the poem. In fact, Brownk 
Ing Is asking us to help create the reality of the poem.
He Is, In essence, asking us to help create the truth for 
ourselves. This quality Is the one referred to earlier as 
the principle of the "creative consciousness."
The present study Is concerned with the way Browning 
developed this principle In The Ring and the Book. More 
specifically. It will seek to demonstrate that Browning 
viewed this consciousness as primarily an artistic phenomenon, 
and that the exercise of It was necessary in order for us 
to help shape the reality of the world In which we lived. 
Perhaps we can understand this Idea better If we examine 
the central metaphor which Illustrates Browning’s notion 
of the creative consciousness and how It works.
4.
"Do You See This Ring?"
When Browning asks, "Do you see this Ring?" In the
19
first line of The Ring and the Book, he is asking the most 
important question of his poetic life-time. For he is making 
a demand on his reader that no nineteenth-century English 
poet ever made before him. He is asking the reader to help 
create the myth and the reality of The Ring and the Book.
He is asking the reader to help establish a dynamic inter­
action between poet and reader. He is asking the reader: 
"Will you contribute you own imaginative and metaphoric 
abilities to this poem?" And he is implying that only if 
the reader derives artistic inspiration from the poem will 
he be able to contribute his own creative, "mythic" insights. 
Such an interaction, growing and evolving as the reader 
explores the world of The Ring and the Book, is Browning's 
final quest. It is, finally, all he can and should hope 
for.
When Browning asks, "Do you see this Ring?" he is 
asking the reader to "see" creatively, imaginatively, in­
tuitively, metaphorically, symbolically, mythically. Yet 
he is asking the empirical question, "Reader, do you see 
this golden ring that I hold in my hand?" Such a union 
between the literal and the imaginative is what Browning 
is asking— in fact demanding— of the reader. The reader 
must work to share in the creative processes of this poem.
The reader, just as Browning did in l864 and after, can 
help to engender that very reality which we call life and 
of which he and we are a part.
The reader, as we shall see when this problem is
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explored further in b^fe last chapter of this thesis, must 
corné to regard The Ring and the Book as a metaphor. This 
is not by any means a new way to view poetry. No, what is 
new is what that metaphor represents for the mid-twentieth 
century reader. The metaphor, simply stated, is thus: The
Ring and the Book is an evasive, shifting, growing, evolving, 
"pure crude fact." The reality which comes to exist between 
the reader and the poem is partially created by both. The 
reader accepts what is "given"ï the poem is an historical 
fact; it was written down, printed, and has become part of 
the memory of mankind. Each reader recognizes that he has 
inherited it. But as he reads it, he is asked to bring more 
than sensitivity or empathy or a close exercise of his 
critical faculties. He is asked to think creatively, to 
contribute his own share of artistic ability to the poem.
Browning saw that, in a pluralistic world, the facts 
are never all in. The reality of our lives is never all 
"given." This is why he is able to ask rhetorically "is 
fiction which makes fact alive, fact too?"--because he 
knows the answer. The answer lies in his question, "Do 
you see this Ring?" The metaphor involved here. Browning 
implies, is a comparison between the reality of the poet 
and his poem, and the reality of the reader in his own 
world, regardless of the period in which he lives. The 
reader adds his fancy to the "facts" of the poem'.Just as 
Browning added his fancy to the facts of The Old Yellow 
Book. Browning's metaphor centers around an interacting
21
process: just as he demonstrates that the characters in his 
poem help to re-shape and re-order, for better or for worse, 
the reality of their lives, so too can the reader, through 
reading the poem imaginatively, not only add new facts 
to the poem, bringing in more evidence (his fancy) which 
was missing both at the murder trial and at the writing of 
the poem, but the reader can simultaneously help to re­
shape, to change around, to actually transfigure into 
something new, the reality of his own life.
"Do you see this Ring?" is Browning’s "reach beyond 
his grasp" and as he demonstrates in the heart of his poem, 
this is what a heaven mythically for. He is asking us, 
as readers, to reach beyond ourselves, to reach up and 
"gain" this ring. Because we can make this ring just as 
Browning did. The facts of our lives are pure gold, soft 
malleable, and not "firm to file." We must think "into" 
and "out of" The Ring and the Book to help create meaning 
in our own private experience.
"Do you see this Ring?" is one of the most exciting 
questions ever raised in English poetry and we as readers 
creatively share in that excitement.
CHAPTER II 
THE MAKING OF THE RING
"Do you see this ring?" Browning asks.^ It was made 
in Rome, constructed in the manner in which the worker in 
Etruscan gold prepares the ornament circlet which will be 
worn as a ring; circlets which are found glistening and 
alive, among the fig-tree roots which have been unearthed 
on "a slope and serve as the roof of the old tombs at Chiusi. 
The Ring is llk'e the Etruscan circlet, "soft, you see," yet 
it is crisp because it has been cut by the jeweler. There 
is a trick which enables one to manipulate particles of pure 
gold, as the Ring once was, gold which was almost like wax 
when first taken from the mine, as virgin as the ripened 
honey-combs. The gold is brought forth from the mine soft 
and shapeless. A way must be found to enable the gold to 
withstand the teeth of a file or the tap of a hammer. The 
hammer is needed to round the gold into a ring, the file to 
raise the surface of the metal in order to put the ornaments
^All quotations of The Ring and the Book are from 
The Poetical Works of Robert Browning, (2 vols; London:
Smith, Eider and Co., I896), 11, I-29I.
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on the ring. But the pure metal is soft; it must be mixed
with an alloy to gain the necessary power of resistance.
In a figurative sense, the artisan melts wax and honey 
together. That is, he mingles gold with an alloy and, work­
ing the mixture, he soon gets a metal which can be managed. 
Once his work is ended the ring is partially restored to 
its earlier nature, by dissolving the surface alloy from the 
gold with an acid solution and thus producing a pure film 
of gold on the surface of the ring. The ring was gold, is 
now gold, and shall be forever gold. It is nature’s original 
but with "added artistry," without the loss of a karat, and 
we have "gained a ring," "What of it?" the reader at this 
point might ask. But suppose the ring has significance as
a symbol, as the sign of a real life object. Suppose the
ring, an object itself, stands for a fact or an artifact, 
a fact which was once a living reality but is now part of 
the memory of mankind? (I, 1-32)
The poet addresses the reader again: "Do you see
this square old yellow Book?" he asks. The Ring stands for, 
symbolizes, but is not the Book. Browning tosses the Book 
in the air excitedly, catches it again, and twirls it about 
by its "crumpled vellum covers." The book is "pure crude 
fact." He stands in a kind of "naive won de r, be ca u se he 
is still overwhelmed at his own good fortune. It is one of
iThe "naive wonder" is a phrase borrowed from Langbaum 
and is part of a recent disagreement among Ring critics, to 
be specified later.
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the great discoveries of his life, the finding of this 
square old yellow Book, The squareness of the Book contrasts 
with the roundness of the Ring. The Book Is dull yellow, 
the Ring glistening and golden. The Book Is old, the vellum 
paper Is soft and crumpling; the Ring Is new and hardened;
It is a new metaphor, a new Idea. The Book Is a dead object, 
lifeless when first found In a stall In the Piazza San Lorenzo 
of Florence. The Ring gives It new life. The Ring interprets 
the Book, transforms and penetrates through the Book. The 
hard, tooth-edge quality of the Ring has given shape to the 
pure, crude facts of the Book. But the facts have remained 
hidden in a book-stall, dulled and obscured under the fading 
yellow cover and the parched vellum paper of the square old 
Book. Browning mixes the pure crude facts of the Book with 
an alloy— his own artistic shaping power--and rounds the soft 
square crumpling papers of the old yellow Book into the hard 
circle of the living Ring. Just as the artisan takes the 
soft metal of the gold and mixes it with an alloy to give it 
resistance, so Browning takes the pure crude facts, soft and 
shapeless, distorted and yet somehow true, and intermingles 
his own poetic alloy of fancy (imagination) in order to give 
the pure facts shape and sense and meaning. The square Book 
of pure crude fact becomes the round Ring of pure fact, no 
longer crude but given organization and meaning because of 
Browning's added artistry. In the square old Book the facts 
appeared in the soft pages— endlessly, aimlessly--one on top
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of the other. But mixed with the alloy, the facts are linked 
together in a circle of meaning to find the circumference of 
truth.
He tosses the Book in the air and takes it again.
He describes it further. It is of small quarto-size but a 
divine hand is on his shoulder as his eye picks it out among 
the confused welter of out-of-date and worthless stuff in the 
book-stall. But, he tells us, "one glance at the lettered 
back of which,/ And 'Stalll* cried I: a lira made it mine."
(I, 82-3) It is a book in shape but actually "pure crude 
fact,"
Secreted from man’s life when hearts beat hard.
And brains, high-blooded, ticked two centuries since.
(I, 87-8)
From then on, nothing distracts him from his prize until he
"had mastered the contents, knew the whole truth" of the
Book. "Romana Homicidiorum," it reads on the title page.
Nay, he says, I better translate. "A Roman murder-case, "it
would read, and then underneath:
"Position of the entire criminal cause 
"Of Guido Pranceschini, nobleman,
"With certain Four the cutthroats in his pay,
"Tried, all five, and found guilty and put to death 
"By heading or hanging as befitted ranks,
"At Rome on February Twenty Two,
"Since our salvation Sixteen Ninety Eight:
"Wherein it is disputed if, and when,
"Husbands may kill adulterous wives, yet ’scape 
"The customary forfeit." (I, 122-31)
This, he tells us, is what the square old yellow Book is about.
This is the thing signified by the Ring. He beseeches us to
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hold fast the figure of the "lingot gold," pure and un­
tampered, before it is forged into the Ring. In the same 
way, absolute truth lay in the pure crude facts of this 
Roman murder-case— the murder itself, the trial, the prose­
cution and defense, the appeal to the Pope and, finally, the 
execution. (I, l4l-363) He tells us:
This is the bookful; thus far take the truth.
The untempered gold, the fact untampered with.
The mere ring-metal ere the ring by made. (I, 364-66)
These pure facts, not yet tampered with, are like the pure
gold, not yet mixed with an alloy. The facts represent the
metal for the ring, and now need shaping.
But why resurrect this obscure old murder of two 
centuries ago? Was the truth as it supposedly came out at 
the trial able to take "its own part as truth should,/ 
Sufficient, self-sustaining? Why, if so-/ Yonder»s a fire, 
into it goes my book." (I, 373-75) But what if the pure 
crude fact of the yellow Book needs interpreting, needs to 
be molded into meaning?
Browning takes his book to Rome to try "truth’s 
power on likely people." (I, 423 f .) "Have you met such 
names?" he asks, "is a tradition extant of such facts?"
The Romans respond, "’You’ll waste your pains on names 
and facts thus old,’"^ And besides, the Romans with whom
^This rephrasing of Browning, and also the translation 
of some particular words below, is from Paul A, Cundiff’s 
"The Clarity of Browning's Ring Metaphor," PMLA, 63 (December,
1948), 1277.
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he talks ask skeptically, "don't you deal In poetry, make- 
believe,/ And the white lies it sounds like?" (I, 455-56)
They want to know in what sense he can take the Roman mur­
der case and transform it into a make-believe poem without 
destroying the pure crude fact that he seems to believe is 
in the yellow Book. "Do you tell the story, now, in off­
hand style,/ Straight from the book?" (I, 451-52) Or do 
you keep a hint of the original in your poem here and 
there?
The poet replies "Yes and no!" (I, 457) Yes, he
tells the story straight from the old yellow Book:'
thence bit by bit I dug 
The lingot [solid mass] truth, that memorable day.
Assayed [analyzed critically] and knew my piecemeal
gain was gold,—
Yes; but from something else surpassing that.
Made it bear hammer and be firm to file. (I, 458-63)
Just as "gold is dug from the earth before ring-making may 
begin Browning first dug from the Book the pure and unadul­
terated facts."!
Fancy with fact is just one fact the more;
To-wit, that fancy has informed, transpierced,
Thridded [threaded] and so thrown fast the facts else free 
As right through ring and ring runs the djereed [javelin] 
And binds the loose, one bar without a break. (I, 464-68)
Browning is again asking the audience to hold the figure fast.
He mixed the pure fact of the yellow Book with "something
else surpassing" the facts of the Book, "to make them
malleable and firm to file. His comparison means that what­
ICundiff, p. 1278.
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ever he found In the Book was to him what pure gold is to
the artificer.
I fused my live soul and that inert stuff.
Before attempting smithcraft. (I, 469-70)
His soul is the alloy, the "something else surpassing."
The facts are "inert stuff." By his "smithcraft" he will
breathe life into the dead facts of the yellow Book, "his
fancy with those facts." (l, 68l) "I used to tell the tale,"
he says, "and seldom lacked a listener." (I, 68O-81) He
forges the alloy of his fancy with the gold of the facts,
producing a shapely ring, one which lay ready to be bathed
in acid. He had earlier called the bathing a "repristination,"
(I, 23) that is, a return of the Ring to its original state.
But he had told us we had "gained a ring," from this soft
pure gold. He knows that the acid only keeps the outside of
the Ring from tarnishing and gives the ring surface a
film of pure gold. The alloy is still there. "How much of
the tale was true?" he asks. "I disappeared; the book grew
all in all." (I, 686-87)
Just as the tarnish is removed from the surface of
the Ring, so Browning removes himself from the face of the
poem and disappears into the heart of the poem. But the
alloy, he knows and we know, is still there. It is the
"added artistry," the "something else surpassing." It is
necessary. He has told us that fancy is just one fact the
libid.
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more. But it is no less important. It is the necessary, 
the life-giving, analyzing, ordering, hypothetical fact —  
this fancy of the poet. His fancy is the "interior struc­
ture, the quality which makes the. . .ring durable and shapely.
So the poet turns artificer and through smithcraft, 
forges the Ring, He dissects the old yellow Book, tempering, 
hammering, filing the crude facts of this forgotten scandal. 
When he was in the Piazza San Lorenzo, his eyes roaming 
across the litter and bric-a-brac of the book-stall, one 
glance at the lettered back of the old yellow Book, almost 
hidden and forgotten, was enough. Two centuries had made the 
facts dead, but pure nevertheless. And at a point in time, 
the facts, the events, the characters were alive. The 
triple murder actually happened, the blood flowed. The 
brains of Guido and Caponsacchi clashed and "Husband and 
wife and priest, met face to face." (I, $16) The problem is 
how to breathe the living truth into these dead facts.
So the Ring is forged. The Ring is not the old yel­
low Book but is the poem. The Ring and the Book. It is 
fact with fancy one fact the more. "Lovers of dead truth," 
Browning asks, "did ye fare the worse?" That is, since the 
purs crude facts have not been debased by the addition of 
his alloy, they are even more valuable than before. "Lovers 
of live truth," he then asks, "found ye false my tale?"
(I, 696-97) Again the answer has already been given. He has
llbid., p. 1279.
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told us that the "truth about Guido's murder of Pompllla 
reposed in the legal documents containing the details of the 
case, but was only to be deduced through interpretation of 
the material by a mind endowed with imaginative insight.
He wants to make the truth live again, but in a different way. 
He cannot physically go back in time. He must somehow 
bring the facts back by means of the forge; afterwards the 
facts go through a repristination, but not literally. That 
is, once the facts are embossed in the poem, they cannot 
return to their original state as they appeared in the old 
yellow Book. But they can appear in an analogous state in 
the poem. With insatiable scientific curiosity^, he has 
sifted through the old yellow Book. He suspects that the 
truth is locked up in the facts. His purpose is to "unlock 
the truth,"3 by exercising his creative consciousness. In 
order for the seeming separation of the alloy from the gold 
to take place "once the ring has been shaped. Browning 
says he retained the sense and manner of the documentation" 
of the old yellow Book.
The ring is a finely-wrought piece of artistic 
craftsmanship. The goldsmith has taken a shapeless mass of 
gold and molded it into a ring, thus achieving order and
lE.D.H. Johnson, The Alien Vision of Victorian Poetry 
(Princeton: Princeton UniveYsYty Press, 1952), pp. 133-34.
2Ralph B. Crum, Scientific Thought in Poetry (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1931),P. 19^.
3Langbaum, The Poetry of Experience, p. 132.
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symmetry from what was a disorganized mass of raw material.
The ring stands for love. Thus love is the central force of 
order in the world of human experience. It also is the symbol 
of Browning's artistic shaping power.
Thus "fiction which makes fact alive" is ultimately 
fact too. (I, 705) The alloy rounds the circle, a spurt of 
acid takes away its trace, leaving the alloy inside; and, 
"justifiably golden," (I, I387-89) "we have gained a ring."
CHAPTER III 
THE TESTING OF THE BOOK 
1
What else does the square old yellow Book repre­
sent besides fact? And what Is a fact anyway? It is an 
action, an object, a past event, something that really 
happened. The Book itself is a fact. It has substance and 
reality. When Browning singled out the yellow cover in the 
book-stall it was a fact which loomed very large in his eyes, 
Was he even then interpreting the Book? Why was he so ex­
cited by seeing the inscription "Romana Homicidiorum" on 
the Book's spine?
In the poem he seems to have, at that point, con­
ceived the first fruits of his plan. In Rome, the eternal 
city, a city which suggests creativity and destruction, 
love and hate, myth and spirit, the paradoxical city of 
Christian and pagan ethos. Browning in his poem located 
the factual account of a murder. An obscure case in itself, 
yet surely he must have developed its possibilities in his 
mind in the years from i860 to l864. In a sense, it sug­




As he, in a figurative and perhaps even a literal 
sense, walked back in mindless preoccupation through the 
realities of a Florence contemporaneous with his own life, 
surely a process of artistic empathy and creation was at work 
while he rapidly turned the crumpled pages of the old yellow 
Book, Why suddenly, could he conceive of murder and marriage 
as being at the center of this microcosmic world? Why did 
it assume such immediate significance there in the book­
stall?
Despite what Browning may have really thought when 
he actually did find the book, in the poem he represents 
himself as making the greatest discovery of his life. More­
over, he recognizes his discovery immediately. It is as 
though the book is the key to the philosophical puzzle of 
his own existence and perhaps the existence of all human 
beings. The book is part of the memory of mankind. It is 
the real-life story of a murder by marriage, obscure, 
shadowy, yet evocative of man's relation to man and woman.
For Browning the book seems to have suggested myth, romance, 
chivalry and the interconnecting traditions of eastern and 
western culture.
The terrible beauty of Pompilia's innocence leads 
Guido to a destructive act. There is no evil in Pompilia.
And her innocence is not of the Garden variety. She puts 
her innocence to the test of knowledge when she flees from
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Guido. Caponsacchi views Guido as irreducible evil and cannot 
conceive of any salvation for him because he senses but can­
not accept the mystery of the union of earthly and heavenly 
love. No, the evil is in the string of events, the fact 
linked upon fact that lead to her inevitable death. For her 
death inevitable but in no way fated or determined. The 
strange chain of events is brought about by one fact after 
another, of the human actions of the Comparini, of Half-Rome 
and Other Half-Rome, of Tertium Quid, of Guido, Caponsacchi, 
Pompilia herself, the lawyers, and finally the Pope,.
The events unfold. Pact follows upon fact, once the 
event itself occurs, once the action is completed. Browning 
turns the facts over in Book I and then carries the reader 
through many emotional keys. The very facts of the case 
become matters of dispute. Half-Rome has his own inter­
pretation of the events to favor Guido. He insists throughout 
that what he says is fact, "a fact none dare dispute." All 
the old law is now back in force, he says: husbands may kill 
faithless wives and their lovers. Other Half-Rome is pre­
judiced toward the Comparini and Pompilia, who lies dying.
There is an emphasis on the evils of lying. Tertium Quid is 
a nobleman, sophisticated, cooly weighing the two sides of 
the story, finding both guilty. But his statements are 
qualified by his scorn of the whole affair, his detachment 
from the events, his frequent interruptions to address his 
noble listeners.
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Guido Judges Pompilia by the law, but he justifies 
his murder of her by another law, what he calls the law of 
the "first conscience." To Caponsacchi, Pompilia inspires 
a mystic, religious conversion and he defends the dnnocence 
which Pompilia exposes as an absolute entity when she com­
pares herself to a mutilated statue of the virgin and child. 
The lawyers irrelevantly and irreverently abuse Pompilia’s 
timeless virtue. One is the kindly father who is without 
scruples in his own profession. Both are indifferent to the 
truth of the case. They ignore the central fact of Pompilia. 
The concept of law, the established institution, is uppermost 
in their arguments during the murder trial. "The presence 
of such à conventional institution of law, so far removed 
from real Justice and truth, is a profoundly significant 
aspect of Pompilia’s tragedy.
The Pope, however, is aware of his human limitations 
in Judgment. And he answers the ironic riddle: who shall 
die first, the old Pope or Guido? An element of doubt about 
his Judgment haunts him, but he furnishes a glimpse of God’s 
completeness through self-sacrificing love. He sends the 
order. "How should I dare die, this man live?" Guido 
defends his actions. The Church fooled him. He lived behind 
the mask of conventional Christianity. The whole world of 
Rome lived behind a mask of pretense, the tacitly agreed
^Charles W. Hodell, The Old Yellow Book, (Washington: 
The Carnegie Institute, I908), p. (4J.
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upon convention of Christianity. Life was a lie which he 
lived like all the rest. Why now, he asks, does the mask 
presume to hide not a lie but the truth? He finally calls 
upon that innocence which he murdered. "Pompilia," he cries, 
"will you let them murder me?"
The actions one by one occur, are recorded, and they 
too become facts. Just more material fro. Browning's story, 
simply the rounding out of his discovery. The Book becomes 
his key. Something that seems to have eluded him has now 
been uncovered. And he will not be blinded by these facts 
as the two lawyers were.
2
Browning turns his key into a ring. And at the end 
of the first book of the poem, that ring is his objective 
declaration of himself, of the significance of his experience 
in relation to the facts in the old yellow Book. In Book I 
(1391-1416) the ring is love, suggested by the simple golden 
ring of his wife. The ring is symbol and fact, the union of 
divine and earthly love. Browning cannot be divested of the 
temporal limitations of his own self. He can never be ef­
fectively objective about his own experience if he simply 
recounts it. Neither can the old yellow Book do it for him, 
because the facts locked inside the old yellow Book are in 
themselves without meaning, "for the crime, as history, is 
of little value, and evidence is but f r a g m e n t a r y . T h e
iRodell, p. (4).
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facts become lasting only when forged into the ring. The 
ring, itself a fact, objectifies the truth by intermingling 
the points of view of the characters of the murder case.
The facts in the old yellow Book are not enough. They don’t 
tell the truth. Browning is unable to trust the way the 
facts are recorded in the Book. He must go to Rome and 
Arezzo and inquire into the matter himself. "Have you met 
such names?" he asks, "is there a tradition extant of such 
facts?" (I, 453-54)
He tells himself that the facts represent absolute
truth; this, because they are irreducible. Human actions,
once committed, cannot be altered. With both happiness and 
dismay, he knows that in this sense, facts are absolute
truths, absolute because they are now non-temporal, true
because once committed, they cannot be denied. Thus Pompilia 
really was murdered; once committed, the action cannot be 
subject to any temporal laws. Pompilia’s murder is also a 
truth. It is a kind of dead truth because it is dépendent on 
fact, the fact of the murder, before it can exist as a truth.
But the universal facts about Pompilia— as they are 
interpreted in the different monologues— are not dead. These 
truths, stemming from the differing visions of human exper­
ience, somehow become objectified and assume a life of their 
own. The ring gives them their completeness.
38
3
A recent, mild series of disagreements has occurred
in four articles published lately in the Victorian News- 
1
letter regarding fact in The Ring and the Book. Although 
the disagreement itself— whether or not Browning believed 
he remained true to the facts of the old yellow Book—  
seems somewhat beside the point, what was stated in the 
meantime by all the articles leads the reader into a very 
fruitful discussion of the problem of fact as it appears in 
The Ring and the Book , and not as it is seen in comparison 
to its faithfulness to the old yellow Book. Robert Langbaum 
easily disposes of the initial problem— if it is a problem 
at all— by stating that "no one could read both the Old 
Yellow Book and The Ring and the Book and suppos* that they 
were the same," For example, the habit of Browning's of 
referring to his source as a "square old yellow book" is 
itself misleading, since really what he bought in Florence
^The articles in chronological order: (l) Paul A. 
Cundiff, "Robert Browning: 'Our Human Speech,'' VNL, 15 
(Spring, 1959), 1-9; (2) Reply by Donald Smalley,” "Browning's 
View of Fact in The Ring and the Book," VNL, 16 (Fall, 1959), 
1-9; (3) Rebuttal by Cundiff, "'Robert Browning: 'Indisputably 
Fact,;: VNL, 17 (Spring, 196O), 7-11; and finally, (4) a comment 
on the disagreement by a third party, Robert Langbaum, who 
believes he has been partially misunderstood by both sides, in 
"The Importance of Fact in The Ring and the Book," VNL, 17 
(Spring, i960), .
^Langbaum, "The Importance of Fact," p. 12.
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was a series of pamphlets tied together by a vellum cover 
which had yellowed with age, part print, part manuscript, 
and not, properly speaking, a book at all. There are of 
course a great many other differences between the two works 
and, as Langbaum remarks, "these are not surprising If we 
remember that we are dealing after all with a poem."1
Langbaum then settles the first part of the con­
troversy by pointing out that
There Is not. . .much disagreement over the 
first question, whether Browning really did stick 
to the facts. Everyone admits that he did not 
Stick entirely to the facts. . . .Here again every­
one reads the ring metaphor to mean that Browning 
Intended to mix fancy with fact. When later In 
Book I he poses the rhetorical question, "is fiction 
which makes fact alive, fact too?" (705), we must 
Infer that he Is claiming some license for Inter­
pretation and even for amplification and Invention.^
Even while Langbaum rightly disposes of this first part of 
the argument, he glides too easily over the real problem.
When quoting the passage "is fiction which makes fact alive, 
fact too?" he correctly points out that Browning Is claiming 
a poetic license to use his own fancy. The question Is, why 
does Browning refer to his fancy as "fact"? This Is actually 
where the confusion rests. What does he mean by "fact" here? 
He knows that part of his poem Is fiction. He Is obviously 
suggesting that when fiction Is used to make facts alive.
It becomes fact too. The question then Is, Indeed, a rhe­
torical one, since Browning Is going to demonstrate In the
libId. 2lbld.
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poem that the facts were capable of being turned into non­
truths by the disputants, and only his fancy can bring them 
back into proper perspective. He therefore means that his 
fancy— his poetic shaping power— becomes part of the evidence 
of the trial— the part that was missing at the trial. The 
most important fact turns out to be a fiction, not even in 
existence at the trial. This fiction is partially embodied 
in the Pope, since he is closer to placing the facts in their 
proper position than HaIf-Rome and Other HaIf-Rome, and is 
able to cut through the legal terminology of the two lawyers. 
But no one at the trial is able to supply the missing evi­
dence of Browning's fancy, the alloy. It is in this sense, 
in keeping with the language of the poem, that Browning is 
referring to his fancy as "fact, too."
Langbaum says that the real issue of the Victorian 
Newsletter disagreement is "over the importance of facts."
He asks, "Where else does a poet feel it necessary to ex­
plain that he is going to mix fancy with fact?"
Clearly Browning established certain novel con­
ditions which did, as a matter of record, open 
his poem to historical judgment. . . .We are more 
impressed by the gold or fact in the ring metaphor 
than by the alloy or fancy. Gold has the advantage 
over alloy (though I do not think that was in 
Browning's mind); besides we expect fancy, it is 
the emphasis on fact which is new and accounts for 
the present controversy.!
This emphasis on fact is important because it is related to
truth. As Langbaum says,
!lbid.
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Browning did not of course think that facts could 
be picked up readymade like pebbles, or that they 
would lead anybody to the truth....Browning tells 
us that the perception of truth is a creative or 
imaginative act, and that fact is merely an index 
to the truth which is always much larger.^
This is what Browning means in Book XII in the line, "So
write a book shall mean beyond the facts." (XII, 886) This
line does not lessen the importance of facts. As Langbaum
points out.
The reason for Browning's excitement over his real 
life subject is this: that without the jumble of 
true and false, good and bad, which are the raw stuff 
of life, there would be no meaning to truth. If 
fact is important as an index to truth, truth itself 
cannot be known except through fact or material con­
ditions.^
This passagfitesuggests the center of the controversy. From 
Browning's point of view, what is the difference between fact 
and truth? Why does he keep referring to the facts of the 
old yellow Book as gsM and absolute truth and then later 
imply that truth can only be perceived after the facts are 
mixed with the alloy? Here again, it seems apparent that 
Browning consistently uses the terms which will be in keep­
ing with the language both of the poem and the old yellow 
Book. Browning's artistic strategy is to make the poem 
resemble the old yellow Book. The way the depositions and 
letters are a&ranged in the old Book surely must have sugges­
ted the division of the poem into points of view. In Book 
I, though there is a careful explanation of the ring meta-
^Ibid., p. 13. ^Ibid.
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phor. Browning emphasizes the4pure crude fact, the ab­
solute truth of the old yellow Book. In Book XII, he 
emphasizes the ring, and gives less emphasis to the facts:
our human speech Is nought 
Our human testimony false, our fame 
And ^uman estimation words and wind, (XII, 834-36)
Art remains the "one way possible/ Of speaking truth" by
telling It "obliquely." Thus a "book shall mean beyond the
facts." The facts are simply the Index to truth.
Browning gains his ring by testing the facts, by 
placing his own vision Into the old yellow Book of dead 
truth and fallible human law. The Pope earlier had done 
something like this because he had found so much In human 
life that makes for doubt. Including the human law which 
presumably orders human experience. He knows that the law 
Is fallible, and also subject to constant abuse. He does 
not repudiate the law; he concludes by working on the side 
of the law. But he recognizes Its limitations.
In a like manner. Browning regards the old yellow 
Book. The facts In the Book are absolute truths, yet, 
paradoxically, they are not Infallible, because they are the 
results of the actions of human beings. Browning regards the 
old yellow Book the way the Pope regards the law case. The 
facts are there. Irreducible, but they must be tested by 
another kind of law which comes from within, as men listen 
to the voice of God.
Let this old woe step on the stage again’
Act Itself o’er anew for men to judge.
Not by the very sense and sight Indeed —
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Which take at best imperfect cognizance.
Since, how heart moves brain, and how both move hand.
What mortal every in entirety saw? (I, 824-29)
Browning thus helps to re-shape the world of the 
Roman murder case. Within the framework of the poem, Capon­
sacchi, Pompilia and the Pope realize the plastic nature of 
reality and perceive In varying degrees that they can help 
shape the very reality in which they live. Outside the frame­
work of the poeny viewed aesthetically, we see that Browning 
has demonstrated an important function of the artist, namely, 
that he helps to create the very reality in which his readers 
live, and that they too can share in this creative process.
However, this creative process can be abused. It 
can distort as well as order reality. When we meet the first 
speaker of The Ring and the Book, we see with what delight 





Half-Rome Is a voluble fellow and has gathered 
around him a group of passers-by--the group problably grows 
steadily as he talks— to whom he imparts his own commonplace 
deductions about the murder. Half-Rome wants his listeners 
to look him in the face and tell him if they actually think 
Guido is guilty. If the authorities "touch one hair of the 
five" then "There's an end of all hope of, justice more."
(II, 1475) He wants to know how such a thing can happen 
here in Rome, which is supposed to be the seat of honor, the 
center of "civility i' the world." If it does happen, he 
mourns, "Astraea's gone indeed, let hope go tool" (11, 1476) 
He sums up his basic argument with the question, "Who is it 
dares impugn the natural law?" (11, 1477) The natural law 
is God's law, in which man has the right to kill adulterous 
wives. Of course. Half-Rome says, the formality of law re­
quires that Guido and his four assistants be tried, but once 
the formality is satisfied, it should end since the issue 
itself is clear enough. Are we to "Deny God's word *the 
faithless wife shall die?'" (11, 1478)
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Law, he suggests, is an imperfect instrument at best —  
a man-made thing— fit to serve when it is needed. But here 
is an issue which is higher than something that man has made. 
What’s the good of law, he asks, in a case like this?
(II, 1519-20) You call in the law when a "neighbor breaks 
your fence," steals from your field, "tampers with rent or 
lease," or when it concerns your "purse or pocket." But 
"wooes your wife?" The law is no good here; the law— man- 
made law— does not really apply. "No: take the old way trod 
when men were menî" (II, 1524) Guido tried the new way—  
the new, sophisticated way of society— and he got "Stuck in 
a quagmire." He went through the courts; he did all the 
things he was supposed to do; he cleared all the obstacles —  
judges, lawyers, paperwork— and he just "floundered worse 
and worse." And all he got for his pains was talk behind his 
back— the butt of jokes and whispers— as the shame of it all 
brought scandal and disgrace on his house and his good name.
But he got back on the right road once more and "Revenged 
his own wrong like a gentleman." (II, 1529) Honor is, after 
all, a private matter. And if a gentleman's honor is called 
into question, nobody else can answer for that honor except 
the gentleman himself.
There is no doubt. Half-Rome admits, that Guido was 
somewhat over-zealous in making amends for his original mis­
take of placing too much faith in the courts, but this was 
simply a matter of a "natural over-energy" on Guido's part.
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Thus the deed "yields three deaths instead of one," This is 
understandable and does not bother Half-Rbme. Incredibly 
enough, he does not fail to point out that there is still 
"one life léfÊw" For where, he asks, looking around, is 
"the Canon's corpse?" The implication here is that since 
Guido did get carried away, he might as well have gone ahead 
and taken care of Caponsacchi while he was about it, and thus 
have wiped the slate clean.
Be frank, he tells his ever-growing audience. All of 
this might be the worse for Guido, but it is "The better for 
you and me and all the world," (II, 1538) It is the better 
for all "husbands of wives, especially in Rome," It is good 
that the whole thing "IS put right" again here in Rome, "the 
old place" where the old values originated and are still in 
force, "Ay," he says, "the rod hangs on its nail behind the 
door," and husbands and gentlemen are required to use that 
rod from time to time if they are to be men. This is a 
point, he adds, that he wants especially to call to the 
notice "Of a certain what's-his-name" who has been "Somewhat 
too civil" in his attentions as he loiters "About a house 
here, where I keep a wife," (II, 1545-46) Then he eyes one 
of the group of listeners and suggests that "You, being his 
cousin, may go tell him so," (II, 154?)
The reader thus learns that behind all Half-Rome's 
assertions lies the psychological identification which Half- 
Rome has made with Guido's plight. Half-Rome,has, in fact.
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created a world of values in which Guido's actions can be 
explained and justified. He uses his creative abilities 
because of his own psychological need to rationalize the 
problems which exist between himself and his wife. Out of 
the rumors about the murder, mixed with what few facts he has, 
he artistically constructs a version of the murder that fits 
more closely with the way he thinks things ought to be—  
that is, as he says, if Riame and all that Rome supposedly 
stands for, is:: still to mean anything. Instead of using 
his artistic ability to get at the truth and to achieve some 
sense of personal fulfillment, as Caponsacchi, Pompilia and 
the Pope do, he uses it to construct an elaborate rationali­
zation for his own failings as a man and as a husband. 
Caponsacchi, the real man in the stbyy, is Half-Rome's villain; 
Guido is the hero who, saddled with tremendously burdensome 
problems, finally throws off the yoke of disloyalty, adultery, 
faithlessness, scandal, disgrace and ruin and washes his name 
and his honor clean in the blood of those who had wronged him. 
His only mistake, says Half-Rome, was in not doing it sooner.
2
Browning has already told us thgt Half-Rome will 
function as the "Gossip in a public place," (I, 865) but the 
latter's opinions become more than just a matter of what half 
of the people of Rome think about the murder. If all people 
have the ability to create for themselves aspects of the 
reality that they live in, then it becomes very important to
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know Just how they go about exercising this ability and for 
what ends.
It is obvious that Half-Rome has no interest in the 
moral issues of the murder.^ The fact that three people were 
brutally stabbed to death (or near death, as in Pompilia’s 
case) seems to have little effect on him; his ethical con­
cepts are not tied up with the right and wrong of murder 
but with historical stereotypes such as "honor," "the 
gentlemanly code," and the like; he speaks of a world in 
which men can be men; he makes a case for this world by 
asserting that it is the "old way"— the suggestion is that 
it received its divine or natural sanction long ago in manfs 
history; that at the base of the real world are these romantic 
concepts which have an ineffable sense of rightness about 
them; that these qualities are at the center of man’s true 
civilization; that society now has become too effeminate, 
too spineless, too weak; that the machinery we have set up-- 
legal, ecclesiastical and otherwise— is of value only when 
the good, old natural laws are not points at issue; that we 
don’t need a lot of legal machinery to help spell out the 
natural laws--these laws are clear enough and we know when 
they are being applied and when they are being mis-applied. 
Society endangers the very values which are at its foundation 
when it becomes too nicely structured,
^See Park Honan, Browning’s Characters,(New Haven:.
Yale University Press, I961), p. 181'.
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For society, when it becomes too civilized, too 
sophisticated, too artificial, only stands in the way of one’s 
acting;on the true principles that one feels in the deepest 
part of himself. Half-Rome does not speak of any specific 
golden age. Since he is of a superficial turn of mind, with 
a shallowness of insight which, of all the principals in 
The Ring and the Book, can only be compared to Guido’s lawyer, 
Arcangeli, his feelings about this world at first seem trite, 
repetitious and commonplace.
He vaguely atteraptsito identify some of the concrete 
entities that go to make up such a world, but the best he 
can do is to mention God's law, a Roms of the old days, a 
time when men were men, a tradition of honor that all true 
gentlemen instantly recognize: these vague stereotypes seem 
at first to be all he is artistically capable of. As he 
speaks to his audience, however, he warms to his task. He 
has a minimum of facts; about the case, but he has heard many 
rumors. Reversing the artistic process which Browning des­
cribes in Book I, Half-Rome regards the facts of the case as 
the alloy that he needs to make the rumors--his own fantasies 
about the case— strong and firm to file. He mixes his own 
fancy with the rumors, rather than with the facts; then he 
uses the few facts he has to give weight to his story. But 
he makes use of the facts in a curious way; he only engages 
them when they help round out the age of real tradition he 
speaks of "when men were men." Thus Guido did indeed, with
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four henchmen, murder Pompilia and her parents. This is a 
fact no one can dispute. Half-Rome does not attempt to 
minimize the lurid aspects of the murder itself. Under the 
terms of the Rome of a "golden age" which he has vaguely 
formulated, he takes pleasure in emphasizing the physical 
details of the murder, because Pietro and Violante can serve 
as an example to others that this is what will happen to them 
if they violate the natural laws. Half-Rome uses the fact 
of the murder with a kind of vindictive self-righteousness 
to drive his point home. He goes to some artistic and 
rhetorical pains in the opening lines of his monologue to 
give graphic details of the condition of the corpses of Pietro 
and Violante. (II, 23-34) He derives enjoyment a little 
later as he describes the kind of knife used in the stab- 
bings. (II, 142-51) His casual, detached, careless attitude 
toward the brutality involved is obviously the result of his 
own insensibilities to the human feelings that are part of 
the case. His artistic abilities are used to circumvent, 
rather than understand or extend, the reality which Pompilia 
and Caponsacchi have strived so hard to sustain and half- 
create. He does not see that in order to restore this old 
world of tradition that he speaks of--this stable order of 
values where men unerringly know what to do when their code 
has been violated, and then go out and do it— he does not 
see that it takes men of courage to do this, and that they 
are the very men who establish the laws he so condemns. He
51
tries to make a case for Guido by maintaining that Guido 
asserted his own natural rights and performed the only way 
he knew how— in the way of a man of honor and a gentleman; 
that Rome is a better place because of Guido's actions.
The values of courage, conviction, sacrifice, love— all those 
values which would necessarily have to accompany Half-Rome's 
world of tradition--values which have traditionally been 
associated with the so-called man of honor— Half-Rome cannot 
make a case for, since he Idiows unconsciously that it is not 
Guido, but Caponsacchi, who has demonstrated these qualities 
in action. Half-Rome is limited by Guido; Guido does not 
leave him much room for extending his world of the man of 
honor. Half-Rome succeeds in creating out of limited materi­
als, but his creation can hardly be regarded as an artistic 
success. Once we, as readers, grant him his materials and 
h^is donnee, we then judge his execution of those materials; 
Half-Rome's execution is not good, because he refuses to 
employ his materials accurately. His story tells us much 
about himself, but it tells us little about the important 
aspects of reality or experience, except in a distorted and 
embarrassing way.
3
Half-Rome speaks without much genuine information 
upon the day after the murder, January 3, I698, while the 
bodies of the Comparini lie on display in the Church of San
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Lorenzo. He Is standing outside the church and represents 
the man of the street arguing about the city's most recent 
cause célébré. The physical details of the setting are 
Interesting and. In retrospect, assume an Importance as we 
discern Half-Romé's artistic Intentions. The situation that 
he creates can be compared mock-herolcally to Antony's 
In Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, when Antony delivers his 
famous polemic while Caesar lies dead on the Forum steps.
Just as Antony distorts the situation when he speaks of 
"honorable men" so too does Half-Rome develop his own Ideas 
about honor, using the situation Itself as a point of de­
parture whereby he can further his own ends. The reader does 
not discover what these ends are until the last lines of 
Half-Rome's monologue when we note that here Is a painfully 
self-conscious and sometimes vulgar member of the lower 
middle-class whose wife Is suspected of having an affair with 
a "certain what's-his-name" and that the latter might get 
the same treatment the Comparini received If he does not 
stay away from their house. It Is also here that we under­
stand why Half-Rome suggests that Guido left one stone un­
turned when he did not murder Caponsacchi at the same time 
that he murdered Pompilia and her parents. For Half-Rome's 
purposes, his wife's supposed lover and Caponsacchi have 
treaded the same dangerous waters and thus ought to receive 
the same punishment. Banishment Is not punishment enough for 
Caponsacchi, nor would It be enough for the "jackanapes" who
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has been courting his wife.
The combination stage melodrama, painting, and epic 
poem that Half-Rome clumsily attempts to create carries its 
own artistic downfall. It is a cumbersome vehicle at best. 
Although it might satisfy Half-Rome's immediate psychological 
need of compensating for his own failures as a man and a 
husband, it cannot give him more lasting satisfactions since 
it distorts the very experiences of the murder which he has 
taken pains to insist are the true ones. As a result, it 
does not extend his understanding of the nature of reality 
and, on psychological grounds (grounds that interested 
Browning to the extent that no other grounds did) this can 
only blunt his own chances for any sort of personal ful­
fillment. He seeks fulfillment instead, in fantasy and old 
myths about gentlemanly codes and a Rome of the past.
Half-Rome's stereotyped world of honor is based on 
a false assumption. He assumes, with only scraps of evidence, 
that Pompilia and Caponsacchi are guilty. On this false 
foundation he creates his world. He is not interested in 
considering the possibility of Pompilia's innocence, because 
once he does his creation dissolves; Guido becomes the villain 
and noblesse oblige is dead. The possibility of guilt seems 
beside the point to him. He obviously wants to believe certain 
things about human beings; he does not seem to respect people 
as individuals; it was only there, back in the old days, that 
men of honor could command respect; nowadays the world is full
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of faithless wives and cowards and villains like Caponsacchi, 
The world he wants is one similar to the divine right of 
kings. The real heroics which Caponsacchi demonstrates that 
strong men are capable of he cannot recognize. He wants to 
believe that Pompilia is really a whore. Just like his wife 
and like all women. He even suggests that Pompilia obtained 
her release from the convent in which she was placed after 
the first trial because of the intervention of new lovers 
whom she had in the meantime acquired. (II, 1332-33)
The further Half-Rome carries the arguments which 
are based on his false assumption, the more exaggerated his 
conclusions become. He carries them all to their logical, 
but insane, extreme. Thus, if Pompilia is promiscuous and 
sexually abandoned, then why stop at one lover? Thus, if 
Guido has the right, because of the natural law that says he 
defend his honor, to murder Pompilia, then why not Pietro 
and Violante at the same time? And why is not Caponsacchi's 
body lying alongside their corpses right at this moment?
And why was not Pompilia strangled when she was a baby so 
that all this disgraceful business could have been avoided?
(II, 235) And while we are thinking about it, strangle 
Violante too, so she cannot cause any more mischief by finding 
yet another helpless waif from some dying prostitute. (II, 246) 
Half-Rome’s absurdities become vicious and cruel and 
even insane as his artistry gathers momentum and he begins 
to realize all the possibilities involved in the irrational.
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fantastic world of honoris causa.
4
The Church of San Lorenzo, where the bodies lie, has 
been turned into a theatre (II, 51), Half-Rome says. People 
have been filing in and out all day. Some have "climbed up 
the columns," others have crammed into the organ-loft; women 
have fainted, fights have broken out; not only, he says, is 
all Rome "at the show" but it is a show where the people 
have been well paid for their pains. (II, 98) Many already 
had some acquaintance with the affair because of the trial 
the previous May, in which the whole scandal was laid bare 
and Guido revealed as a cuckold. Some are not in much sym­
pathy with Guido, explains Half-Rome, because "The Count had 
lounged somewhat too long in Rome,/ Made himself cheap."
And besides. Half-Rome shrewdly adds, the Count is still 
alive. For the purposes of the drama that Half-Rome says 
the public is busily creating, the story would be much better 
had Guido "considerately died." (II, 117)
Half-Rome is here confusing life and art--a major 
failing of his which is more apparent in the early stages 
of his monologue than it is toward the end where reality 
slowly obtrudes itself back upon his consciousness. The 
reality of the murder does not affect him; but the artistic 
possibilities interest him a great deal, and for the purposes 
of making his play more successful artistically, it would 
have been much better had Guido also been killed in the
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melee of stabbings. Since this did not happen. Half-Rome will 
have to make do with the materials that are available to him. 
During it all, however, he has no desire to see the principals 
in the play as real human beings. They are figures whom 
he can manipulate and move on and off the stage as he so 
chooses.
One of the old men who had been to view the bodies 
earlier in the day had told Half-Rome that he had seen many 
bodies on display at the church, but, he says, "all was poor 
to this I live and see,/ Here the world's wickedness seals 
up the sum," (II, 124-25) And then he adds ominously, 
"Antichrist's surely come and doomsday near." (II, 127) This 
grim prophecy by one of the neighborhood sages, whom Half- 
Rome sets up as someone who can speak with authority, fits 
well with Half-Rome's artistic maneuverings when he speaks 
yearningly at the end of his speech for a re-establishment 
of the old values before the "new" society renders us all 
helpless to cope with people like the Comparini,
Half-Rome's "epic" play includes some Biblical trap­
pings as he identifies the heroes and villains of the piece. 
Caponsacchi is the "Lucifer/ I' the garden where Pompilia,
Eve-like, lured/ Her Adam Guido to his fault and fall."
(II, 167-70) With such over-simplification and easy general­
izations— necessary to the artist's proper functioning— Half- 
Rome can effortlessly maintain that the "case could not well 
be simpler." (II, I83) We have got the main facts, he states
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blandly, and It is possible to "follow the murder's maze 
from source to sea." (II, 184)
Half-Rome even argues, and rightly so, for the In­
evitability of the affair happening exactly the way It did 
happen. He has the artist's "feel" and the artistic per­
ception needed to see that once on Its track, nothing could 
have prevented the circumstances from falling together the 
way they did, and leading relentlessly to their tragic con­
clusion. "One sees Indeed," he says, "Not only how all was 
and must have been,/ But cannot other than be to the end of 
time." (II, 186-87)
All these preliminaries merely serve as Half-Rome's 
prologue. Now that he has set the stage he Is ready to 
launch Into the first act. "Do you hold/ Guido was so pro­
digiously to blame?" (II, I88-89) he asks Insinuatingly. 
"Here's a friend shall set you right,/ Let him but have the 
handsel of your ear." (II, I9I-92)
5
The way Half-Rome tells It, the Comparini were once 
a gay couple of the "modest middle class," who lived the 
"accustomed life" In Rome. They had a good reputation and, 
being without children, they had an easy time of It. They 
were more than just well off since Pietro owned two houses 
and some land. The smaller house, where they lived Infre­
quently, was In the Pauline district on the outskirts of the
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city, and It was such privacy and seclusion, suggests Half- 
Rome, that would perhaps invite one's enemy to think of 
murder.
Their life was complicated, however, by the fact that 
Pietro's possessions were in "usufruct," a legal term meaning 
that if he did not produce an heir, his possessions would 
pass into the hands of strangers. Pietro never stopped 
hoping for an heir— a story, says Half-Rome, "always old and 
always new." (II, 214) And with what "trick," what "sleight 
of hand," Violante used to produce the child, "spite of her 
unpromising age," Pietro never discovered until too late.
At that time it would have been "in the old fool's interest" 
had someone stepped in and strangled the baby and "throttled" 
Violante too, and saved "the old murdered fool" much anguish.
Then, when Pompilia was twelve, and with the Comparini's 
estate mysteriously dwindling. Violante decided to compound 
the original lie, to use a new trick "should reinforce the 
old." (II, 251) Half-Rome maintains that the Comparini's 
poverty was serious, and since Pietro was past sixty and too 
old to work, it was up to the wily Violante to cast about 
for some way to catch an even bigger fish. Thus, with his 
analogies working overtime. Half-Rome says the angler 
Violante, "with an angler's mercy for the bait," put the 
minnow Pompilia wriggling on the end of her hook and tossed 
her line into mid-stream. And then, with more accuracy than 
is characteristic of him. Half-Rome says that this twelve-year-
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old girl, who was already grown, with "great eyes" and a 
"bounty of black hair/ And first crisp youth that tempts a 
Jaded taste," was dangled In "the way of a certain man, who 
snapped." (II, 272-77)
6
His name was Count Guido Pranceschlnl, an Aretlne 
by birth, the head of "an old noble house," a house which 
was not, at that time, "over-rich," but then "you can’t have 
everything." The point Is, Half-Rome Insists, Guido had the 
Innate nobility; he was such a man "as riches rub against" 
and "Readily stick to." He has the natural right to the 
riches because It Is something that Is "Born In the blood."
(II, 278-83)
Guido, "As such folks do," had come down to Rome as 
a young man to better his fortune. However, he was not 
successful. He served a cardinal, hoping that the latter 
would get him some lucrative preferment; but none ever came 
and Guido spent thirty years In Rome waiting for the doors 
to open to him. At the age of forty-six he decided to give 
It all up and make the best of his palace In Arezzo, where 
his widowed mother and his younger brother Girolamo lived In 
poverty.
It was In such a mood of "disappointed worth" that 
Guido, Just prior to his planned departure, was seized upon 
by Violante. "Where was I," Half-Rome says, stopping for a
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moment, "with that angler-simile?" (ll, 322) Violante 
"threw her bait, Pompilia," and Guido took the hook because 
in this way he at least salvaged something from his wasted 
years in Rome. Besides, the new bride would be "light in 
the dark house, lend a look of youth" to the mother's face, 
now "famished with the emptiness of hope." (II, 331-33)
"Such were the pinks and greys about the bait/ Persuaded 
Guido gulp down hook and all." (II, 341-43) Besides, Half- 
Rome insists, as he continues to interpret the action for 
his audience, the machinations of Violante brought about the 
marriage so fast and in such secrecy that Guido hardly knew 
what was happening and had no time even to protest. More­
over, Half-Rome erroneously concludes. Violante had to do this 
before Pietro found out what her intentions were. Pietro 
did not even know about the marriage, and Guido was given 
"no time for thinking twice"; the end result was that 
"Guido's broad back was saddled to bear all." (II, 390-91)
As part of the marriage agreement, Pietro signed over his 
lands and possessions to Guido in return for a permanent 
membership in the Franceschini household for himself and 
Violante. He also agreed to pay over a dowry for Pompilia.
It is obvious. Half-Rome points out with a certain 
degree of accuracy, that Pietro and Violante were social 
climbers and it was their own fault if they expected more 
of the Arezzo household than they found. They already had 
a preconceived notion of the luxuriousness of aristocratic
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living and they were going to exploit their desires to their 
fullest once they were established in Arezzo. Guido hoped 
that times would better themselves if he carefully managed 
the household budget. But things went from bad to worse, 
Pietro and Violante were shocked at conditions in Arezzo, 
hated the widow Donna Beatrice and the greedy younger brother, 
the priest Girolamo,
For three months life was unbearable for all concerned. 
It was "Dog-snap and cat-claw, curse and counterblast,"
(II, 505) Pietro began going down to the center of town, 
complaining loudly to his barroom cronies, "trumpeting huge 
wrongs/ At church and market-place," (II, 507-08) Violante 
did the same with her own friends, "In whatsoever pair of 
ears would perk," Naturally, Half-Rome rightly concludes, 
the common people of Arezzo loved this story of an impover­
ished nobleman's domestic problems laid bare at the same 
time that he was trying to keep up appearances. In the mean­
time, after three months. Violante and Pietro returned to 
Rome in anger and bitterness.
While at first glance it might seem that Guido was 
better off with the Comparini's departure. Violante was still 
able to do him harm. Once back in Rome, she took advantage 
of the Pope's Jubilee to confess something that had been on 
her conscience for twelve years. Half-Rome says this laugh­
ingly and then asks: Why now would she confess the truth about 
Pompilia's illegitimacy except for the obvious fact that once
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it was proved that Pompilia was not the legitimate heir of 
the Comparini, then the agreement to transfer lands and 
possessions to Guido would be void.
Guido protested vigorously to this confession, not. 
Half-Rome says, because he would lose his recently acquired 
wealth, but because he did not want it even suggested that 
the wife he loved and respected was of a low and common-- 
even bestial— heritage. Furthermore, Guido, in spite of 
the disgrace which had by now been made public, did not 
attempt to take his revenge out on Pompilia. No, Half-Rome 
says, "birth and breeding, and compassion too/ Saved her such 
scandal." (II, 639-^0) In fact, Pompilia championed Guido's 
cause at first, wrote a letter to Guido's brother in Rome, 
the Abate Paolo, in which she said that her previous com­
plaints were all part of her parents' promptings, that they 
had devised a plan whereby she was to come to Rome later, 
after she had found some handsome and daredevil companion 
to assist her. She was, she says, supposed to poison Guido, 
steal all his valuables, set fire to the house, and leave.
7
Now, Half-Rome knowingly asks, how can you deny such 
facts? "God knows I'll not prejudge the case," (ll, 680) 
he says blandly, but these things are "Fact," and "not a 
dream of the devil. Sir!" Moreover, it is "a fact none dare 
dispute." We have the proof, "Word for word, such a letter
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did she write." (II, 720-21) Half-Rome does not bother to 
speculate about the possibility that the letter might be a 
forgery. The letter is a fact because she wrote it, and 
the Abate Paolo published it as part of a public proclamation 
in Rome, and everybody knew about it. (11, 722-25)
And what did the courts do? he asks. They did what 
they always do--they gave a compromise decision. They allowed 
Guido the dowry but denied him Pietro’s possessions. "Thus 
was justice ever ridiculed" in this city where "double ver­
dicts" are in such favor, where both parties go home un­
happy.
In the midst of appeals and counterappeals Pompilia 
began to grow restless and bored. Who turns up in a trice, 
says Half-Rome sarcastically, but that man with the halo 
around his head, a fop with curls around his tonsure, the 
"all-consoling Caponsacchi"; and what else should a consoler 
be but a priest, even though he is tall, well-built and 
handsome? Too, he is a priest "Nowise exorbitantly over­
worked" and in fact a "courtly Christian" sending his 
"god-glance" out "while the snake/ Pompilia writhed trans­
fixed through all her spires." (11, 79^-95)
Though Caponsacchi was not an acquaintance at Guido’s 
house, he was in "prime request/ With the magnates of Arezzo." 
He met her in a rather curious way; Half-Rome describes 
it as a time when he was on some "weighty business" while 
he found his steps/ Incline to a certain haunt of doubtful
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fame," which happened to be close to Guido's palace, and 
dangerously near Pompilia's window.
Guido, the responsible head of a falling house, 
ever busy trying to save the estate, his mind and attention 
weighed down by care, suddenly realized that something was 
wrong. "Friends, there's falseness here," he cried, but his 
friends at first made light of his suspicions and accused 
him of an early senility.
When the escape finally came, after weeks of Pom­
pilia 's embarrassing behavior concerning her trips to the 
Bishop and the governor to complain about her marriage,
Guido shook off his cares and pursuing the lovers, he rode 
them down. And, Half-Rome says, one of the reasons he caught 
up with them at Castelnuovo was because they had taken time 
out to spend the night together In the Inn and give satis­
faction to their desires.
Guido, Half-Rome points out, does not kill them 
here In the middle of this drama. No, being the gentleman 
that he Is, he Is only ashamed for them. It Is no honor 
for him to avenge the wrong that has been done to him. 
Instead, he has them placed In jail In Rome and desires to 
prove himself In the courts of Roman justice. And as the 
case goes on and becomes more tangled, all the Court can 
say Is "'Let each side own Its fault and make amendsl'"
(llj 1172) One Is banished Into exile at Clvlta, to pro­
tect him from his own waywardness; the other Is placed In
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a convent where she will get the love and warmth she craves. 
And the husband? Well, says the Court, if his tale proves 
true, then he is rid of "two domestic plagues" and we lift 
a "double load" from his breast, (II, 1204-08)
8
Half-Rome mixes fact and fancy with a freedom that 
Browning never claimed for the artist in the first book of 
the poem. He assumes what must have happened when Guido 
returned to Arezzo, as good as beaten in his usufruct case. 
Guido found "no heaven/ I ' the house when he returned there." 
His welcome by the people was an upside-down affair as he was 
greeted "In a chorus of inquiry." No sooner was he back than 
he was met with "’What, back--you?/ And no wife?" (II, 1239-40) 
Well, they understood, but beneath their questions were the 
innuendoes about that "madcap Caponsacchi" who was "fired up," 
and showed "fight and skill of fence?/ Ay, you drew also, 
but you did not fight I" Of course, it was wiser not to fight. 
They nod their heads, but they do not believe it. And did 
not "’the little lady menace you’" when she drew your own 
"’harmless sword’" and pointed it at your chest? "'The 
spitfire’’" Well, at least you got home safe and sound, and 
at least you have kept the "’sixth commandment whether or no/ 
The lady broke the seventh.’" And then Half-Rome’s imaginary 
speaker at Arezzo adds, " ’I only wish/ I were as saint-like, 
contain me so.’" But, the speaker continues, "’ I am a sinner, 
I fear I should have left/ Sir Priest no nosetip to turn up
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at me !'" (II, 1252-59)
Now how could anyone take this kind of baiting?
Half-Rome asks. It was enough "to make a wise man mad."
Then Half-Rome, implying it all along, subtly turns his 
play into a courtroom drama as he tells his listeners, "Oh, 
but I ’ll have your verdict at the end I" (11, 1263)
Well, Half-Rome continues, this was "not enough it 
seems," The Comparini kept pouring salt on the wounds,
"drop by drop," Guido, arguing on the grounds that since 
his wife was sent to the convent as punishment, what else 
could the punishment be for but adultery? Thus he sued 
for divorce on these grounds in the Roman courts, Pompilia 
promptly filed a countersuit, making outrageous charges, 
"hints of worse than hate," stories of how Guido's brother 
Girolamo had attempted to seduce her with Guido in full 
consent and with the mother's prompting. This, now, was a 
"bolt" in Guido’s breast. But he "bore up, giddily perhaps," 
dizzy from this rain of treachery, and he rallied with his 
brother in Rome— the Abate Paolo— and "joined battle in the 
public courts," Then more deceit, as Pompilia was released 
from the convent after only three short weeks, to go live 
again with her parents, the very people who had renounced 
her. And they renounced her Just so they could rob Guido, 
This time they took her to their hiding-place— their second 
and smaller house in the Pauline district— away from the 
heart of Rome, thus making it easier for Caponsacchi to
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steal down from Clvlta to see her.
And then the final blow, "Hell’s quintessence," 
the last drop poured on the wound: Pompilia gave birth to 
Guido’s son and heir, "Or Guido’s heir and Caponsacchi’s 
son." (II, 1384)
Half-Rome stands dramatically before his audience, 
letting his rhetorical pause sink In. Then he says to them, 
"I want your word now: what do you say to this?" What did 
great Rome and little Arezzo say, and what did God say and 
the devil say as they poured things Into Guido's ear? Why,
It was too much for Guido as It would be too much for any­
body. "Why, the overburdened mind/ Broke down, what was a 
brain became a blaze," (II, 1390) In the fury of the 
moment. Count Guido gathered "four hard hands and stout 
hearts" from his fields and went Immediately to the Com­
parini villa In Rome. Once there, Guido decided to give 
Pompilia one last chance. He planned to call out a name and 
If Pompilia did not answer, he would know that she was 
Innocent. "’Who Is It knocks?' cried one." And with the 
answer went Pompilia's last hope. "’Gulseppe CaponsacchiI' 
Guido cried;/ And open flew the door." (II, 1431-32)
And that was enough. "Vengeance, you know," says 
Half-Rome, "burst, like a mountaIn-wave" throughout the house, 
"And wiped Its filthy four walls free again/ With a wash 
of hell-flre." (II, 1433-36) Guido "killed them all, 
bathed his name clean In their blood." (II, 1437)
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Thus it was, says Half-Rome, and it all happened 
just yesterday.
9
So here they lie. Half-Rome says, apparently ges­
turing to the bodies of Pietro and Violante, "hacked to 
pieces." One expert said he had never seen "so thorough 
study of stabbing." And Pompilia, "very difficult to slay," 
continues to writhe "viper-like" at a hospital near by. 
Caponsacchi will be called back to testify. After all, he 
is the "hero of the adventure," Half-Rome says sarcastically, 
(II, 1452) And Guido? What of his fate? He is no doubt a
(•
"most unromantic spouse." But the people in both Rome and 
Arezzo who had formerly snickered about the scandal are no 
longer laughing now. Guido "gave the broad farce an all 
too brutal air." (II, l46l)
Half-Rome suggests to his listeners that it was up 
to Guido to tell the others when playtime was over. Guido 
is a man of honor, not some mindless, cuckolded buffoon.
His primary mistake was when he did not kill them when he 
first caught up with them during their flight from Arezzo. 
That was the time, when he had them in flagrante delicto.
The natural law implies that you kill them when you catch 
them. He could have used the incriminating letters that he 
found as further Justification for his killing. If he had 
done this. Half-Rome insists, the world would have "praised 
the man. But no!/ That were too plain, too straight, too
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simply Just I" (II, 1503-04) Guido was a gentleman and he 
wanted to carry it out the right way.
And what was Law's reaction? Why they told him that 
if he could not have taken it seriously enough to have done 
something about it at the time, how can he expect them to 
take action later? Law is "alien to the actor whose warm 
blood/ Asks heat from law whose veins run lukewarm milk,"
(II, 1515-15)
And thus the curtain closes on Half-Rome's incredible 
drama— a drama in which little is seen clearly, in which 
absurd premises are carried to logical but insane con­
clusions; it is a drama in which none of the real issues 
are laid bare, none of the deepest feelings are recognized. 
Guido is an innocent Adam, hard at work in his Eden-like 
gardens at Arezzo, "among his vines, it seems," (ll, 1392) 
and Pompilia is the Eve who lures him, and he is led un­
suspectingly Inttcthe morass of treachery and deceit, as 
Pompilia wriggles serpent-like in front of him, Caponsacchi 
is the Lucifer arch-villain, who uses the cloak of the 
Church to conceal his evil nature. The only regret is that 
Guido did not kill him too,
Rome is a better place for it. Half-Rome insists, 
Guido has reminded all of us, particularly if we are hus­
bands, that we have obligations if we are to be men and if 
we believe in honor. But, though HSlf-Rome reminds the 
cousin of his wife's supposed lover that something Similar
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to the fate of the Comparini family might happen to that 
"certain what’s-his-name," the reader suspects that while 
Half-Rome is standing by the church talking with such blus­
ter, his wife has not failed to take advantage of her hus­
band’s lengthy absence from home.
CHAPTER V 
THE OTHER WORLD OP OTHER HALF-ROME
1
The Other Half-Rome is a straightforward character 
whose mind tends to run along conventional channels. His 
personality has long been categorized--a melancholy, lonely 
bachelor who romanticizes the murder case and the principals 
in it into a different kind of world than the normative one 
which Browning will so carefully establish in the poem.
Since exaggerated truths are perhaps not so far 
femoved from reality as exaggerated lies. Other Half-Rome's 
version of the murder is more accurate than Half-Rome’s, but 
the former’s monologue has fewer psychological ramifications. 
For one thing, it is not necessary for Other Half-Rome to 
rationalize his own inadequacies. Although a vague sense 
of a fin de siecle weakness is diffused throughout the 
monologue, there is very little personal reference and 
indeed, there need not be, since it is not necessary for 
DtBier Half-Rome to talk personally about himself; he is not 
interested primarily in the pedestrian world in which he 
spends his practical life. He is more taken up with the 
constructs of the world of the "romance-books » perhaps
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because of this. Other Half-Rome's monologue does not contain 
the deadly logic of Half-Rome's; it also suggests that Other 
Half-Rome is lacking in a personal sense of identity. Un­
able to assert himself as an individual in the real world, 
he uses his imaginative abilities to people a world where 
individuality is possible.
The reader is inclined to grant Other Half-Rome some 
of his premises, and as we follow him in his version of the 
case, it is no accident that he is not able to carry his 
arguments to sensible conclusions. Just as Half-Rome's 
original premise is false, yet all his conclusions are wildly 
logical, so Other Half-Rome's premises are true, but his 
responses to them are exaggerated in order for him to sketch 
out a picture of the romantic world of grand dame, melo­
dramatic heroics, and other-worldly love, that so fascinates 
him and to which he devotes most of his creative energies. 
Since his world centers around a basic ideal. Other Half- 
Rome, instead of approaching the facts with logic, inevitably 
has to rely on absolutes to talk persuasively for his version 
of the case. As a result, there is little development in 
the picture he gives us; it is the same exotic world at 
the end as it was at the beginning; he rounds it out for 
us, we learn more and more about it, but it is essentially 
a finished product when the monologue:begins.
To be sure, the murder case has all the ingredients 
and flavor one would need to create— in writing or painting —
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an exciting, mysterious romance. It is all here; the 
illegitimacy, the plotting, the secret marriage, the mys­
tery of a nobleman who is protecting a rotting castle, 
the dark-eyed, black-haired heroine, the handsome, reckless, 
courageous hero, the greedy parents, the perverted brother, 
the inheritance of property and possessions, the imprison­
ment in her own house of the wife, the flight of the lovers, 
the court case, full of recriminations from both sides, 
the convent, the birth of the baby, and finally a triple 
murder— with the murderers caught soaked in blood--on the 
day after New Year’s. Here is material for the meanest of 
artists— plots and counterplots--action and passion of the 
wildest and most adventurous kind. Here is where life’s 
meaning is, in this world of courage and treachery, intrigue 
and mystery, love and hate. This is where things are 
happening, where one can see his heroes and heroines plainly 
as they reach for that heaven seemingly beyong their grasp—  
reach for it and get it.
Other Half-Rome calls this the world of the "common 
light and air and life of man" (XII, 1694) at the end of 
his monologue, but it is difficult here to reconcile his 
exotic fantasy world with this "common light" of the real 
world as the plot comes slowly down to earth again and the 
murder takes on a more commonplace aspect.
2
Other Half-Rome begins his monologue with some
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Introductory comments which indicate that his intention is 
to idealize Pompilia. He then touches on the problem that 
Pietro and Violante had faced seventeen years earlier when 
they had no heir. He describes the first twelve years of 
Pompilia’s life as being happy ones, even though they were 
based on a lie. Then he passes on to his version of how 
Guido’s brother, the Abate Paolo, came to call on Violante 
and begin the negotiations for the marriage. Violante was 
excited by the possibility of her daughter's marrying into 
the nobility. Pietro inquired among his friends about Guido's 
reputation and discovered that Guido was a tattered, im­
poverished, and sycophantic nobleman and his friends could 
only laugh when they heard Pietro's news. Upon learning 
this, Pietro could not tolerate the idea of the marriage, 
and he thought Violante agreed with him. But Violante 
arranged a secret marriage and told Pietro about it later 
and succeeded in appeasing him after he got over his first 
anger.
Other Half-Rome then discusses the terms of the 
dowry, and the transfer of Pietro's holdings. Prom there 
he moves to the Comparini's four-month stay at Arezzo,
Violante's confession during the Pope's jubilee, the suit 
filed in Rome by the Comparini, in which the Comparini 
claimed legal right to the possessions (which they had 
previously signed over to Guido) since they now admitted 
that Pompilia was not their legitimate heir. Then Other
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Half-Rome describes Guido’s countersuit and the Court's 
compromise decision. The Court had ruled that Pompilia was 
indeed illegitimate, yet ruled that Guido keep the dowry 
but give Pietro back his possessions. Both sides immediately 
appealed. Pietro argued that if the Court ruled that Pom­
pilia was not his child, then he ought to get the dowry back. 
Guido maintained that if he had a right to the dowry, he 
had a right to all. The Court ordered a reinvestigation 
of the whole case and there, adds Other Half-Rome, the 
matter stood right up to this day.
The entire business filled Guido with much hatred 
and the one person around upon whom he could expend his 
hate was Pompilia. He hoped that, if he goaded her enough, 
she would break out in full rebellion. Guido forged a letter 
supposed to be written by Pompilia in which she admitted 
that her parents urged her to plot against the Franceschini 
and escape. This letter was sent to Paolo, who publicized it 
widely in the hopes that the Courts would reverse their 
decision.
Pompilia was almost a prisoner in her own house.
Other Half-Rome says. On two occasions she managed to get 
away long enough to appeal to the Governor and the Archbishop, 
but they were old friends of the Count’s family. She then 
tried a simple friar who, after some deliberation, decided 
against helping her because he feared the punishment Guido 
might mete out to him. Then she went to Guido’s Jolly cousin.
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Canon Conti, who suggested that she appeal to his brother- 
priest, Guiseppe Caponsacchi, and it was he who ultimately 
helped her escape.
It was a daring flight. Other Half-Rome says, and 
it was only because of Pompilia’s complete exhaustion that 
the two of them ever stopped at Castelnuovo, only four hours 
from Rome. There the murderous Guido overtook them and 
there Pompilia summoned strength to strike back at Guido 
with his own sword; after the Courts made their decision 
and banished Caponsacchi to Civita and placed Pompilia in 
a convent, it was Guido who could not rest. He heard from 
his brother Paolo that Pompilia had given birth to Guido's 
son and heir. At that time Paolo told Guido that he would 
conveniently be out of town so that Guido could do what he 
had to do. Guido got four of his henchmen and went to 
Rome where they remained in hiding at a villa of his brother 
for a few days until they knew the daily routine of the 
Comparini family. Then, on January 2nd, they murdered them 
all.
The Other Half-Rome ends his monologue with some 
comments on law and Guido. It is hardly necessary, he 
states, to "ask what Count Guido says," (III, 1642) since 
he has to say something. The fact that Guido admits the 
deed means nothing, since he could hardly have admitted 
anything else. And for Guido to claim that his crime was 
"just and inevitable," because it was more important to him
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to save his honor Instead of his life, becomes absurd when 
we realize that the three people who were murdered were not 
guilty of anything.
No, Other Half-Rome argues, Guido brought it on 
himself. It was his own deceit and trickery that got him 
into the trouble and now he is attempting to put on the 
face of a man of honor and is trying to exercise a "hus­
band’s rights." (Ill, 1649)
3
Cook has pointed out some minor discrepancies 
concerning the exact day on which Other Half-Rome speaks, 
but the most consistent date seems to be January 5th, three 
days after the murder.^ He is speaking in the Barberini 
Plaza in the heart of Rome. Browning, in his summaries 
of Books Two and Three, compares the two speakers’ attitudes 
towards the murder case. (I, 847-58, 883-92)^ Both the 
speakers, says Browning, are honest enough, in a sense, but 
both are led astray "by a prepossession," a fit of fancy—  
the implication is that their artistic abilities are turned 
inwardly upon themselves--and that this tends to neutralize 
their honesty and brings "unsuccess" to their attempts at 
getting at the truth. Browning goes on to suggest that
lA. K. Cook, A Commentary Upon Browning’s "The Ring 
and the Book" (Bond on: Oxford University PressJ 1920j, p. 53. 
Hereafter cited as Commentary.
^Cited in Cook, p. 53, f.n.l.
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while it might he correct to say that the second speaker is 
closer to the truth than the first, this was a matter of luck 
on his part, rather than skill. What Browning means here, 
of course, is that Other Half-Rome happens to be on the right 
side. He is simply lucky because his distorted view of 
reality— in which the world is regarded on one level as a 
romantic possibility and on another as a commonplace fact 
with no bridge between the two--happens to coincide with 
the truths of the murder as the reader comes to know them 
through Caponsacchi, Pompilia, and the Pope.
A proposition discussed at length later on in this 
thesis, and one upon which most recent Ring criticism tends 
to agree, is that the "truths" of the murder case are 
intellectually presented— quite plainly and with no attempt 
at beguiling us--by Browning in the first book of the poem.
Then these truths are emotionally discovered by us only after 
we have been exposed to the "facts" of the murder. That is, 
we are required to experience them just as the principals 
did; thus the truths that we already know intellectually-- 
we have no reason to distrust Browning— we resolve emotionally. 
But we are only able to do this after submitting ourselves 
to the empirical situation, just as Browning himself did.
Only in this way can we offer our own insights toward the 
murder and only in this way can we extend and even help to 
create reality for ourselves.
Other Half-Rome, unfortunately, does not do this. It
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is not that Other Half-Rome does not see clearly the situation 
and weigh the facts carefully; indeed, he does. However, 
unlike Pompilia and Caponsacchi, Other Half-Rome refines 
his insights to a point where they cannot be assimilated 
into his own everyday world. He is not able to accommodate 
them except in his world of romance. Thus, he cannot say, 
as Pompilia does, that he has helped to create his own 
values and that he has helped to formulate and realize his 
own goals. He cannot say, as Caponsacchi does to the judges, 
that it is not for the sake of the principals in the murder 
that he is arguing his version of the case, but for the sake 
of his listeners. Caponsacchi is not appearing before the 
judges in his own behalf or in Pompilia’s. They are both out 
of it, he says. His function as amicus curiae is more than 
just a practical one, and Caponsacchi is aware of the sym­
bolic significance of the term. Caponsacchi wants to show 
the judges the "truth," not for his own sake, or Pompilia*s 
sake, but for the sake of the judges themselves.
Caponsacchi is thus aware of his own ability to 
re-order the objects of his reality; Other Half-Rome is not.
The latter has the ability— or at least the capability--and 
Browning would insist that all people do. The language that 
we use, and its metaphorical basis, is evidence enough 
that this capability exists, regardless of what one might 
wish to call it. Browning believes it is of great significance 
but that it can be distorted and misused.
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Other Half-Rome cannot "see" reality, so dazzled is he 
by his own extravagant fictions. He cannot "see" the ring 
Browning asks us to see in the first line of the poem. He 
must take all the principals in the story and set them out­
side reality. Only then can he participate creatively in 
their experience. Unlike Caponsacchi and Pompilia, Other 
Half-Rome cannot ground his romance in the empirical data 
which confront him.
In contrast, Caponsacchi argues powerfully and 
eloquently for action. One can do nothing, he tells the 
judges, unless one acts. One cannot extend his reality 
unless he participates in it. Other Half-Rome does not 
do this. Thus, as Browning suggests, his honesty is neu­
tralized by his own vision, and he gets by on luck rather 
than skill, as romantics--perennial optimists— always seem to 
do.
4
Various passages in Park Honan’s book. Browning’s 
Characters, deal successfully with Other Half-Rome’s attitudes. 
However, Honan tries to make a case for Other Half-Rome’s 
personal identity. Since the thesis of his book is that the 
imagery, diction and sound in Browning’s dramatic monologues 
tend to reveal the personality of the speaker, it is natural 
that Honan would try to make a case for Other Half-Rome’s 
individuality. But there is little evidence to support this;
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the evidence generally points to Other Half-Rome's lack of 
individuality. H^s own personality is not felt as strongly 
as that of Half-Rome's. How could it be, since he has 
placed the drama in a different context altogether, where 
his own personality would only be obtrusive?
But Honan has gathered strong evidence to point up 
some of Other Half-Rome's attitudes and show that they are 
at the base of his other world. Honan notes that in the 
animal imagery Other Half-Rome uses, he sees things in 
black and white. Pompilia is seen approvingly as a "snow- 
white chick" (III, 65), a lamb, a bird, a dove. Guido,
in contrast, is "a lion, fox, worm, ferret, uncaged beast,
1
wolf-in-sheepskin, scorpion, wildcat, dog, and hawk."
These images indicate simple divisions of black and white 
for Other Half-Rome. Pompilia, Caponsacchi, and Guido 
"are seen indistinctly through an emotional curtain that 
simplifies all matters." Other Half-Rome is thus a man 
"who is at the mercy of his own prejudices, who lacks 
objectivity and discernment." The fact that he discovers 
Guido's guilt and Pompilia's innocence is accidental.^
Honan notes that Other Half-Rome "uses six colors 
extensively, black, white, red, blue, purple, and silver." 
The first three are the colors used most often and they are 
"almost invariable associated with Guido, Pompilia, and
^Honan, p. 182. ^Ibid.
82
Caponsacchi respectively,"^ Such a simple association seems 
to point to the fact that Other Half-Rome views experience 
much too simply to be able to understand it. On the other 
hand. Other Half-Rome is obviously a more refined speaker 
than Half-Rome, Although he creates his own fantasy world. 
Other Half-Rome tends to be reflective. Even though he has 
what Honan calls a "sentimental preoccupation" with the 
facts, he nevertheless talks about these facts "with a 
certain delicacy that his counterpart does not manifest or 
possess," His imagery, though simple, is artistic. While 
he sees Guido as the villain in a sentimental melodrama, 
he "echoes the wolf-imagery of Book I. , .and for the wrong 
reasons, sometimes expresses Browning's opinion of Guido's 
character,"^
But Other Half-Rome does not seem as dynamic as Half- 
Rome, His simple use of colors, besides indicating his 
attitudes toward the three principals, also indicates his 
essentially colorless personality. His own life is hardly 
worth talking about. His make-believe world is what interests 
him; it is his reality, the result of his artistic abilities. 
It is a world pregnant with meaning, purpose and fulfillment. 
Unfortunately, Other Half-Rome is not in it himself. Thus, 
he does not really extend his own vision or re-shape it and 
his romantic maunderings can tell him nothing new about




Other Half-Rome creates his own interesting side­
lights concerning the actual murder. The way he sees it, 
when Guido was tapping at the door of the Comparini villa 
in the Pauline district, the fact that the door was opened 
immediately after Guido disguised his voice and said he was 
Caponsacchi, proves uhe exact reverse of what Guido claims 
it proved. After all. Other Half-Rome argues, if Caponsacchi 
were a frequent visitor at the Pauline villa (sneaking down 
from his place of exile in Civita), then Pompilia would 
have known that the person at the door could not have been 
Caponsacchi, because. Other Half-Rome says melodramatically, 
"Stealthy guests/ Have secret watchwords, private entrances." 
(Ill, 1611-12)
Thus even when he is denying Guido's charges. Other 
Half-Rome must speak in a hushed voice about passwords and 
secret passageways. When he describes the murderers' escape 
from the villa, he adds many emotional touches of his own. 
Thus Guido and his henchmen "Reeled. . .like drunkards along 
open road" and later arrived at the village of Baccano and 
"Stumbled at least, dear, dumb, blind. . ./ Into a grange and, 
one dead heap, slept there." (Ill, I632-36) When their 
pursuers caught up with them, they found Guido and his 
men "red from head to heel"— an exaggeration that only
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Other Half-Rome could find useful for his purposes.
Other Half-Rome also makes much of Pompilia’s 
motherhood. The reason, he says, she fled from the palace 
of Arezzo was because she was "one month gone with child." 
(ill, 1527) It does not matter if Pompilia actually knew 
she was pregnant or not. Either way, we can see that she 
fled because of "The strong and passionate precipitance/ 
of maiden startled into motherhood." (Ill, 1530-31) This 
is the way doctors have always accounted for the mystery 
of motherhood— it "changes body and soul by nature's law." 
(Ill, 1532)
Other Half-Rome is frequently guilty of this kind 
of extravagance. The suggestion was made earlier that 
occasionally he does well by his method. For example, when 
Guido first hears the news from his brother Paolo that Pom­
pilia is pregnant and has moved out of the convent. Other 
Half-Rome describes Guido's reaction with powerful artistry. 
Guido, in "the blue of a sudden sulphur-blaze" saw "the 
ins and outs to the heart of hell." (Ill, 1570, 73)
But, only too frequently. Other Half-Rome is pre­
occupied with isolating and romanticizing the entire situa­
tion; thus he forces himself into the position of the romancer 
who must separate the absolute good from the absolute bad. 
Honan cites the passage which is the key to Other Half-Rome's 
concept of himself as the artist.^ Other Half-Rome, as he
^Ibid., p. 194.
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dlBousses Caponsacohl's personality, is obliged to consider 
the possibility that Caponsacchi may have Indeed tried to 
seduce Pompilia. After all. Other HaIf-Rome argues, "priests 
are merely flesh and blood." (Ill, B30) When we find 
weakness In a human being, but no guilt, then there can 
be no misfortune resulting from It. For, "finding grey,/
We gladly call that white which might be black." (ill,
831-32} Here, In one sentence. Other Half-Rome not only 
exposes his own attitudes and his own lack of individuality 
as a human being; he also Is describing his own artistic 
method and at the same time explaining the necessity for the 
romance-structured, "literary," pseudo-popular milieu that 
Inevitably results from such a misapplication of his creative 
abilities.
Since he finds grey In the world of everyday exper­
ience— the ambiguous and uncertain "real" life that does not 
Interest him— and since such grey does not meet his own.ro­
mantic expectations— he Is forced to turn his gray Into 
either a black or a white. For his purposes. It Is con­
venient to see Pompilia as his white figure and Guido as 
his black figure. He admits that were It real life, what 
we call white might be black or vice versa. But In thé world 
he creates, one does not have to worry about such distinctions. 
He grants himself artistic license, attempts to justify 
It, and paints Pompilia a pur3 white and Guido a villainous 
black. The fact that he Is correct In doing so Is only
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accidental.
Thus Other HaIf-Rome "arrives at the truth in the 
wrong way; and so exposes himself."1 His method is the 
wrong way because it could just as easily call what was false 
true (or what was black white). It would depend upon how 
easily the real facts could be reduced to simplicities and 
be fitted into Other Half-Rome’s already preconceived 
romance-fantasy view of experience.
Other Half-Rome can rhapsodize about his function 
as the artist who is going to find the truth. "How hold 
a light, display the cavern’s gorge?/ How, in this phase 
of the affair, show truth?" These questions are pretentious 
and rhetorical since Other Half-Rome has already supplied 
himself with the answers. Even here, when discussing Pom­
pilia ’s truth, it is not the truth that Pompilia herself 
discovers and extends into and out of herself right up to 
heaven. For Other Half-Rome, Pompilia is a truth, "All 
truth and only truth." Her presence is also "something 
else..../ Something that every lie expires before." (Ill, 
000-02)
Other Half-Rome’s own monologue contradicts this 
because in the figurative presence of Pompilia’s whiteness 
and her purity, he only succeeds in making even stronger 
his own false view of reality.
iRonan, p. 1$4.
CHAPTER VI 
TERTIUM QUID: BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL
1
Tertium Quid, holding forth inside a fashionable 
Roman salon, maintains that the rabble have had too much to 
say about the murder. What we need to do. Quid tells his 
dignified listeners, is to lift the case "Out of the shade 
into the shine, allow/ Qualified persons" to "edge in an 
authoritative word/ Between the rabble*s-brabble of dolts 
and fools." (IV, 7-10) Law, he says, will not do it. And 
if the rabble think that a legal trial is somehow going 
to set everything straight, they are mistaken. If Law were 
competent to take care of such matters, it would have done 
it three years ago, when the case first came up.
Quid laughs at the very idea, then associates himself 
with his listeners by insisting that he and the Excellency,
"we and his Highness here/ Would settle the matter as suffici­
ently" as any lawyers or judges will ever do, with a "word 
and a wink" between us because we know that the ultimate 
arbiter will be the Cardinal, who is sitting over there 
half-listening while he gambles at cards. (IV, 49-55)
Then Quid addresses himself to another nobleman
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present: "And here's the Marquis too'" (IV, 57) he says.
One can imagine Quid standing in the midst of the card 
tables and salon chairs, casually walking about, equating 
his social status with his auditors, attempting to enlist 
their attention. He entreats his listeners to "indulge 
me but a moment." I am, he says, favored with a powerful 
audience, and if I fail "To set things right, why, class 
me with the mob/ As understander of the mind of man'"
(IV, 60-1)
Quid's sarcastic implication here, of course, is that 
the mob claims to understand what really happened during 
the murder, but without any basis for that understanding.
Only in his class will there be found the people of intelli­
gence who see that there can be no final understanding, no 
final solution to the case.
He relates the story of how the modest but comfor­
table Comparini couple lived; he describes Violante's machi­
nations when, after they ultimately found themselves in 
debt and had to go on papal relief, she suddenly produced 
an heir. This, Quid instructs his listeners, was definitely 
a crime. Quid resembles a trial lawyer who is obliged to 
enlighten not only the jury, but the defense, prosecution 
and judge as well. When he speaks of Violante's deceit, 
he leaves little doubt— at least momentarily— as to how 
he regards her actions. "A crime complete in its way is 
here, I hops?" he asks rhetorically. (IV, 215) Violante's
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lies were "Lies to God, lies to man, every way lies." (IV, 
216) and not only did she rob the proper heirs when she 
turned up with Pompilia, she also robbed God,
"Is so far clear?" he pauses to ask his listeners. 
He feels that they know Violante now and that they can
"compute her capability of crime," And hers was a "Black
hard cold/ Crime like a stone you kick up with your foot/
I ' the middle of a field," (IV, 229-31) At any rate. Quid 
tells them, "I thought as much" for a while, "But now,"
he says, "a question," And here is the first of a long
series of instances where Quid pauses, discusses, equivo­
cates, turns over the matter and examines it from the other 
side,
Consider it this way, he says. How long does that 
stone lie that you kicked up as you were walking through 
the field? As the years go by, that stone is certain to 
become covered with "moss, weed, wild-flower," (IV, 236) 
Quid turns and speaks to his Highness directly. Your High­
ness, he says, minds that are healthy tend to let bygones 
be bygones. They leave old crimes behind them and hope 
that those crimes can grow "virtuous-like" in the sun and 
air. This is the way time treats ugly deeds. In the case 
under discussion, Pietro was overjoyed to have an heir 
and even Violante's "old wicked heart" was softened. The 
crime itself actually began to resemble a virtue. Out of 
the "dungheap" a rose grew,a "pure child," There was
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still a second virtue since she was rescued from the horror 
of being raised by her real mother. Why, if there are 
any moralists present, says Quid ironically, let them note 
that sin has saved a soul. (IV, 256)
In fact the best way of "unsinning sin/ Is to begin 
well-doing somehow else." (IV, 285-86) Pietro began this 
automatically; since he was so delighted to have an heir, 
he was a good father to Pompilia. Besides, he was not a 
party to Violante's crime anyway. It was Violante who was 
guilty of the "whole sin." So to her belonged "the exem­
plary penance." (IV, 300) She too was happy and an excellent 
mother to their foster child.
But Quid feels as though his audience can see a 
fallacy here. He flatters his distinguished auditors by 
telling them that they can get past his guard and thrust 
straight to his heart if they point out "'There's a lie 
at base of all,'" (IV, 306) that lie being the fact that the 
Comparini could never erase Pompilia's illegitimacy. How­
ever, like the pearl which is around the Principessa's 
neck, a thing that is worthless at the core is not necessarily 
worthless all over.
Now are you with me so far? he asks them. You can 
see at this point in the story who was right, who was wrong, 
and who was neither, can't you? "What, you don't?" (IV, 3I5 ) 
he says with mock-surprise. Well then, we must all admit 
"there's somewhat dark i ' the case." But let's go on with
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it and I promise you that it will all become clear.
Quid tells them what happened twelve years later when 
the Comparini married Pompilia off to Guido, The one desire 
of Pietro and Violante was to see Pompilia well-married.
As a matter of fact. Quid points out, Pompilia would have 
been a good catch for someone from the burgess class. But 
instead Pompilia married the "real thing," the "truth and 
not the sham" and hence "ruin to them all." (IV, 35^)
Guido's situation was typical of many noble families who 
had been reduced to poverty, but in Guido's case the "pov­
erty was getting too acute." (IV, 381) Guido got nowhere 
when he served Cardinal Nerli in Rome for so many years; 
then the Cardinal rewarded him by dismissing him. At the 
age of forty-six, Guido was penniless, and was forced to 
appeal to his brother Paolo for advice and assistance.
After Paolo arranged for the marriage with Pompilia, Pietro 
rebelled when he discovered Guido's true situation, but 
Violante arranged and completed the marriage secretly.
Thus the Comparini discovered that "in the Countship was 
a truth, but in/ The counting up of the Count's cash, a 
lie." (IV, 492-93)
Now, Quid pauses, all of you take a breath for a 
minute and ask yourselves who was the dupe here— Guido or 
the Comparini? "Who/ Was fool, who knave? Neither and 
both, perchance." (IV, 506-O7 ) Quid cannot help but hedge 
all his bets, and yet his argument is compelling. If we
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can get through all the verbiage, he says, we can see that 
both sides traded to get something. The trade was one of a 
noble name in exchange for money and beauty. Both sides 
needed a lie to put a gloss over the marriage, "a lie/ To 
serve as a decent wrappage." (IV, 522-23) But the truth is, 
"each cheated each" so both are guilty. Quid brilliantly 
puts his finger on the fundamental fact: "Each did give 
and did take the thing designed,/ The rank on this side and 
the cash on that." (IV, 529-30) And Quid's attitude is that 
it is "The way of the world," the usual cold bargain struck 
in the market place. (IV, 532-33)
Here is the gist of it, he tells them. "Each sees 
a profit, throws the fine words in." (IV, 538) They had to 
dress it up in fancy words. If both sides had simultaneously 
discovered the pretense--as Quid puts it, "will Excellency 
forgive?"— it would be like a cook who "Strips away those 
long loose superfluous legs/ From either side the crayfish, 
leaving folk/ A meal all meat henceforth." (IV, 543-45)
If they had thrown off the pretense from the start, a balance 
could have been maintained and Just the "meat" of the facts 
would have been involved. Furthermore, Quid continues, by 
sheer chance, one party had the advantage of discovering the 
other party's cheat first while it kept its own concealed.
For it was the foolish Pietro and Violante who saw that 
"The nobleman was penniless, and screamed/ 'We are cheated!'"
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As Tertium Quid gets deeper into the story, his un­
questioned brilliance begins to tarnish. His analogies, 
such as the crime that is like a stone you kick in the field, 
or his "worthless core" simile, offer a penetrating commentary 
on the issues involved. But just as he seems ready to carry 
his imaginative abilities into a significant reality for 
himself, he lets them drop. He says "But on the other hand" 
and begins to discuss carefully the other side's point of 
view. And for that other side, he applies his imagination 
with just as much force, so that the result in the end is a 
verbal deadlock. For both sides he uses his creative abili­
ties only to neutralize the issues and sterilize the truth. 
From his point of view these abilities are always under the 
control of his cool, rational mind. Always, he feels, he is 
weighing the evidence impartially and logically. Occasionally, 
in order to illustrate the logical argument, he will draw 
upon an extended analogy to demonstrate the proof of what 
he is saying. But this is the only thing such an ability 
is good for.
As he recounts the story he summarizes the harsh 
treatment Pietro and Violante received in Arezzo, their re­
turn to Rome, and Violante's confession of Pompilia's 
illegitimacy. He discusses the Comparini's point of view 
(IV, 558-580) and then offers Guido's as a kind of retort
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("On the other hand 'Not so'' Guido retorts" (iV, 58^  )
Quid uses the sophistic technique of discussing one of the 
issues as if it were his own point of view. Then, just at 
that point where his audience believes that this is his true 
attitude, he ends by stating something like, "So say the 
Comparini." (IV, 573) Then the audience has to re-adjust 
itself as Quid goes on to discuss the point of view of the 
other side.
The Comparini's charge is that Guido deceived them 
about his riches. Guido's retort is based on his assertion 
that his being poor was an irrelevancy, a "bye-product" 
that might end tomorrow if one of his uncles dies and leaves 
him more property. There is always the chance, he argues, 
that I will recover my wealth tomorrow. Tertium Quid's 
interest here is in the absurdity of the whole situation.
He asks his audience "Which of the two here sinned most?
A nice point !" (IV, 629) Of course we cannot decide but we 
can see certain aspects that stand out. For example, the 
fact that the Comparini blatantly exposed Guido's poverty 
to the world in the most embarrassing manner was a mistake. 
It was. Quid says, one more wrong than we needed. (IV, 650) 
Here Tertium Quid tends to side with one of his kind— a 
nobleman whose poverty is announced to the world.
Guido is forced to fight the Comparini charges by 
proxy. There is no way he can personally strike back from 
Arezzo. So he decides "To take revenge on a trifle over-
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looked." (IV, 664) Here Quid offers a striking metaphor 
which is unerringly accurate. Pompilia was the "pet lamb" 
which the Comparini had left within Guido's reach. She was 
that thirteen-year-old girl who, until four months ago, was 
"Never a mile away from mother's house." (IV, 669) But she 
was taken "Out of the bower into the butchery." Guido con­
cludes that if he plagues her, "he plagues them threefold." 
(IV, 677-78) His plan is to drive her into disgracing herself 
through adultery. His motivation is revenge on the Comparini 
for cheating him, and also to "blacken too a soul they boasted
white." Guido wants to "show the world their saint in a
lover's arms," or at any rate. Quid hastily adds, this is
what they say. (IV, 696-98)
Quid then again shifts ground and reminds his audience 
that "On the other hand," it is easy to blame it on Guido, 
but the latter does not lack an apologist. For example, if 
the Comparini cared so much:.about their daughter, why did 
they not take her back to Rome with them when they left 
Arezzo? Then, to really compound the problem. Quid turns to 
the Prince in the salon and addresses him directly. He tells 
him that even if both sides had been honest and plain-dealing 
from the start, it still "would prove a difficult problem, 
Pyincel" (IV, 715) Then Quid proves this assertion by 
developing an effective extended analogy in which he describes 
Pompilia and Guido as ingredients in a meal that is to be 
served. It "were hard to serve up a congenial dish/ Out of
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these ill-agreeing morselÈ, Duke," (IV, 726-27) Quid says 
ingratiatingly, as he continues to try to address everybody 
as he speaks. Then add to this basic incompatibility between 
Pompilia and Guido, the abuse Guido received from the 
Comparini, the scandal of his poverty as it was bruited about 
Rome and Arezzo, and the meat of this "cook’s craft" becomes 
"never a pheasant but a carrion-crow." (IV, 738) No, this 
meat Guido could not eat. And instead of using Violante’s 
confession as an opportunity to divorce Pompilia and be rid 
of them all, Guido, filled with rage and hate, devised a plan 
whereby, if Pompilia committed adultery, he could get rid of 
her and keep the dowry too, Guido wants to blot out, "as 
by a belch of hell/ Their triumph in her misery and v^eath,"
(IV, 75^-55) and thus win on all counts,
Tertium Quid then pauses again as he considers Guido 
the person, "You see," he tells them, "the man was Aretine" 
and had that shrewd air and subtle wit. He was a nobleman 
too, and because of these qualities, he took a "finer 
vengeance" on the Comparini than they did on him. The peasants 
have their methods of revenge; the nobility, however, is 
something else, Guido’s forged letters prove this; his revenge 
was not coarse, as the Comparini’s carryings-on were, but 
subtle and hidden.
At any rate. Quid blandly reminds them, this is what 
they say; this is how a lot of people look at it. Quid then 
begins a series of imaginary dialogues concerning the principals
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after he has told how Pompilia was--so some say--engulfed by 
Guido’s torture and fled to first the Governor, then the 
Archbishop, then the friar, and from all three received the 
same negative response. In the dialogues (IV, 839-1124) 
which are spoken by Pompilia, Guido and Caponsacchi, Quid 
argues for each side. Would Guido, he asks, have built up 
Caponsacchi as such a terror to Pompilia when Caponsacchi 
was the very man he was going to use as bait? Furthermore, 
one might consider that Pompilia's complaints were heard and 
dismissed by the Governor and the Archbishop. Of course, 
the other side claims that the two were influenced by Guido’s 
power in Arezzo, but how could a penniless nobleman have such 
influence? Moreover, how could Guido possibly have arranged 
for Pompilia and Caponsacchi to meet when the two parties 
did not even know each other? It is also difficult to accept 
Caponsacchi’s version of his meeting with Pompilia and ultimate 
flight from Arezzo. Even if Pompilia’a tale is true and she 
really was wronged, what part of a priest’s duties say that 
he put on a lay-dress and go skipping from the church-dqor 
with a married woman and spend the night with her at an inn?
Quid cannot plead for Caponsacchi very eloquently and 
it is difficult for him to accept the letter’s claim that he 
felt the truth by "instinct." Quid has to laugh at this notion 
and he tells the Prince that instinct is surely a "Process 
which saves a world of trouble and time." (IV, IOO7) He 
jokingly suggests to the Prince that the latter might try
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the same technique. You should try Caponsacchi's truth by 
your own instinct, since that seems to be "the expeditious 
mode."' (IV, 1010 )
But Guido also has some more points to make about 
his version of the murder. They sneaked around behind my 
back, he claims. They attempted to use my maid, but she re­
mained faithful to me. Then Guido starts pointing to those 
love letters that he found. What more proof does he need?
I caught "this pair of saints" red-handed, Guido says, waving 
the letters. "I stand or fall by these." (IV, 1042) And 
finally, after more arguments from both sides (IV, 1042-1112) 
Tertium Quid breaks into his dialogues and says, enough. 
"Highness, decide! Pronounce, Her E x c e l l e n c y I B u t  his 
listeners are silent.
Quid says. Then let us leave this argument in doubt 
and examine the trial itself. Of course some people say that 
the case is open-and-shut; the husband catches the wife 
and her paramour in the "very act of shame." What else 
could Guido do; it was a "man-tO*man" situation— "nature 
must have her way." (IV, 1132-33) It is too bad, according 
to these people (Quid is, of course, here recounting Half- 
Rome's version of the case), that Guido did not clear things 
"on the spot." Another Roman view (not Other Half-Rome's)
is that Guido might have still been in doubt when he caught
 - ■ )•
^In the Italian language, high dignitaries in the 
seventeenth century took the feminine pronoun. Browning 
follows this convention.
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up with them; or, if someone argues that Guido was a coward, 
then why did he pursue them in the first place?
The trial itself was of no help. Quid continues. The 
Court's position was that "'Each of the parties, whether goat 
or sheep/ I ' the main, has wool to show and hair to hide.'"
(IV, 1222-23) This is, of course. Quid's own position. The 
Court cannot take the case seriously. They criticize both 
parties for making such a bother. The Court decides that 
though all parties might be innocent, they should receive 
some mild punishment for stirring up a noise. Though Quid's 
attitude is roughly similar to the Court's, Quid can point 
out the fine but significant distinction. It is not his 
job to decide; society has invested that responsibility in 
the Courts. However, as he implied earlier, what can you 
expect? Law is a deus ex machina that the rabble expects to 
descend on stage and "clear things at the fifth act--ahal"
(IV, 17) But the truth is, law is not up to it; it is just 
another facet tbt) 'Wha't Quid calls "the way of the world."
3
Tertium Quid, his tongue in cheek, his tone doubtless 
bland, his manner glib, moves effortlessly to his conclusion.
He asks his listeners, "is it settled so far?" Are you still 
with me? Have I settled the issues up to this point, or simply 
confused them? Perhaps another example, he suggests, will 
suffice to clear this up.
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You've seen the puppet-shows in the Piazza Navona, 
he begins. Remember the formulai these plays about Punch 
and his mate always follow, "Threats pass, blows are dealt,/ 
And a crisis comes." (IV, 1283-84) By this time the crowd 
is clapping or hissing depending on whether they favor the 
husband's side or the wife's side. Now just at that moment
I
when they have decided whose side they are on, the actors 
duck down, put on clothes that best suit their next adventure, 
and create a whole new effect. The problem is, the mob is 
already on the move Vwith something like a judgment pro and 
con," (IV, 1290) about the previous adventure. Suddenly, 
the whistle blows, up pop the actors, to re-engage in still 
another fight which attempts to show that "what you thought 
tragedy was farce." (IV, 1294) And note that the climax of 
these puppet-shows is invariably the appearance of the devil 
himself.
Well, says Quid, it is just so in the case before us. 
The principals have been on stage, moving about like puppets 
on a string. Then the principals "duck down" and you think 
the case is over. That is, Caponsacchi and Pompilia were 
tried and one was sent into exile and the other into a con­
vent during this period. But suddenly after you've already 
made your judgment pro or con, the actors pop back up again 
and what you thought was a serious business turns into a 
joke. Suits and countersuits are filed as the whole thing 
drags clownishly along. Guido's friends argue that when Guido
101
discovered Pompilia was pregnant, he had to seek relief the 
only way he knew how— by murdering her. But Guido?s foes 
have to laugh; the whole thing has got so out of hand, that 
for Guido, Pompilia's pregnancy Is "'The luckiest of con­
ceivable events,'" an excuse for him to solve all his prob­
lems at once.
Well, what have we? Quid asks. Pompilia's leaving 
the convent to live with her parents and give birth to her 
baby Is no doubt a strange divergence. Bui, Quid maintains,
"I simply take the facts, ask what they show." (IV, 1352)
Quid then proceeds to give a brilliantly graphic 
description of the murder as Guido breaks Into the Pauline 
villa with his four thugs, stabs Violante "through and 
through," and then reaches past her falling body to Pietro 
and shouts "'with yoursson,/ This Is the way to settle suits, 
good slrei'" (IV, 1375-76) After Pietro falls, Guido moves 
towards Pompilia, who "rushes here and there/ Like a dove," 
and then he stabs her. She too falls and Guido lifts her 
head up by her long black hair to see If she might be still 
alive. He "Draws a deep satisfied breath; 'So--dead at last!'" 
he says, and throws her body back across PletreJs knees.
(IV, 1389-91)
When Guido and his four henchmen are caught the next 
morning, Guido Is amazed. He cannot understand how they could 
know It was he. He asks the authorities who It was that told 
them. "'Why, naturally your wlfel'" Is the reply. (IV, 1421)
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It staggers him that Pompilia lives to tell all and gets him 
in the end. But, Quid says, Pompilia had prayed for only one 
thing after the stabbing--not time to confess and save her 
soul— but "Time to make the truth apparent." (IV, 1429) And, 
Quid adds, this seems to be about the only prayer "She ever 
put up, that was granted her." (IV, 1432) At least. Quid 
quickly interjects, this is what her friends say.
Of course, he goes on, if we are honest about it we 
have to admit that Pompilia might have asked that final prayer 
out of her own guilt feelings. And her detractors point 
out that she has been consistent to the end. She gains both 
her goals; the first is to set her lover free and the second 
is to revenge herself upon Guido.
Moreover, Guido has a long list of complaints. Quid 
reminds them. He was cheated in getting a wife, robbed by her 
parents, made into a laughing-stock by the story of her birth, 
and disgraced by his wife's flight with a priest. Quid points 
out that Guido had earlier brought his case before a Tuscan 
court and they had found Pompilia guilty. But the court had 
had no jurisdiction in the case.
So, ultimately, Guido became his own judge. And the 
only argument. Quid says, against the way he used the law 
was that he did not kill them when he caught them. But what 
is "sooner" or "later" in this case? A wound in the flesh 
doubtless demands immediate redress. "But a wound to the 
soul? That rankles worse and worse," (IV, 1532) as time goes
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by. Guido's critics, of course, reply that Guido was left 
many other avenues, "'We left this man/ Many another way, 
and there's his fault.'" (IV, 1542-43) When he discovered 
that he could not solve his problems the right way, he 
resorted to the wrong way. Does a man who is blunted as he 
coldly tries one way after another really become the victim 
of an injustice? Does a man who methodically hires assassins 
plots, plans, executes--is he a man who is overcome by 
"'honest self-forgetting rage?'" (IV, 1557-58) It is no 
more likely to be the case than when a furious bull "'Pick 
out four help-mates from the grazing herd'" to travel with 
him until he finds his enemy.
But you are wrong, say Guido's supporters, picking 
up the "bull-sirailitude." For Guido's behavior is the proof. 
His slaughter was reckless and indiscriminate, proof that he 
was victimized by rage, and tormented by the injustice of it 
all; thus he murdered blindly. "Do you blame a bull?" Quid 
asks innocently.
4
Tertium Quid, now at the end of his story, surveys 
his audience with humor. To tell you the truth, he says, 
you look as puzzled as when I began. Why is that? Part of 
the problem is the fact that each party in the murder case 
"wants too much," and each party demands more sympathy for 
its object of compassion than it is entitled to.
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The whole affair has been blown up out of all pro­
portion, People cannot see realistically. They insist on 
making Pompilia an angel, "purity herself," and "her parents 
angels too." (IV, 1594) "Why," Quid finally says, "here you 
have the awfulest of crimes/ For nothing!" (IV, I6OO-OI) It 
is actually a crime concerning the commonalty, inherently 
trivial and insignificant. It is only "Hell broke loose on 
a butterfly!" And as for Guido, "here is the monster! Why, 
he's a mere man." (IV, 1603) He was. Quid argues, "Born, 
bred and brought up in the usual way." (IV, l604) He had a 
mother like everybody else. His brothers continue to stand 
by him. The Governor and the Archbishop know and approve of 
him. Cardinal This and Cardinal That vouch for him.
Why build it up? Suppose it is a tragedy that malice 
could not improve upon? And here is innocent Guido with 
his four innocent assistants, and they are added, "all five, to 
the guilty three," so that we the citizenry can be instructed 
by "one full taste o' the justice of the world." In short, 
maybe they are all guilty.
"The long and the short is, truth is what I show,"
Quid asserts. (IV, I618) Guido is noble, and he may be inno­
cent. In fact it seems unduly harsh to try to get the truth 
out of him through torture. On the other hand. Quid says, 
hedging right to the last, if they exempt Guido because of 
his clerical privileges. Quid grants that he can think of no 
crime that ever was or ever will be so deserving of torture as
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this one.
"Then abolish itl" Quid exclaims. Throw out the whole 
thing. "You see the reduction ad absurdum. Sirs?" he says.
Any way you look at it, it becomes ridiculous. So who is 
to decide? Quid insists jokingly that "Her Excellency must 
pronounce, in fine I" (IV, I632) But Her Excellency prefers 
Joining the gambling. Quid turns to Her Highness, but it is 
late and Her Highness plans to retire. "I am of their mind," 
Quid says. But, he says, he hopes that all this talk has 
not been for nothing. It was good conversation and both Her 
Highness and Her Excellency now know as much about the murder 
case as all Rome.
And as he sees the bored expressions on their faces. 
Quid reaches a sad conclusion. "You'll see," he tells himself, 
"I have not so advanced myself,/ After my teaching the two 
idiots here I" (IV, l639-40)
5
The reader might recall that Tertium Quid is in a 
fashionable Roman salon addressing an intimate group of people 
of the upper class— three of them are high dignitaries— who 
are standing and sitting around him, their attention not al­
together undivided. One of the dignitaries, the Cardinal, is 
resolutely playing cards, but he cannot help listening with 
one ear as Quid reviews the Roman murder case.
Tertium Quid implies that the murder is a matter that
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need not concern them, but it does make for Interesting con­
versation, Under other circumstances, a murder which ori­
ginated in the pleb and burgess class would be beneath their 
notice officially. But as a conversation piece to afford an 
evening's entertainment for the group, the murder has some 
small merit.
As Tertium Quid reviews the facts of the case, the 
reader discovers that Browning has taken pains to create an 
atmosphere which ostensibly appears to be accidental on the 
post's part. As Cook noted. Browning presents his picture 
of late seventeenth century Italian aristocratic society 
"without any apparent effort or over-emphasis."^
In reviewing the case. Quid inevitably reveals the 
society in which he and his companions move; it is obviously 
a sophisticated, aristocratic and wealthy group, and they are 
obviously in control of the affairs of the city. Quid mentions 
various areas of the city: the crowd at the puppet-play of 
Piazza Navona— the largest market-place in Rome; he has 
occasion, in telling his story, to describe the washer-women 
at work by the fountain in the Piazza Citorio; when he dis­
cusses the circumstances surrounding the manner in which Paolo 
arranges for the marriage of Guido'and Pompilia, we follow 
him as he describes the lady barbers at the wig shop of the 
Piazza Colonna— a place much frequented by all manner of 
people, including noblemen such as Guido. In the course of
ICook, Commentary, p. 74.
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his summary of the case, he mentions the then fashionable 
custom of having a negro page; he lowers his voice when he 
speaks obliquely of a current scandalous affair within his 
own social set; inside the salon itself we are told of the 
Jewels of the Principessa, who is present, and whose Jewels 
are multiplied and reflected by the many mirrors surrounding 
her; the powdered wigs of the two dignitaries whom Tertium 
Quid is addressing directly are spoken of; then there is the 
"testy cardinal, who, if you Jostle his cards, will rap you 
out a ...stl"l
These remarks are merely incidental to Tertium Quid's 
summary of the murder story as he sees it. However, it would 
not be accurate to say that he is not aware that he is in­
dicating his own social position; it is precisely because he 
cannot resist snobbishly identifying himself with those 
dignitaries whom he is addressing that he frequently resorts 
to pointed remarks about his own station in life. He seems 
bent on separating himself entirely from the "rabble's- 
brabble of dolts and fools/ Who make up reasonless unreasoning 
Rome," (IV, lO-ll) Why it would be necessary for him to do 
this can be arrived at by supposition: Tertium Quid is a 
gentleman farmer and an aristocrat but he is not equal in 
rank to those people he is addressing and he obviously wants 
to be. When he tells his story, he is actually using it as
^All these details are admirably summarized in Cook, 
Commentary, p. 74.
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a vehicle by which he may ingratiate himself further into 
their favor; he is subtly toadying up to them; he is fol­
lowing carefully the upper-class social code of behavior, 
telling his auditors what he feels they want to hear. He 
admits to no personal bias; he has no axe to grind; he is 
cooly detached. How could he possibly be otherwise when 
the case involves people almost entirely of the burgess class? 
Let the plebs wax emotional and indignant about it. They, 
after all, identify with the principals in this puppet-show 
and feel as though they have a personal stake in the outcome. 
But he could not care less; it is not good form to display 
feeling; it is a violation of the aristocrat's code; and it 
is particularly bad form to display feeling toward members 
of the lower social classes. Since they are motivated by 
irrational considerations, it is difficult to take them 
seriously.
One could not possibly view the murder story as 
material for the romance books. There is nothing fanciful 
involved here; the ideals which both sides contend they were 
trying to uphold are merely cover-ups for their true motives. 
After all, he points out, when one strips away all the 
rationalizations, charges and countercharges, one can easily 
see that each side cheated the other. It is absurd to idealize 
it. There are no heroes or heroines involved, only the plebs, 
and they are once again immersed in one of their sordid scan­
dals; it hardly matters who is the most guilty. There will
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always be crimes— irrational in nature— on this level and 
one should not attempt to discover any sort of order or pur­
pose in the lives of these simpletons. And once you set an
irrational set of circumstances on its way, it develops a
sort of logic and inevitability of its own. Although there
is a trial coming up, it is merely the "last link of a
chain/ Whereof the first was forged three years ago. (IV, 
22-3)
When Tertium Quid moves toward the close of his 
analysis, he sums up his own attitude by stating that the 
whole thing is a "reduction ad absurdum" (IV, 1631) a phrase 
which is indicative not only of Tertium Quid’s opinion toward 
the murder, but a phrase which also reveals the central am­
biguity and indecisiveness in his own personality, and in 
the ethical concepts of the aristocratic class of Rome in
1698.
6
Park Honan guesses at Tertium Quid’s background 
through the kind of images the latter employs; these Images 
generally center around farm land and the objects one would 
associate with farming. The animals Quid speaks of are 
predominantly farm animals; many of the terms are terms con­
nected with the gentleman farmer who is also fond of outdoor 
sport, especially hunting.1 He uses such phrases as "a
iHonan, p. 102.
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leash of lawyers," (IV, 44) and "our brace of burgesses."
(IV, 313) The dead bodies of Pietro and Violante are a 
* "bale" of "cargo." (IV, 29-30) Guido Is a swine and a 
"furious bull," (IV, 1559) Pompilia Is a "cur-cast mongrel"
(IV, 611) and Caponsacchi Is a hare. The way Tertium Quid 
uses these Images, It seems clear that both of the parties 
In the case are "equally objectionable."^ Each of the 
parties Is really beneath serious notice and he can regard 
them only as litigants In a murder trial; he even Imagines 
the Court as saying that whether or not the two parties are 
"goat or sheep," each of them "has wool to show and hair to 
hide." (IV, 1222-23)2
In fact, when Tertium Quid at the end asks his renowned 
audience, "You see the reduction absurdum. Sirs?" (IV,
1631) humanity Itself becomes something that he has attempted 
to reduce to absurdity. As Tertium Quid works to dissociate 
himself from the burghers and the plebs and Identify himself 
with the Roman upper class, he becomes so detached that he 
divorces himself from humanity In general. Thus the world 
that he desires to create Is no world, really. It Is a world 
without people, without feeling, without experience. It Is 
very like the puppet-show which he tells us about. Everything 
seems strangely lifeless; strings are pulled, figures move 
about, predictable behavior occurs. Tertium Quid and his
llbld.
2cited In Honan, p. 183.
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audience undergo slowly a transformation into straw figures. 
Like the principals in the murder story, they go through their 
paces, attend the fashionable salon, play cards, listen to the 
latest gossip and then retire. Their behavior is thoughtless 
and mechanical, their activity purposeless and inhuman.
Even in his speech, in his use of balance and parallel 
structure, Tertium Quid reveals to us that he is not so con­
cerned with what he says, but how he says it, as in the 
"symmetrical" first lines of his monologue. (IV, 1-8 )^
Since he apparently is insecure socially, he feels the need 
to employ "elaborate syntax, diction and alliteration" in 
order to "impress the fashionable people around him."^ In 
this way, he exploits the murder and reveals himself as an 
unprincipled social-climber. In reality he has probably bored 
his audience by his account of the murder--partially because 
anything would bore them--and if he in this way uses the 
murder to further his own ends, it is not likely that he has 
been very successful.
What is more important, however, is the psychological 
trap which he has unknowingly set for himself. Tertium Quid 
is the only monologuist in the poem who seems to have denied 
himself the right to exercise his creative abilities to any
great extent. It is obvious that he has these abilities
^Cited in Honan, pp. 278-9.
^cited in Honan, p. 280.
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because his monologue is filled with analogies and metaphors. 
But the curious manner in which he employs his creative talent 
perhaps explains why this "play," this "puppet-show," as he 
conceives of it, seems so mechanical and lifeless. Of course 
it is difficult for him to bring life to his drama because 
he has a tendency to regard the principals as inanimate objects 
rather than real human beings. They are like the animals and 
other objects on his farm; they have no existence in them­
selves; they exist only for his convenience, and under such 
circumstances they can be exploited mercilessly.
This lifeless attitude inevitably carries over into 
Tertium Quid's own social class. The society he describes 
seems typically brittle and sophisticated; it has a certain 
hollow quality to it; there is something deadening about its 
very existence. There are hints of corruption--the Cardinal 
gambling at cards, the married couple involved in a scandal, 
the Principessa's diamonds reflected in the mirrors--which 
Tertium Quid is partly aware of. The class as a whole has no 
vital ethical center; Quid's monologue, in fact, suggests that 
once you refine your judgments to the extent to where you 
cannot make judgments, then the ethical center of your world 
dissolves. E.D.H. Johnson calls it "the born skeptic's 
inability to make a c h o i c e . A n d  although the fourth book 
is a "real measure of the ambiguities which the affair has
^"Robert Browning's Pluralistic Universe," TQ, 31 
(October, 1961), p. 24.
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taken o n , i t  is also a real measure of the impotence and 
ineffectiveness of the society of which Quid desires so much 
to be a part; it also provides the scale by which we can 
measure Quid’s own success in using his imaginative abilities.
Perhaps the most effective way of determining Tertium 
Quid’s methods in exercising his own artistry is to contrast 
it with the terrific success which Caponsacchi and Pompilia 
realize in their own creative efforts. This process will be 
explained at greater length in Chapters 8-11, but it is well 
to introduce it now in order to demonstrate the working out 
of the process.
7
The ability to re-shape and actually half-create 
(or at least extend the values of) one’s very reality is, 
as Johnson has stated, a moral process. Caponsacchi and 
Pompilia extend the beliefs which they personally adhere to 
by flying in the face of a system of values in opposition to 
their own. It is impossible for them to extend their values 
in the world as they know it. They are obliged to create 
another kind of reality other than the one that they find 
themselves bound by. In this way their values can find the 
room to become operative. The kind of reality they create 
is not entirely mythical, but it does re-vitalize various 
myths which can have a modern application for the principals
llbid.
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who evoke them. In other words, myth is a form of pre­
philosophy which seeks to explain reality, and which can be 
re-applied continuously. Caponsacchi and Pompilia take this 
path to move on up towards the higher reality which spiritually 
they regard as God and heaven. On a figurative level, they 
are reaching through the ambiguities and loss of idealism 
which are at the base of the societies of Rome and Arezzo,
They are going beyond this towards a universal sympathy or a . 
universal love, the concomitant of which they feel exists 
within themselves. They cannot "prove" it, but they know 
it is there.
In the face of the world they live in, and the values 
it goes by, they assert collectively their own creative 
wills. As Johnson states, it is through their recognition 
of the evil inherent in the reality which has been engendered 
upon them that they rebel, regardless of the consequences.
They both know that there is more in reality than what has 
been made accessible to them. It is not that the values which 
they believe in have not existed in the world before, but 
that they do not exist now, Caponsacchi and Pompilia re­
vitalize these values; in fact, it is the same kind of "re- 
pristination" which Browning describes in Book I in connection 
with his own artistic ability to re-shape the facts of the 
old yellow Book.
These values (the basic value is the central concept 
of love which is at the heart of the poem) are new in the
115
sense that Caponsacchi and Pompilia create them anew, make 
them work once more. They do this by asserting what we have 
to regard as the powerful wills of two strong personalities.
They cause an upheaval in the "real" world. At first they 
are required to move into another kind of "mythic" reality in 
order to gain inspiration to do what they know they must do.
Once they have done this, however, their values and their 
own sense of what reality amounts to cannot be divorced from 
the typical real-life world of Rome and Arezzo which is des­
cribed to us by Ha If-Rome, Other Half-Rome, and Tertium Quid.
Unlike Other Half-Rome’s world of the romance-books, 
the new reality which Caponsacchi and Pompilia help to create 
is not divorced from the disjointed world which they are re­
belling against. It is the same reality, but it is a reality 
which is plastic, which can be molded and shaped by the very 
people who participate in it. The plastic nature of reality, 
the multiform nature of truth, require us to exercise our own 
creative abilities; we derive poetic inspiration from such a 
dazzling, shifting kind of reality, and through our own artis­
tic abilities, we can give to that reality a sense of moral 
order and purpose. It is through their own will to believe 
that Caponsacchi and Pompilia uncover what seems to be an 
ethical center in reality. But, as Johnson suggests, this im­
pression is dependent on nothing less than their creative ability 
to impose their own will-to-believe "through the resources of 
an art which does not simply enunciate, but which actually
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becomes the vital form of that belief."^ In other words, 
they must impose their own will to believe through art; in 
this case, the word "art" is used to mean their own imagina­
tive resources; once they have exercised their creative 
imagination they have given their belief a form--an artistic 
one to be sure--and this form or structure gives their reality 
and their own values an order and purpose which it could not 
possess otherwise. This is why the process is ultimately one 
of "moral creativity."
In short, Caponsacchi and Pompilia choose to take 
"the hard way." They see that for them this is the only way. 
The Pope is the only other principal in the poem who sees 
this, since this is the way he has always taken.
Tertium Quid, however, does not see this. In fact 
he uses his imaginative abilities to block this very sort of 
insight. Quid accepts the plasticity of reality; not only 
does he accept it, he seems to revel in it. He enjoys the 
knowledge that nothing can be known for sure, that truth is 
elusive and pluralistic, that values shift and change shape; 
that there is no good or bad, justice or crime, virtue or 
depravity. But Quid can take it no further than this. At 
first glance it appears as though he plays down his own 
artistic ability; the implications of his monologue suggest 
that he does not think well of "fanciful" interpretations of
^Johnson, "Robert Browning’s Pluralistic Universe,"
P. 39.
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the murder case. This is not the place for one to be 
imaginative, but for one to be coolly logical. And it is 
never very important for us to reach a final judgment on the 
case because it is impossible to say which side is most guilty. 
By the nature and tone of his speech. Quid inevitably leaves 
us with the impression that life itself is like this. All 
of us are selfishly motivated; on the lower social levels 
such motivations usually manifest themselves in irrational 
and vulgar behavior. But as for judging the right and wrong, 
who can say? If we are all motivated by selfishness, then 
ambiguities develop concerning matters of right or wrong.
Quid is not objecting to the rabble's judgment of 
the case so much as he is their presumption in discussing 
it at all. The way he sees it, neither lower nor upper class 
can arrive at a final judgment; the fact that Half-Rome and 
Other Half-Rome are making and passing judgments annoys him; 
they really do not know anything about anything. He further 
implies that it is because of their general ignorance that 
they are able to pass judgment at all. Were they qualified 
to discuss the case, it would be different; they would be 
in the same state of uncertainty that Quid is.
Tertium Quid is, like Arcangeli and Bottini, without 
strong convictions. Quid has no will-to-believe. . .in any­
thing. Thus there is no necessity to impose an art form on 
reality as he knows it; instead, he uses analogies and meta­
phors which help to sustain his attitude that the world is
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uncertain, ambiguous and that there can be no final judgments 
and no convictions. He will draw brilliant figurative com­
parisons using effective metaphors, such as Guido the "furious 
bull" and Pompilia the "pet lamb" who is taken "out of the 
bower and into the butchery," when he is arguing for one side 
or the other. But no sooner has he got us convinced--by 
using his own creative talents— that one side is guilty, than 
he begins to employ his artistry to speak just as eloquently 
for the other. Thus his artistry, brilliant though it is, 
has no artistic form because there is no will-to-believe on 
Quid's part. He uses his abilities to draw analogies whereby 
he can show that there is always more than one way to look at 
something, and that they are all equally valid. In short, he 
has no faith; that is, he feels no need to use his creative 
ability to impose a kind of moral order--through his will-to- 
believe--on his own life and world. He resembles Pompilia's 
lawyer, Bottini, in this sense, except that Bottini has gone 
ahead and developed his own artistic ability because it has 
amused him to do so, and it has also been financially bene­
ficial to him. Bottini regarded his artistry as a kind of 
plaything which provided him with some satisfaction. Quid 
uses his artistry to neutralize human behavior.
Thus Tertium Quid does exercise his creative ability, 
but his only goal is to make sure he does not have to face up 
to the responsibility of having convictions in mind. H^s 
only purpose is to move up on the social ladder by entertaining
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his betters; he knows he must be detached, cool and rational—  
at least ostensibly--and also indecisive; his artistry, at 
least a part of it, becomes one of imitation; he simply mimics 
his social superiors, while at the same time he exploits the 
principals in the Roman murder case. In addition, he uses 
his imaginative brilliance to blunt, to forestall, to prevent 
any of his listeners from adopting a particular point of view; 
he wants to keep them from developing their beliefs; he wants 
them to turn away from the will-to-believe by not exercising 
that very talent (of creativity) which traditionally has sus­
tained that will.
8
Once Tertium Quid concludes that each side is guilty, 
and once he proceeds from that conclusion, his case is closed. 
He, a discriminating raconteur, and in spite of all his refine­
ments of the issues, makes no distinctions in the trial. The 
principals, with the exception of Guido and Caponsacchi, are 
in the burgess class. And as for Guido, it is almost as if 
he had deserted his own kind, since we get no hint from Quid 
that he feels any kinship-of-class for Guido. Although a 
nobleman with a centuries’ old family name, Guido is im­
poverished, the member of a once-famous family but now no 
longer included in the social register. (IV, 355-380) At 
any rate, this is the way Quid seems to regard him. Guido 
has not been discreet; he has sullied himself by allowing his
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name and family to be mixed up with the plebs; therefore, he 
has to be dropped; he can no longer be considered seriously 
as a member of the aristocracy; his whole background and 
person are too tattered.
The other side of this coin is the Comparini. Once 
again Quid cannot discriminate. He is unable to tell the dif­
ference between Pompilia and her parents. He does not stop 
to consider that Pompilia might be different in some unique 
way from other of her plebs or that Caponsacchi, from an 
aristocratic family himself, might have real convictions, 
unlike other members of the aristocracy. He does not under­
stand the issues which underlie the sequence of events in 
the murder. The behavior of the principals has little chance 
for honest analysis because Tertium Quid, in refusing to 
Judge the case, is in actuality prejudging it. Quid has 
already assumed that the world is full of ambiguities, that 
we cannot really know anything, and that since we cannot, 
then we cannot believe in anything with all of our hearts 
and minds. Thus, he does not really give the case the ob­
jective and rational inquiry that he says he does.
It is because of his own prejudging that he concludes 
that both sides are guilty. He makes no attempt to sift out 
the essentials; he does not consider that Pompilia is innocent 
and her parents are guilty; he can only go so far as to sug­
gest that the Comparini are guilty and perhaps Pompilia is 
less guilty; thus his view of the facts--his view of human ex-
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perlence in general— is not really a view but a re-view.
Or as Eliot’s Prufrock was to put it, there is not only time 
for visions, but for a hundred revisions, as people sit 
around coffee cups and card tables and endlessly discuss the 
murder case because it is a good vehicle for social conver­
sation.
His belief that only by cool reasoning, only by 
carefully weighing the facts, only by impersonally consider­
ing the points of view of both sides, can one arrive at any 
justifiable conclusions, is no more sound than it would be 
for the scientist who believed that there were only two 
possibilities. For Tertium Quid mistakenly believes that 
there are only two sides to the murder case, and he employs 
his imagination to drive that attitude home. Even though 
his name means a third thing, differing from the two views 
advanced prior to his, he uses his imagination to block the 
truth--which is that Caponsacchi and Pompilia are really the 
"tertium quid" of the story. They are that third thing, 
higher than the other, going beyond the other two--a third 
and brilliant side to the coin--because they have the will 
to believe and the courage to place their beliefs squarely 
up against the blackness of Guido’s "world by torchlight."
CHAPTER VII 
GUIDO'S WORLD BY TORCHLIGHT 
1
In the fifth book of The Ring and the Book we finally 
meet the villain himself. The reader has been introduced to 
him so many times, and from so many points of view, that 
Guido can hold few surprises for us. Browning has carefully 
prepared us psychologically for Guido’s personality. In 
Book 1, Browning tells us flatly that he is the villain of 
the piece. He is introduced as the murderer (1, 120-25) 
when Browning translates for us the title page of the old 
yellow Book. When Browning summarizes the arguments of 
Bottini (l, 165-76) and Arcangeli (1, 176-97) and their legal 
assistants (1, 200-13), Guido, as Honan points out, "appears 
in a guilty l i g h t . T h e n ,  when Browning allows the Pope to 
speak (1, 328-43) Guido is condemned by Browning himself, 
since he has delineated the Pope as "just, merciful, humble, 
great and good." (l, 300-26)^ Browning leads us to believe 
that the Pope’s opinion of Guido is essentially the correct
^Honan, p. 294. Honan brings together all the refer­





Thus, before the first book is half finished, we 
know that Guido is the murderer and that he is guilty.
Later, there are formal introductions to Guido’s two mono­
logues (l, 949-1015, 1272-1329) which, among other things, 
describe further his personality. The result is, "By the 
end of Book I we have met exactly the Guido that we are to 
know intimately in Books V and XI." The major difference, 
of course, is that after we have read his two monologues our
impression of his personality is "enriched many times over."^
We experience "the artistic impact of his portrait.
We do more than this, however. What is truly fantastic
about Guido is that we experience his own artistry; we are 
subjected to it, beguiled by it, and perhaps even briefly 
seduced by it. In Book V, which this chapter will concentrate 
upon, we experience Guido as the artist who is prostituting 
himself. Just as Bottini, the public prosecutor, later 
"sells out," Guido falsifies his true nature, goes back on 
his true principles, and "sells out" in his first monologue.
His artistry in the fifth book is nothing short of brilliant, 
but for Guido it is false art and he knows it. It is false 
because Guido is absolutely and irrevocably committed to the 
principle of evil. He is a villain because he believes in 
villainy, just as Pompilia is a heroine because she believes 
in goodness. Guido's truth is hatred, Pompilia's truth is
llbid., p. 295. ^Ibid.
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love. But in the fifth book Guido uses his artistry to con­
ceal his black nature. He must portray himself to the judges 
in a manner that he knows they want to see. His behavior 
must be in accord with the sanctioned behavior of the Italian 
aristocracy of the times. It must be normal and typical; he 
must convince the judges that he is one of their kind, and 
that he is motivated by the same qualities that they are 
motivated by. Concerning the murder itself, he must make 
the judges see that he was compelled to murder by the very 
same values that have motivated him in his ordinary daily 
life as a seventeenth century Italian nobleman. For the same 
reasons that he is a count, an educated man, intellectually 
and socially aware, with a long family history, following the 
customs and habits and the training of all people of his 
class--for these very reasons he must show that he was obliged 
to commit a murder— not once but three times. If he can con­
vince the judges of this, he knows he will win his case.
So, he applies all his imaginative and creative efforts 
towards this end. This is, of course, not at all what he is 
really like. And he is not being true to his nature when he 
is doing this, but his life is at stake here and he must bend 
his efforts for this most crucial meeting with the judges.
Guido appears before the judges "in a small chamber 
that adjoins the Court." (I, 950) The judges know him well, 
since most of them were at the trial the previous May when 
he brought charges against Caponsacchi and Pompilia after he
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caught them at Castelnuovo. At that time they were unable
to take the case too seriously, and their attitude toward
Guido was mockingly humorous. Now, of course, Guido has
forced them Into a more serious frame of mind. As he tries
to gauge their reactions, based on what they know about him,
and how he will speak to them now, he wraps his personality
In what Cook calls "artifice and subterfuge."^ He must make
his views In accord with the ambiguous opinions of the Italian
aristocracy of his time. Only In this manner can the judges
Identify with him. Thus Guido makes from the start a "frank
disavowal of any claim to be on a higher level than the
2average worldling of his time." He gains sympathy from the 
judges when he describes how his poverty has made him "a 
laughing-stock, and how his life generally has been a series 
of deceptions and disappointments."3 His attitude toward 
the judges as he speaks to them suggests the kind of attitude 
a typical Impoverished Italian might have. He can be bltlngly 
sarcastic and disapprovingly critical In his attitude toward 
them, particularly since they know him and he knows them.
But for the most part his tone Is conciliatory. On both counts, 
this Is what they would expect and this Is what he gives them.
In his two monologues Guido, like some of Browning's 
other scoundrels, demonstrates a high degree of Intellect.
His thoughts "often hit the truth." He can be profound, even
^Cook, Commentary, p. 92. ^Ibld., p. 234.
3lbld.
126
noble; he can be deftly Ironic, deeply subtle.^ His creative 
abilities have a power and brilliancy all their own. He uses 
them in the fifth book in order to gain the sympathy of the 
Judges. He must have this if he is to win acquittal. When 
they first bring him before the Judges and offer him some 
wine, he declines more than one sip because, as he says, "I 
want my head/ To save my neck, there's work awaits me still." 
(V ,  7 - 8 )
2
I could not give her the kind of love she wanted, 
Guido tells the Judges. Some people have criticized him be­
cause no mention of love has come up in the murder case.
But Pompilia, the "child, girl, wife, in one," wanted youth 
and romance. She wanted the "beating pulse, the rolling eye, 
the frantic gesture" of some handsome and passionate swain.
No, Guido says, there were no roses in my shoes, or a plume 
in my cap, or a trio of guitars and singers at my side. These 
are all good things and a girl has a right to demand them 
"when the fit price is paid the proper way." (V, 567-77)
But was this that kind of a marriage? he asks. Was Pompilia 
a girl from my own class? he wants to know. NqW, "Had it 
been some friend's wife," who had dropped her fan at his foot 
with a note saying that she was willing to risk "'Shame, 
death, damnation,'" Just so she be with him for a minute —  




Guido here paints a picture of himself that is part 
of his larger portrait. He is, he suggests, like most noble­
men, and his reactions, if a married woman of his own class 
pressed her favors upon him, would be the topical one of any 
Italian aristocrat in his position. He knows the judges will 
understand this; they would do practically the same thing, 
although the idea of Guido himself--fifty years old, sallow­
faced, hawk-nosed, shaggily bearded and scrawny in physical 
stature— involved in something like this perhaps appears as 
incongruous to them as it does to the reader.
Guido is, of course, not identifying love with 
marriage. His conception of love seems to stem from the 
romantic infatuations— especially if they are illicit--that 
men of his class habitually get themselves involved in. It 
is, he implies, one of the accepted practices of the worldly 
aristocrat of the time and Guido here sketches it out in the 
false picture of himself that he is artistically constructing.
The idea of such an assignation enlivens his fancy 
and as he warms to his task he offers a further and almost 
lascivious illustration to drive his point home. Suppose, 
he tells us, "some other friend’s, .say daughter," came up­
stairs into his chambers and "tumbled flat and frank on me?" 
Supposing she was bareheaded and barefooted, with her hair 
loose, and with her clothes arranged in such a way that they 
were purposely revealing? What if she was suddenly all over
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hlm, begging hlm to take her, even though she was the adoles­
cent daughter of "’Duke So-and.-So, the greatest man In Rome,*" 
and has "broke bounds" to get away from him, having come all 
the way across town just to be with Guido? Well, Sirs, Guido 
says, with familiarity. If she did come, "The lady had not 
reached a man of Ice!" (V, 685-92)
This passage is revealing of Guido’s true personality 
at the same time that It Indicates how he Is busily working 
away at his art. The picture of the young girl— not some 
friend’s wife but some friend’s daughter (and this makes It 
all the more sexually appealing since It Is such forbidden 
fruit)— Is a daring artistic stroke on Guido’s part. He 
cannot afford to miscalculate here. Everything depends on the 
attitudes of the Judges. Both parties know what the accepted 
conventions are. The kind of things Guido describes must not 
violate the judges’ moral sense--whlch would be largely a 
matter of taste. Since they are In private chambers without 
an audience, the judges will not be required to put on con­
ventional masks and pay lip service to a conventional morality 
which nobody In the upper class gives much credence to. Guido 
knows these men; they are the same ones who shrugged at the 
Illicit romantic entanglements of Pompilia and Caponsacchi 
In the earlier trial the previous May.
The other side of the coin Is Guido’s own Inner self. 
He has obviously thought of such Illicit affairs himself, 
and the one with the young girl especially appeals to him.
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as he believes it will to the Judges. She is somebody young, 
fresh, ripe; she is innocent and virginal; she is the decent, 
virtuous sort, the daughter of the most prestigious man in 
Rome. It would be quite a lift to Guido's debased ego if she 
desired him above all others— an impossibility in reality, 
both for Guido and probably for the judges. All these details 
Guido the artist includes in his little vignette and he knows 
they will add relish to the tale.
But while he is trying to manipulate the Judges and 
play on their attitudes at the same time that he is daringly 
admitting to them that he is no different from other worldly 
Italian aristocrats, he unknowingly reveals to us a flash of 
his true nature, of which we will not receive the full force 
until his second monologue. Such a revelation helps to explain 
at least a small part of Pompilia*s appeal to him: she was 
young--very young--and beautiful, and it would be his pleasure 
to violate her. Unfortunately, however, he can carry it no 
further in Pompilia's case for, while he does violate her 
physically, it is impossible for him to corrupt her goodness, 
and he knows this Just as Instinctively as Pompilia does. 
Moreover, the imaginary Duke's daughter in Guido's picture 
is, despite her training and social station, sexually per­
verse herself, and recognizes in Guido the man of courtliness 
and experience who can bring out what has lain dormant inside 
her. This is the way all women are basically; this is the 
implication of Guido's lascivious portrait. He wants women
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to be basically corrupt, and he suggests that the origin of 
their corruption lies in their sexual nature. It infuriates 
him that Pompilia is totally immune to this corruption and 
is in fact ^  her very nature in perfect opposition to it.
In his second monologue, when he defiantly flings 
aside his sheep’s clothing to reveal his "wolf’s shag" we 
see what he finally understands--that all along, he has hated 
Pompilia with the purest, deepest and blackest kind of hatred, 
"for no other reason than that she is good. In the second 
monologue, he casts aside all the "artifice and subterfuge" 
that he applies in his speech before the judges. He admits 
that he hated her because she was good, because she was utter­
ly self-possessed, because she regarded him with the detached 
and "terrible patience of God." (XI, 1373-80)^
But now, before the judges, he perhaps cannot arti­
culate for himself his true feelings about Pompilia, so in­
dustrious is he in drawing his false picture of himself, in 
order that it will fit in with contemporary Italian attitudes. 
His notions of love and marriage are the ones he believes 
the judges will expect him to have. And, indeed, they are 
not precisely false attitudes on his part so much as they are 
the first layer of attitudes on his part. These values of 
love and marriage Guido might go along with as pragmatic
^Robert Langbaum, The Poetry of Experience, p. 111.
^Cited in Langbaum, ibid., p. 111.
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notions which seem to work in his own time, for his own 
particular social class. Everyone accepts them and uses them 
as a cover to operate under. Most noblemen have both wives 
and mistresses and keep the one distinct from the other.
Each has its place. The wife is a practical matter, a bar­
gain struck for the financial benefit of both sides. A 
mistress, on the other hand, satisfies one's sexual and emo­
tional needs.
Thus it is foolish for the rabble to inquire as to 
whether or not love was an issue in Guido's marriage to 
Pompilia; she was a hawk that Guido "bought at a hawk's 
price and carried home/ To do hawk's service." (V, 703-04)^
It was a bargain pure and simple. Pompilia "was no pigeon," 
but a hawk— a bird Guido bought for its practical value, as 
he would buy other animals for his estate. She was a pos­
session, nothing more. Despite what was said, both parties 
knew it was an exchange for the benefit of each side; this 
has been the way marriages have been arranged for hundreds 
of years. Why, Guido asks persuasively, am I being criti­
cized for doing it now?
3
Love, of course, is only one part of Guido's complex 
portrait. Since he knows it is necessary to prostitute his
^The hawk passage is lucidly analyzed by Honan, 
Browning's Characters, pp. 298-305)
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art, he must ask certain questions. What do they want to 
hear? What would sound most reasonable and yet fit the facts? 
What would sound as though it were the thing that really hap­
pened? The answers will indicate the way he paints his false 
portrait. It cannot be idealized; the judges know him too 
well for that. The portrait must show him as both good and 
bad, like everything else that is uncertain in the ethically 
ambiguous upper-class. It must show that his action is 
typical of a man of his class, and such a typical reaction 
must contain its own justification; that is, his justification 
for his murderous acts must be the typical justification of 
the average Italian nobleman. It is what most people in his 
condition would have done under the circumstances. Then, 
once he has established this premise, he may go on to enlarge 
his own acts as essentially the correct ones and emerge as 
the put-upon hero of the piece, rather than its villain.
His artistry is thus clever but superficial; Guido 
knows its nonsense. But his contempt for legal institutions, 
which he discloses in his second monologue, he must keep 
hidden here. His life depends on whether or not he can per­
suade them that his false portrait is the way it really was. 
His artistic strategy is to admit the murder from the start, 
then to work slowly up from bad to good. That is, Guido looks 
better and better the further we get into his speech. At 
first he is a little man, old, in ill-health, scrawny, 
married to a young, promiscuous girl who gets restless and
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begins to cast about for younger, more virile and more ex­
citing companions.
He has what Cook calls an "acid pseudo-cheerfulness"^ 
when he first enters the private chambers of the judges. No, 
he says, waving help away, I can stand somehow, "half sit 
down/ Without help, make shift even to speak somehow, you 
see." (V, 1-3) He is being very magnanimous about the whole 
thing. Though having been put on the rack and tortured, and 
even yet in pain, he is all right. He deliberately reveals 
a trace of sarcasm to the judges, since it is necessary for 
his portrait. For, if he is indeed innocent, as he will 
show them (his plea is really the equivalent of justifiable 
homicide), then they have gone too far by torturing him, and 
it is especially an insult on account of his rank. It is not 
your fault, he tells the person who is assisting him into 
the chamber. After all "Law is law," in spite of the fact 
that the vulgar have always thought "Noblemen were exempt. . ./ 
Prom racking." (V ,  11-13) Law apparently thinks otherwise 
now.
At the same time that he calls attention to his tor­
ture, he dismisses it; to the reader it is all rather obviously 
theatrical but then, now is the time for cheap dramatics if 
there ever was one. In fact Guido, already beginning to lay 
the first brush strokes for his artistic production, turns 
around and thanks them for the deed. "In short I thank you,—
iQook, Commentary, p. 92.
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yes, and mean the word." (V, 20) The rack is a novel form of 
taking pain. After all, it is "Getting tortured merely in the 
flesh." (V, 23) He thought he would not be able^ta withstand 
it, but he finds that it has served as a sort of counter 
irritation to the spiritual torture which he has undergone 
for the past four years. You see, he tells them somewhat 
pathetically, "Four years have I been operated on/ I' the 
soul," (V, 29-30) so that physical torture acts as a kind of 
release from the psychological discomfort. It is his soul, 
he says, establishing the first piece in his artistic frame­
work. There has been an invasion into the privacy of his 
soul. And so many things are involved in this invasion, he 
tells them.
Guido paints carefully, delineating each detail. My 
self-respect was involved, he says, and my anxiety over our 
good name, my pride in the historicity of that good name, and 
the love I bore for my family, and my responsibility to them 
as head of the house. They looked up through the dim shadows 
to my face "And fancied they found light there." (V, 35)
He begins to add to his framework, building slowly; as an 
artist he is selective but he is thorough. This is what 
leads him to speak eloquently and poignantly on the im­
poverishment of the Pranceschini house— the tatters that have 
been exposed to the world. His father left him poor and Guido 
grew up forced to take on responsibility; his environment 
was such, he claims, that now that he has reached middle age
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he is inevitably sour and saturnine. Guido artfully omits 
the fact that he left Arezzo when he was sixteen, came to 
Rome to seek his fortune, and played toady to the Cardinal 
for thirty years; in reality his responsibility towards his 
family in Arezzo is an artistic device rather than a truth.
As a middle-aged man, he says, the rumor was that he 
beat his young wife if he caught her taking to the window.
Oh, surely, he beats her, Guido laughs, if you want to take 
the word of every gossip monger in the crowd. And as for 
the economies that his mother has practiced in the house for 
all of them, well, the mob can let that alone. Rejoicing in 
God by drinking wins that is three parts water, and scrimping 
along at the dinner table, and dealing with the Comparini-- 
the Court’s physical torture is a trifle compared to these.
I give you this brief catalogue, he tells them, through 
policy. And here Guido as much as admits his artistic maneu- 
verings. It is a rhetorician’s trick, he says, to touch on 
many points at the first of his speech and reserve the 
"choicer points" for later, "Having an eye to (the] climax"
(V, 77-81) This is precisely what Guido is doing. "I 
married the mongrel of a drab," he suddenly exclaims. What 
was I supposed to do with somebody who had duped me and was 
in the arms of a priest, calling their bastard my heir?
(V, 88-93) Your sole mistake, he tells the judges, was in 
putting me on the rack at all. Why go to all those pains 
just to make a stone roll down hill— a stone that is already
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on Its way? Why "rack and wrench/ And rend a man to pieces?" 
The only thing you succeed in doing is to make him open his 
mouth in his own defense. You make him "Show cause for what 
he has dons." Certainly it was "irregular deed" and it is 
apparent that he did it. No one can or would dispute that.
But perhaps he can clear his, name and fame, and stop his neck 
from falling to the ax. There's no point in "calling in 
screws to help!" Then Guido says, "I killed Pompilia 
Pranceschini, Sirs;/ Killed too the Comparini." (V, IO9-IO)
He says it disarmingly, with confidence and a tone of righteous­
ness in his voice. "There's the irregular deed," he tells 
them. Now what we need is a just and correct interpretation 
of that deed, "And truth so far--am I to understand?" (V, 115) 
Isn't this what we want, to get at the truth? Then let us 
get at it as fast as possible, because in spite of my boast,
I feel the pain in my ailing shoulder and might pass out at 
any moment, "Whatever the good will in me." (V, 120)
"Now for truth!" he says dramatically, as he ends 
his prologue and prepares to launch into his full-scale 
artistic production, creating his most complex and most 
intricate lie.
4
One might note Guido's artistic technique here in the 
introductory speech of his monologue. The first section 
(V, I-I20) serves as a microcosm of the rest of his speech.
It is the symbol of his art and of his artistic technique.
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Guido touches on almost all the things that he will 
speak on at much greater length. He gives the judges a sort 
of plot outline or summary of his story, in order to prepare 
them for what to expect in the artistic production itself.
It makes little difference into what art medium we place 
Guido's endeavors, whether it be the art of the painter, or 
the dramatist, or the rhetorician; he mentions all three.
Also, he is a conscious artist, and he knows what he is 
doing and where he is going. He casually admits to the judges 
that he is exercising his art, because even this is part of 
his technique. The judges, he knows, will appreciate him much 
more if he makes some effort to impose a form or framework 
on this muddled business. What the judges want is order, 
purpose, meaning. If he can embellish it and make it inter­
esting, he will even enliven their day; though they are aware 
of what he is doing, he obviously hopes they will admire him 
for it, rather than be wary of listening to it. Art, after 
all, includes illogical things like metaphors and tends to 
minimize what Honan calls "factually demonstrable relation­
ships .
As Honan illustrates when he analyzes Guido's "hawk" 
passage, Guido uses metaphors not simply to illustrate or 
embellish his meaning, but to express his m e a n i n g . ^  Por 
example, when Guido refers to Pompilia as a hawk, he knows
^Honan, p. 299. p. 298.
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he is on safe ground; after all, "a certain leeway with the 
facts must be granted to anyone who uses metaphor, for no 
metaphor is in a factual sense entirely true."^ As a matter 
of fact, to determine whether a metaphor is an appropriate 
and true one in a court of law would be very difficult to do. 
If a witness were allowed, as Guido is, to express his meaning 
metaphorically, he might succeed "in perpetrating the most 
outrageous falsehoods" because of the nature of metaphor, 
since metaphor "takes leave of factually demonstrable relation­
ships and communicates meaning implicitly or symbolically,"2 
Thus, legally, Guido is on safe ground here because the Judges 
cannot accuse him of perjury.
Even Guido's entrance into the chamber is part of his 
artistry; he is simply acting out the role he has already 
assigned to himself. He discusses the issues that have been 
introduced into the case after he has utilized his false 
sense of cheerfulness to call attention to himself. He points 
out the suffering he has experienced for the past four years 
and how this has centered around all the things that would 
be important to a human being— particularly a nobleman. These 
things--self-respect, family pride, a sense of the gentle­
man's station, prestige and honor--would be the normal 
motivations for murder for someone in Guido's situation.
In the deepest part of himself Guido does not feel them, but 
he knows he is supposed to; therefore, artistically, this is
llbid, ^Ibid,, p. 299.
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the way he must portray It. Thus, he brings out immediately 
the family's poverty and how, as the beleaguered head of the 
house, he has been struggling to prevent poverty from making 
further inroads, and he implies that it has been a losing 
battle. He freely admits that there might be some truth to 
the rumors that he is a sour and irascible old man, but he 
points out that his environment has in part made him this way. 
He has been strict, authoritarian, humorless, because, after 
all, fighting to keep one's family from going under is a 
serious business, and there is no time for jesting.
He acknowledges the rumors that he beat his wife —  
the old senex married to the young girl— but he says those 
are just rumors; however, he does not expressly deny them.
He emphasizes the spiritual suffering he has undergone at 
the hands of the Comparini. And if he is eventually beheaded 
or hanged, he wants to point out what he is being executed 
for: for protecting his honor against an adulterous wife 
who was trying to pass the Pranceschini name down to a bastard 
son. He candidly and quite simply admits the murder. The 
only good that has come from his being on the rack is that it 
has caused him to speak in his own defense. For that, he 
claims, is where the truth lies. The truth is not in the 
murder itself, but in the interpretation of that murder. It 
is Guido who will serve as the judges' instruraetot, in order 
that they may see the truth for themselves. He is their 
guide; he knows where the truth is, and he will lead them to
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it through his art.
5
Guido then proceeds to fill out his rough sketch, 
elaborating, detailing, expanding, on the framework he has 
already established— his background and upbringing, his 
filial obligations, his struggle against poverty, his desire 
to restore the family's status, his work for the Church, his 
admitted personality defects, his marriage to a young wife, 
his candid admission that he did indeed commit the murders, 
but only because of the torturings administered by the 
Comparini, and on account of the behavior of his promiscuous 
wife. It is a generally false picture, made up out of bits 
and parts of the truth.
The subject he first returns to is his early training. 
Guido claims that all his trouble came about as a result of 
his early "treading" in those paths where )ie was trained to 
go. (V, 125) He was born into the nobility and was raised 
as the oldest son under the yoke ofsibëlôfeEitgobionsv'- @elpdints 
out he had a higher and nobler obligation— to serve the 
Church; this he maintains he did by being attendant to 
the Cardinal all those years in Rome. And, he says half- 
accusingly, for carrying out my noble work, I end up here 
before you, stiff with torture.
Guido's obvious implication is that his murder of 
Pompilia and the Comparini is in line with and a result of
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his early training in the nobility and in his service to 
the Church. He was merely fulfilling his noble and religious 
obligations when he murdered and now he is being tortured for 
it. He wants to establish in the minds of the judges that 
murdering Pompilia, Pietro and Violante was his duty--not 
only to himself but to society and to God.
Hêêbegins to create a fantastic story about his back­
ground which--the way he constructs it--is not only distorted 
but almost totally untrue. It is a fiction which only an 
artist such as Guido could do Justice to. "l am representative 
of a great line," he tells his auditors, "One of the first 
of the old familles/ln Arezzo, ancientest of Tuscan towns."
(V, 140-42) For Guido's purposes, this is a brilliant begin­
ning of his own personal history. He is appealing to very 
old values in this first statement. His family goes back for 
hundreds of years; it is a famous family, and has contributed 
much for the benefits of others; it is a family steeped in 
tradition and impresses with the hoariness of its age; it 
suggests respect, prestige, privilege and power.
OMé might note that Guido expresses these qualities 
not boastfully, but modestly, with the restraint characteristic 
of the true nobleman. He does not need to boast; his family 
speaks for itself. Although Guido's literal statement is 
almost altogether true, the implications of that statement 
are almost altogether false. Too, he admits with matter-of- 
fact candor that his family is now of the second rank in
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nobility, but at one time thèÿ were of the first rank, and 
although many a parvenu has passed his family up, they do not 
have the blood line that he does. By pointing up his blood 
line in this way, he knows he is bound to impress the Judges. 
His aim is to present a picture of a man proud of his lineage 
and willing to fight and die for it. This attitude is im­
portant later on when Guido attempts to establish as one 
of his motives for murdering Pompilia the fact that she had 
stolen the noble name of Pranceschini and had already passed 
it down to her bastard son.
Of course none of this is true. Guido has almost no
sense of history or tradition. The fact of his own nobility 
he takes for granted. Pride in the family name is an ir­
relevancy to him. His real feeling about the family centers 
on his bitterness against his father for leaving him in such 
poverty. He is cold towards his mother, hates the palace in 
Arezzo, and spent thirty years in Rome attempting to find a
fortune so he would never have to go back. He continually
made demands on his brother Paolo without the slightest feeling 
of gratitude in return--not that Paolo deserved it. He spent 
his time in Rome gambling, gaming, fencing, drinking and 
loafing. He has never done any work in his life, has ex­
ploited people mercilessly and indiscriminately and is by 
his very nature totally and incredibly evil, perhaps even 
outdistancing lago in the depth of his depravity. The judges 
of course cannot know this. We know it because Browning has
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already told us. But we are almost willing to suspend our 
disbelief because of the layer after layer of invention that 
Guido creates as he rounds out his story. It is fascinating 
to follow: for us, to see what fantastic lengths his fictions 
can carry him; for the judges, to see whether or not there is 
something to Guido's story, after all.
Guido explains to them how, as head of the house, he 
could not be a priest or a military man— the two leading pro­
fessions which ordinarily would have been open to him. He 
maintains that he had to go to Rome at such an early age, for 
he could certainly not restore any part of the family's 
fortune in Arezzo. He tells of his disappointments in Rome 
and why, after thirty years, he decided to return. And he 
would have, except for Paolo's advice concerning marriage.
He defends his reasons for marrying such a girl as 
Pompilia. Though he had no money he could give her his honored 
name. This, he argues, is the way of the world; it was the 
custom, the way he and all men like him are trained. Honor 
of birth has value, he claims, and can be justifiably used 
to buy value of another sort; the social fabric itself would 
break if this method of sustaining one's noble family was 
disallowed. Honor is a privilege, after all, and may be used 
as a coin at the bargaining counter. Guido's references 
to the "social fabric" are of course accurate as far as they 
go. The judges know that many marriages are arranged just 
as he says and the custom has long been in effect and is
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desirable.
Guido justifies his marriage as a marriage of con­
venience for both sides. As he describes the hatred and 
bitterness of the Comparini while they are at Arezzo, he 
maintains they had nobody to blame but themselves, and that 
when they exposed his poverty to the world, his standing 
and reputation were done irreparable harm, and all because 
of their "purblind greed." (V, 5^5)
As for Pompilia, was he so wrong in demanding loyalty 
and obedience from her? One can imagine the judges nodding 
their heads in assent. The law says that a wife must stay 
with her husband, no matter what her parents do. "Who sets 
this law aside/ Iti my particular case?* he asks pointedly.
He ^admits the difference in their ages, but argues that a 
woman who is the "nobler of the sex" would have been success­
ful in sharing her life with him. He believes in the good 
old way, "Believe a woman still may take a man" and for that 
short period we call life, this woman can, "for the soul’s 
sake, understand the fault/ Of armour frayed by fighting,"
(V, 598-602)
Guido is here drawing apicturé of himself as the 
aging, embattled and still heroic knight--his armor no longer 
shining but frayed--whose young wife would have all the more 
reason to stand by him. The obligation he incurred when he 
married her was "just to practise mastery, prove my master­
ship," as it was Pompilia’s duty to submit herself and afford
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him pleasure. (V, 716-I8) There is no point in his teaching 
the judges what marriage means. They know that God and law 
say it is for the husband to be master in his own house.
This was the custom of the time and the judges know it and 
agree with it. He compares it, in an elqquent analogy, with 
the marriage of the monk to the Church— the monk always sub­
ordinate in the relationship and fulfilling himself through 
the reflected glory of the Church. (V, 723-53)
If I was over-harsh, he tells them,the worse in the 
wife who does not try to soften me; this is her wifely duty.
If I was too clumsy, too unromantic, and perhaps too rough, 
she will not "mend the case" by biting and clawing and fighting 
back, (V, 751-53) or else I may get rougher.
The credit is due me, Guido claims, for taking up 
Pompilia*s cause after Pietro and Violante were shamelessly 
voicing her illegitimacy all over Rome. She, for her part, 
should have renounced her father and mother for damning her 
to such infamy. And, Guido says, this is the reason why he 
forged Pompilia*s letter to Paolo, because he was merely 
helping her to carry out her duty. "I confess all--let it 
be understood--/ And deny nothingl" (V, 846-47) By writing 
out the letter in pencil and them making Pompilia trace over 
it in pen, he was teaching her what her duty was.
When Pompilia began to realize her beauty and began 
to feel the stirrings of youth and recklessness inside her, 
did she resist all the attentions the young men of Arezzo
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began to pay her? It would seem, since she knew she was the 
daughter of a common whore, as though this might cause her to 
want to be even more chaste than the average girl. But,
Guido claims— in one of his baldest lies— the exact opposite 
was the case. And while he was working day and night strug­
gling to keep their heads above water, she was already meeting 
Caponsacchi, and their illicit affair had begun. "Capon- 
sacchi," he says, and the Judges are bound to appreciate his 
humor here, "thought the nearest way/ To his church was some 
half-mile round by my door." (V, 939-40)
If they wonder why he did not do something to stop 
her reckless behavior at the time, he admits that he was too 
tolerant; he used threats when he should Have used force.
The course that he finally took--murdering all three of them-- 
was the "course a wise man takes." (V, 979)
Although Guido's "quasi-candid" views on love and 
marriage might seem cruel today, they were "in accord with 
the opinion of the Italy of his time."  ^ And they are quasi- 
candid for the simple reason that we have no evidence that 
Guido either accepted or rejected them. Love and marriage, 
for Guido, merely offered more opportunities for exploitation. 
He would not be concerned with having "views" about them. 
Instead, he formulates and presents those views that he knows 
the typical nobleman of his day has, and he seeks to establish 
his own motivations through those views.
^Cook, Commentary, p. 93.
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When he describes his marriage as a business arrange­
ment, he is describing a procedure common in his time and 
acceptable to the judges. When he asserts that he had to be 
master in his own house, not only because it is man's law, 
but God's, he knows the judges will emphatically agree with 
him. In fact, the only place where Guido obviously feels he 
is on weak ground is when he is hard pressed to explain why 
he did not put a stop to Pompilia's reckless behavior in 
Arezzo, and why he did not kill them when he caught them.
This would have been the natural thing to do for a person 
in his position according to the custom of the time. Guido’s 
explanation is that he thought threats and loud talk on his 
part would be enough, but he admits now that he was foolish 
in believing this. Instead of brandishing his sword, he says,
he should b&sre used it. (V, 98O-81)
Threats did no good, for on that day when he awoke
to find "noon in my face, a crowd in my room,/ Fumes in my
brain, fire in my throat," (V, 990-91) and a wife gone God 
knows where, the money-coffer ransacked, the closets empty, 
the devils were indeed making merry over his "tesselated 
floor," romping "around my broken gods/ Over my desecrated 
hearth." (V, 990-93, 1031-35) Guido pauses, then adds, "So 
much/ For the terrible effect of threatening, Sirg,r" (V,
1035-36)
6
Guido reminds the Court of its original reaction when
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he caught Pompilia and Caponsacchi and brought charges against 
them in Rome, I ôâlled in law, he says, and they accused me 
of shrinking "‘from gallant readiness and risk,/ Were coward: 
the thing's inexplicable else.'" (V, IO9I-92) But "sweet my 
lords," he begs them, please "inform my ignorance." If we 
suppose for a moment that I was afraid, "no lion but a lamb," 
does that deprive me of my right as a lamb "And give my fleece 
and flesh to the first wolf?" Guido here is almost stretching 
his artistry too far in using the lamb analogy as a comparison 
to his own temperament. He^quickly abandons it by asserting 
that gentleness and timidity were not the problems anyway.
He insists that, as a nobleman, he was brought up "at the very 
feet of law," a man who would await the approval of the Courts 
before he would ever clench a fist at an outrage, "much less 
stab 1" (V, IIO6-O8) He insists that he was "ready enough to 
rise at the right time," whenever he received the sanction 
of law.
He admits that Caponsacchi and Pompilia never made 
any secret of their affair, and that during the first trial 
he became the laughing stock precisely because heucarried out 
his obligation by calling in law. "$hey never tried to put 
on mask at all," he says in mock-surprise. Being a person 
who has been wearing masks all his life, Guido knows the 
implications of playing a role. The ironic part is that Guido 
is privately aware that what he is saying is true, since 
Caponsacchi and Pompilia never found it necessary to put on
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masks after they met; they were never anything other than 
their true selves.
Once he had the case before the judges, however, all 
he could get was the terrible compromise decision. The Court 
judged that Pompilia was driven to flight by what "she some­
how took for cruelty." (V, ll84) It is not, the Court had 
argued, that this was actually the case, but the way it 
seemed to her. Therefore, the Court decided the end result 
was lawful because, in order to save a life, "there's no risk 
should stay our leap." (V, 1188) If this is so, Guido main­
tains, "it follows that all means to the lawful end/ Are 
lawful likewise,--poison, theft and flight." (V, 1189-90),
Guido, now established as the embattled nobleman and 
wronged husband, has more or less equated his status with that 
of the judges, and is thus in a position to attack their 
decision. Since they did indeed punish Pompilia and Capon­
sacchi, then it must have been for the adultery, and if it 
was, then that must give him the right in "the riddle, since 
right must bel" (V, 1§39)
Returning to Arezzo after the trial, Guido was mocked 
and ridiculed beyond expectation. He tells the Court that he 
tried to be calm and objective, knowing that he had done the 
right thing. "I played the man as I best might, bade friends/ 
Put non-essentials by and face the fact." (V, 1278-80) He 
still, he insists, had faith in law. He filed for divorce 
and waited in the face of Arezzo's snickering. "'Laugh who
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wins!’" he told them, "'Y ou shall not laugh me out of faith 
in law**" Guido pauses, stretching his portrait of the 
aristocrat who believes in the time-honored customs sanctioned 
by God and society as far as it can go. "'I listen, through 
all your noise, to Rome I'"
But he could only carry his faith so far, he tells them. 
His picture of himself as the good citizen who served God and 
Law is how almost a finished product. The letters he began 
to receive from Rome informing him of the progress of his suits 
in court were accompanied by further information in regard to 
how he was being laughed at by the general populace. He was 
led to understand that even his friends in Rome spoke "’Of 
the old outwitted husband.../ Pitted against a brace of 
juveniles.’" (V, 1355-56) They regarded Caponsacchi as "’A 
brisk priest who is versed in Ovid’s art/ More than his 
Summa.’" (V, 135^-58) Pompilia was the "’gamesome wife/ Able 
to act Corinna without book,’" and the Comparini were those 
"’waggish parents who played dupes/ To dupe the duper.’"
(V, 1358-61) The way his friends in Rome saw it, even the 
situation in Arezzo had its comic aspects. In short, the 
whole thing was simply a delight from the start, and Paolo, 
in the midst of suits and countersuits, suddenly gold 
"’House and goods.../ Leaves Rome,--whether for Prance or 
Spain, who knows?’" (V, 1370-71)
If the judges would only try to visualize the kind of 
life he was leading in Arezzo at the time he heard the news of
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Paolo's departure. It was a chilly autumn day, he tells them. 
He sat in the somber gallery upstairs in bis palace with a 
feeling of hopelessness and futility. His mother was sick in 
bed. His brother Girolamo was walking his misery away by 
hunting along the mountain-side. One might note here the 
effective use to which Guido is putting his artistic technique 
in creating a single image for the judges. The scene per­
fectly symbolizes most of the points he has spoken of to this 
point— his self-effacement, his obligations as head of the 
house, his poverty, the hurt, bitter feelings arising from 
Pompilia's betrayal and flight and the public's snickering, 
the sense of isolation, and the realization that he must 
fight his battle alone. Guido had dinner alone that evening. 
He.ate "the coarse bread" and drank the watered wine. Within 
himself was a great struggle, and there, he says, at that 
point, he reached some decisions. "'1 am irremediably beaten 
here,'" (V, 1393) is what he told himself. Pompilia and 
Caponsacchi, Pietro and Violante, have "'Made me their spoil 
and prey from first to last.*" (V, 1396)
Guido's claim is that he, the ethically just, hard­
working, scrupulously honest man was the victim all along.
Add to this his desertion by his brother in Rome, Paolo, and 
he can only conclude that they had "caught me in the cavern 
where 1 fell." (V, 1409) They were all working against him 
and they "Covered my loudest cry for human aid/ With this 
enormous paving stone of shame." (V, 1410-11)
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Guido here Is furiously painting his false portrait. 
He portrays himself as the man of integrity who is at first 
shocked into passivity by the evil he f jnds in those people 
he had trusted. Even God, he hints, bad deserted him. (V, 
I4l4-l8) He compares his condition to one of his ancestors 
who had taken part in the Crusades and had been betrayed by 
the feigning of a girl. His ancestor rushed to free her from 
her ravisher only to find himself caught in an ainbush by her 
friends who flayed him and killed him "while she clapped her 
hands and laughed." (V, 1424) Pompilia did the same to him, 
he says, and he was brutally ambushed first by Violante and 
Pietro, then by Caponsacchi, then by the Courts, and now by 
the whole structure of the customs and time-honored traditions 
of Roman society.
He said tragically, "‘I am the last of my line which 
will not suffer any more.'" (V, 1^26-27) But at the time when 
he said this, while he was still in Arezzo, he had one com­
pensation. And here Guido puts the finishing touches to his 
portrait. He can hardly expect to add any more to his story 
or it will seem an exaggeration even to the judges. Thank God 
he had no children who would have to bear the same heart­
break. Here Guido suspensefully leads up the the climax. He 
has prepared his audience carefully and now must drive his 
points home.
What possible reaction could he have had, other than 
fire and rage, when he received the news that Pompilia had had
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a baby? He had thought that there i?as very little else they 
could do to torture him, but he suddenly realized that It was 
not the end but the beginning. They were just getting started 
The baby was no Franceschini, but a Caponsacchi and he will 
brandish my name freely; or, if he is mine, the disgrace of 
his mother will follow him always. But, Guido maintains, his 
"inmost heart" told him that the child was indeed a bastard 
and none of his. And Pompilia and Caponsacchi made a nest 
for him, "As the manner is of vermin, in my flesh." (V, 1538)
7
Guido argues for the incontestable rightness of what 
he did. It is God's law, he insists. Was I supposed to let 
things go on and on, rotting and corrupting my flesh and 
soul? "I appeal to God," he says. What does He say about 
it? And what does Nature teach "when I look to learn?"
(V, 15^2-43) Why, he says, God and Nature tell me "that I 
am alive, am still a man." (V, 1544) And as a man, with the 
hand of God touching me, there can be "No more of law."
Law no longer applies. "A voice beyond the law/ Enters my 
heart" and asks "Quis est pro Domino?" (V, 1548-49)
With almost breathless dramatics, Guido describes the 
circumstances surrounding the murder. He describes how the 
four hands he picked from the field were staunchly loyal and 
with him from the start; how his mind reeled and things seemed 
out of focus as they rode to Rome, so overcome by tortured
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suffering was he; how it was the absolute feeling inside him 
that he must kill them because it was an order from God and 
was like stamping out Satan and declaring to the world the 
one supreme law— "that right is right." (V, 1578) He dis­
cusses how he hesitatèd once they arrived in Rome on Christmas 
Eve:and paused to consider the meaning of Christ’s message of 
"peace on earth and good will toward men." But behind the 
halo of the Holy Infant he saw Satan lurking and peace on 
earth came to mean his irrevocable duty to avenge the wrongs 
against him and against God. His picture is here so brilliant, 
so charged with motivation, as he calls on God’s law, as he 
reminds us of the meaning of the birth of Christ, it has every­
thing that the Judges would need to accept his story.
Yet, he continues, he was willing, even at the last, 
to grant one concession. If she did not open the door when 
he said "Caponsacchi" he would grant them all life. The only 
thing he felt certain of, he says, was his will to do right. 
Why, even now,— "I pray God that I think aright’"--I don’t 
believe I would have murdered them had Pompilia or Pietro 
answered the door. "Had either of these but opened, I had 
paused." (V, 1648) But "it was she the hag, she that brought 
hell/ For a dowry" (V, 1649-50) who answered and she sealed 
the doom of all three.
I had to kill her, he argues. There was a feeling of 
the deepest, most real, most Justifiable sense of rightness 
inside him, "one/ Immeasurable everlasting wave of a need/ To
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abolish that detested life." (V, I66I-63) Here, we can rest 
assured, Guido is telling the absolute truth.
8
By this murder, Guido claims, he purged himself. He 
had his sense again and his soul was "safe from the serpents." 
(V, 1678) Now I can sleep at night, he says, now I can live. 
Now I am sane.
The rest of the trial is up to the judges. When they 
hear Caponsacchi's testimony, it will no doubt have more 
polish than his, but at least his is true. "The trial is no 
concern of mine," he says. "The main of the care is over."
(V, 1699-1700) He wants to give the picture of a man who 
knows that whatever happens, he has done the right thing.
If the Court wants to do the right thing, then it is obvious 
that they must set him free. He cannot express to them the 
feeling of relief he has had since he killed his enemies.
"Let me begin to live again^" he entreats them In 
this that they style murder, "I did God’s Bidding and man's 
duty, so, breathe free." (V, 1702-03) My rage is over. The 
disease that was eating away at me I have cured. "I am 
myself and whole now." (V, I707)
He feels a wonder in the simple joy of living. He 
can see and hear again. His body feels youthful and playful. 
He appreciates again the "healthy taste of food and feel of 
clothes." (V, 1710) He is ready to take to the "common
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life" once more and that in Itself is reason enough why he 
should not be put to death. He has that "willingness to live,"
(V, 1713)
He points out to them that he made no real effort to 
escape after béjleft the scene of the murder because he knew 
he was in the right. He insists too, that had he not felt 
vindicated, he could have paid hired assassins to carry out 
the job secretly. Now, he argues, it is over. "Health is 
returned, and sanity of soul." (V, 1740) He has the instinct 
to life. I want to save my life, he tells the judges, not 
only to serve myself and Rome as a useful citizen, but to 
serve God. "God shall not lose a life/ May do Him further 
service." Here on earth, the judges are his "last hope" 
and they must see their duty just as Guido saw his.
And his final defense is one of law. "I claim law," 
he cries to them. It is the "higher law whereof your law/
0* the land is humbly representative." (V, 1762-63) Based 
on this higher law, he asks, is there anything that I have 
been accused of for which I have not furnished a defense?
Guido argues for what he tells the judges are his 
deepest feelings, just as Caponsacchi is to argue for his in 
the next monologue. God breathes his verdict to me, Guido 
claims. He has already informed me that I am innocent. And 
God's verdicts are passed on down to each court until they 
reach "Man's conscience, custom, manners,"--all those things 
that attempt to establish "God's verdict in determinable
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words.» (V, 1771-75)
The rules of law here on earth--that whole body of 
jurisprudence--are really "What simply sparkled in men's 
eyes before." My whole life and what it stands for must be 
considered in this light. And If it is, then "What has 
Society to charge me with?" (V, I788)
You know who I am, he tells them. You know how I
long served the Church while here in Rome. You know that I
was exonerated by the Governor and Archbishop in Arezzo. You
are perhpps aware too, he insinuates, that were I a more
powerful noble, you would be more inclined to favor my case. 
As he builds to the final climax, with feigned passion and 
self-righteous indignation, Guido recklessly and daringly 
castigates the Court. Your equals in Arezzo, he points out 
to them, cleared me; so too did the Tuscan court. "Look to 
it," he warns them,."or allow me freed so far I" (V, I866)
He returns to some of the more intricate points, in 
the case, particularly his behavior during Pompilia»s flight 
and its consequences. He insists that he comes before the 
judges with "clean hands." (V, I867) He asserts that during 
the previous trial the Court allowed that he had not wronged 
his wife. Actually, in the Court's compromise decision, 
the judges avoided the problem. He admits that law gives 
"license" to murder adulterous wives and their paramours but 
he was patient; the world, however, called it cowardice. He 
insists that in the compromise decision, since Caponsacchi
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and Pompilia both received pûtiishment, they must have been 
guilty. He reminds the judges that the Arezzo court sentenced 
Pompilia to life imprisonment. The Roman Court, which could 
not deal with Pompilia's robbery ofuGuido's goods, but only 
with the adultery, gave Pompilia a month in a convent and then 
allowed her to move' intotthat house which was the destination 
of her escape to begin with. Guido is here again criticizing 
the Court; he knows that the judges that are listening to 
him now are the same ones who were involved in the compromise 
decision eight months earlier.
Guido has placed himself squarely in the right. He 
can afford now to chastise the Court, since his criticism 
logically follows from the false picture of the case he has 
given. For if he is indeed all the things he says, and if it 
happened the way he says it happened, the Court deserves his 
rebuke. He would be suspect if he did not give it to them.
He further criticizes them by stating that their "cure"
(their compromise decision) only made the disease worse. For 
once Violante was back in Rome she caused him more misery than 
she ever did in Arezzo. She was like a reptile who crushed 
and coiled itself around him. And, after squeezing the life 
out of him, her aim was to renew his life through his son, 
Gaetano. His son would have had no chance, Guido argues, 
being raised "By that thief, poisoner and adultress/ I call 
Pompilia," (V, 1976) and that perjured priest, the "foster- 
father, Caponsacchi*s self." (V, 1979)
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Can the Court look on him and say that he did not 
do the very thing the judges thought to do in the previous 
case? Has he not "thoroughly trampled out sin's life at 
last?" (V, 1989) Has he not been "law's mere executant" 
carrying out law's sentence? Absolve me then, he enjoins 
them. His plea becomes passionate, idealistic, as he has 
now come full circle in his drama, from being thought of 
as a murderer to being though of as the noblest defender of 
human rights. "Protect your own defender,--save me. Sirs I" 
he urges them. Do not be complacent and play into the hands 
of the devil.
He tells them that now more than ever, he has so 
much to live for: there is his aging mother in Arezzo, his 
fugitive brother Paolo, his misguided youngest brother, 
Girolamo. Moreover, he wants his son, Gaetano, "Whom law 
makes mine,--I take him at your word." (V, 2027)
With these behind him, he can go forward, "face new 
times, the better day." The times will be made better by the 
very decision the judges will make regarding his case. He 
argues for a revival of the old Rome, full of "honest women 
and strong men,/ Manners reformed, old habits back once 
more." He wants the basic values of living restored, "The 
wholesome household rule in force again,/ Husbands once more 
God's representative." (V, 2042-43) He presents himself as a 
symbol of this revival; his case can itself be the beginning 
of a new society with the Church and the family at its
l60
foundation, "Wives like the typical Spouse once more, and 
Priests/ No longer men of Belial." (V, 2044-45)
And he wants to be able to watch his son grow up 
in this kind of healthy environment, so that in later years 
he can tell him of how it all came about, how "The task 
seemed superhuman, still/ I dared and did it, trusting God 
and law." (V, 205O-51)
And after this beautiful piece of sophistry Guido ends 
his speech the way he started it, by referring to his torture. 
The difference in what he says, however, is enormous. Whereas 
before, his pseudo-cheerfulness was a way of criticizing the 
Court, now he uses the torture in retrospect, as it were.
He has put it all behind him, is what he is saying. He has 
been through the fires of hell. Most of his torment was 
inflicted because of other people's hatred. The torture of 
the Court is one of those accidents that always seem to 
happen when one is being subjected to a long siege of torment 
anyway. The "final" torture thus becomes a device Guido uses 
to place himself above the ethical values of the judges and 
"normal" citizens like them. ■ He has the true values of the 
old Rome. In this way Guido ends masterfully by establishing 
the moral truth of his superiority which he achieved through 
heroism, courage and suffering.
If God should stoop to kiss his hand, he says, and 
give a start at the torture the hand has had to undergo, Guido 
will only smile and explain to Him that "'That was an accident/
I6l
I ' the necessary process,*" (V, 2055-56) When one Is search­
ing for truth, accidents do happen, torture-lrons are mis­
applied; but one Is willing to risk pain and suffering, and 
one comes to understand how people with only normal under­
standing might mistakenly administer such pain. One cannot 
blame them because they can not really know. Thus his torture, 
he tells God, "'Is hardly misfortune, and no fault at all,*"
(V, 2058)
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The torch that Guido uses to light up his dark world 
Is the light of his artistic Imagination. His torch Is his 
artist's brush. As he holds his torch outward, he lights 
up portions of his cavern of .daricness; the blackness closes 
In after him the deeper he gets Into the caverns of his soul. 
This takes place largely In his second monologue; In the first 
we see the light of his unquestionably brilliant artistry 
rather than the darktiess; It Is a false light just as It Is 
a ,;false art. In the second monologue we come to see how 
Guido's very creativity Is what destroys him. Art Imposes 
order, and Guido sees the necessity of constructing an order 
In his first monologue. He Imposes this order on his world, 
gives that world meaning and purpose; Its foundation Is an 
unchanging ethical center where the "real" values prevail.
The details of Guido's picture are entirely contrary to what 
Guido actually believes. We might regard them as ratlonall-
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zatlons except that Guido is aware of their falseness and 
would never offer them in seriousness. Although he wants to 
fool the judges, Guido has no desire to fool himself. Whole­
heartedly committed to evil, Guido feels no need to justify 
it to himself even though he might to the judges. Evil, for 
him, is its own justification. He feels no need to philoso­
phize about it.
As an artist Guido knows that he has something working
on his side. He knows that many of the things he says are
true or in part true. It is true that the Comparini duped 
him, for example. It is true that he and his family received 
much abuse from public gossip. It is true that Pompilia 
deserted him in the company of a sophisticated priest who 
had gained some notoriety for his activities with women. It 
is true that Guido attempted to seek red'ress in the Courts 
rather than killing Pompilia and the Comparini outright.
Guido knows that many of the facts are on his side.
As an artist, he is not short on materials to work with. He
obviously sees the artistic possibilities. He knows he must 
create a drama that has a beginning, middle and end, where 
one event follows another because of the motivations of the 
characters involved. He must establish himself as the hero 
of the piece, and the others as the villains. And he must 
show that he himself underwent change as a person— both 
psychologically and spiritually. He must -show, in the best 
tradition of the heroic saga, how the events conspired to
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bring out the best within his own personality; how his 
development was in a sfeep-by-step direction toward higher 
spiritual fulfillment. And in the best sense of tragedy, he 
must show how, because the times have been out of joint, he 
has undergone torment and suffering in order to set them 
aright.
Guido is thus not only poet and playwright; he is also 
the near-tragic hero--the person who emerges from the fires 
of tragedy and hell in order to serve as God's avenger here 
on earth. He admits to personality inadequacies on his own 
part. He admits to having perhaps delayed too long in Rome 
searching for a fulfillment that never came. His point is 
that the qualities were latent in himself and that by mur­
dering, he put these qualities into action, made them operative 
in his own society, in order to reactivate and revitalize that 
society so that it would be a reality rather than a mirage.
One cannot fail to notice the overwhelming parallels 
to Caponsacchi. Such parallels cannot help but add to the 
depths of Guido's subtlety and insight. It is as if Guido 
was appropriating for himself all the qualities that really 
belong to Caponsacchi. It is an unconscious--or perhaps 
conscious— admission on Guido's part that Caponsacchi is the 
real hero of the drama. For it was not Guido, but Caponsacchi, 
who had the heroic qualities within him, waiting to be brought 
out. And it was Caponsacchi who is really God's agent and 
who had repeatedly put off making a commitment to God and who
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instead, played the gallant to the young ladies in Arezzo 
and engaged in the function of being social priest. It was 
Caponsacchi who needed a spiritual force such as Pompilia to 
rouse him from his inactivity and into action. It was Capon­
sacchi, and not Guido, who recognized his deepest feelings 
as being the true ones and finally committed himself to their 
implications. It was Caponsacchi who will later insist to 
these same Judges that one must act, one must put into action 
the principles upon which he rests all his cases.
The parallels between the two men are simply too 
close to be denied. And it can only point to one thing: 
that Guido is consciously--perhaps preconsciously--aware of 
the underlying truths of all the things that Caponsacchi and 
Pompilia stand for. As a person, he knows that his only chance 
is to reverse these roles, to make the reality which Capon­
sacchi and Pompilia have created, his reality. As an artist, 
Guido realizes that his artistic duty is to expropriate these 
truths of Caponsacchi and Pompilia and make them the foundation 
of his own painting; this is the only kind of order he can 
possibly impose upon his false portrait. It is not really 
his reality. When he uses his artistry in the second mono­
logue in a last desperate and defiant attempt to impose order 
upon his "real" reality, Guido's world shatters and breaks into 
fragments. Just as goodness and truth require order and pur­
pose and a true set of values, so the terrible truth of ab­
solute evil requires not order, but chaos and destruction.
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In the first monologue Guido succeeds as an artist, 
because his picture of himself and his world has the truth 
of Pompilia and Caponsacchi*s reality at its base. He creates 
a sort of myth of himself as the St. George of the piece rather 
than Caponsacchi, who has claim on the role. In the second 
monologue, the real myth is disclosed in all the depths of its 
horror. There he casts off his "sheep's clothing" and shows 
his "wolf's shag." We meet Satan himself, holding out the 
light of his painter's brush, trying to sustain the real 
myth of himself through his artistry; there we see how he must 
have light in order to carry out the blackness which is lodged 
in the dark caverns of his soul. There, Guido's artistry 
has to fail.
In using the quality of moral creativity which belongs 
to Pompilia and Caponsacchi, Guido carefully demonstrates 
to the judges the nature of his own moral and spiritual develop­
ment. It is a process undergone only through action. Guido 
must show them the inevitability of the murder as the final 
step in his educational quest for truth.
When he first appears before the judges, he knows
that he is being regarded— in part— as a murderer. It is that
attitude that he must change. When he comes into the chamber,
he seems cheerful in spite of all his sufferings. But he 
presents the picture of someone weak and insignificant.
Through his own artistry he begins to grow in stature before 
their eyes. In touching upon various points in the case, he
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mentions his ill-health, his age, his appearance, his sullen 
personality, his unromantic attitudes. There is not much 
potential here, and he must succeed in showing how he moved 
away from this position toward God's light.
As we read further into the monologue, we see how 
Guido subtly adds dimension to his personality as he slowly 
converts his character into that of the Christian knight- 
hero— one who combines the romantic notions of chivalry 
and courage with the Christian ethic. He is old and his armor 
is somewhat frayed from doing battle. His face shows the 
depths of suffering. We learn, too, that what was once thought 
cowardice on his part was in reality Christian patience— a 
patience which stemmed from his deep faith in justice and the 
legal machinery which society had set up to administer justice. 
But Guido, with more insight than others, saw that when a 
society neglects to carry out its own beliefs, man-made justice 
and its instrument— the law— break down, and that it is up 
to individual human beings like Guido— people who are unique 
because of their will-to-believe— who must restore them to 
their original purpose.
We see that Guido's heroic possibilities have, in the 
past, been more of a promise than a reality. His underlying 
traits have remained hidden because of his self-effacing 
temperament. But once he is put to the test and finds himself 
under duress and spiritual torment, his heroic and Christian 
qualities begin to reveal themselves. We receive an early
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indication of this when Guido slowly becomes more manly in 
the monologue as he speaks of his God-given and wholesome 
authority to be master in his own house.
In the end we discover that all the things he be­
lieved in and had fought for were at stake. As a servant to 
God he could do no other than what he did. Greed, avarice, 
cruelty, maliciousness— all the things that the "world's 
insight" had accused him of— are not even mentioned by Guido 
as motives. He does not lower himself to answer these 
charges, since, from the picture he paints of his own moti­
vations, they could not possibly have even been in his mind.
In the end, he is God's avenger, fighting heroically 
to restore the traditional values upon which the old Rome 
was founded— the belief in honor, truth and dignity, the respect 
for that instrument— law— which society designated to sustain 
and uphold these values and make them truly operative. He 
emerges as the very "soldier-saint" that Pompilia sees in 
Caponsacchi; he is the embattled, aging Christian knight, the 
Crusader, the upholder of law and liberty. As the sun sets 
on his world, he shows the courage and the conviction to 
re-create that world anew.
Such is the picture that Guido paints, dazzling us by 
the flashing darkness of his world.
CHAPTER VIII
CAPONSACCHI, THE FIRST EXPERIMENTALIST
1
Caponsacchi is appearing before the judges for a 
second time. He knows them well. They are the same three 
that he faced eight months before in May of 1$97> when he was 
sent into exile because he helped Pompilia in her flight from 
Guido,
At first he confronts them with anger and sardonic 
contempt. What they had thought were the vapors of an illicit 
romance he now shows to be "this sudden smoke from hell,"
(VI, 2) And none of the judges is laughing now, he reminds 
them, while before there was the "blameless shrug," the 
"permissible smirk," the "titter stifled in the hollow palm," 
as the judges all winked at the sly young priest's indis­
cretion, We too were young once, they had told him.
Now the Court is obliged to call upon him in a dif­
ferent category. He is not on trial. In a sense, he implies, 
they are. The magnanimous Law that Bottini ("Law's son") is 
later to personalize and invest with such maternal sanctity 
finds itself in a rather uncomfortable role. The formulas 
it applied at Caponsacchi's trial the preceding May have dis-
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solved Into uselessness. The Judges, with a certain amount 
of discomfiture, are compelled to ask Caponsacchi for help.
He must tell his tale again. He cannot help but point out 
that his story will be no different than it was when he re­
lated it on the first occasion. Nothing, for his own part, 
has changed. No, he tells them, the change is in the Court 
itself. In May, they greeted his tale with laughter. They 
believed he had simply had the bad luck to have been caught—  
in flagrante delicto as it were. They could not take him 
seriously. Nor does he entirely blame them, since he was 
aware that the Judges knew him by reputation and had no doubt 
heard of some of his other pecadilloes.
He appears in the court in the function of amicus 
curiae, summoned by them for any light he might be able to 
throw upon the murder.^ (VI, I636) In contrasting their 
laughter at his earlier appearance in May with their serious­
ness now, he indicts them by implication, because their 
seriousness is not really needed now, since it will not save 
Pompilia's life. Before, he says, he was the "Jocular piece 
of punishment," and "now you sit as grave, stare as aghast/
As if I were a phantom." (VI, 25-6) They plead with him to 
"Counsel the Court in this extremity." (VI, 28) Now it is 
his turn to laugh, but like the Judges' seriousness, his
Icook, Commentary, p. 112. Cook demonstrates how 
Browning solved the problem of including Caponsacchi in the 
trial, since in the actual trial, there is no evidence that 
he was calledi
170
laughter would be useless and hollow.
Let me show you "the mystery of this murder," he 
tells them. "This deed, you saw begin— why does Its end/ 
Surprise you?" (VI, 77-8) Humorously, they had told him 
before that Law did not need his help, that Law could watch 
over Pompilia's Innocence, If she Indeed were Innocent, that 
It was not his office to carry her off with such dramatic 
suddenness.
But they did not watch over her. And now they must 
ask for his help. Yet why tell the tale again, he hammers 
at them. "For what?/ Pompllla Is only dying while I speak!" 
(VI, 46-7) He reminds them that when Christ was crucified 
the soldiers merrily cast dice for the coat of him whose blood 
was still fresh before them. And Pompllla, whom he regards 
with just the same kind of reverence as he regards Christ, 
demanded at the first trial the seriousness which she Is 
getting belatedly now. But her blood, he tries to show by 
his analogy (John xlx, 23, 24) was actually flowing then,
Guido "has butchered her accordingly,/ As she foretold and as 
myself believed." (VI, 42-3) But the judges were like the 
soldiers, full of mirth. Why, he asks with theatrical sudden­
ness, are you not laughing now?
2
The Pope, when later reviewing the flight from Arezzo, 
comments on the theatrical aspects of Caponsacchl's behavior.
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(X, 1128-37) There was, the Pope points out, something of 
the fool, the hypocrite, and the masquerader, in his actions. 
Indeed, Caponsacchi is not unaware of the dramatic possi­
bilities of his present situation, as he stands before the 
judges. He is a man, we gradually discover, who plays many 
different roles in and out of society. His role-playing and 
stage acting, however, are not to be equated with evasion, 
glibness, or the fate of a man who cannot distinguish his 
mask from his face. With Caponsacchi, as we shall see, it is 
a deliberate trying-out of new roles, testing new ideas, 
attempting new and hesitant approaches towards understanding 
the world in which he lives. For this "prince of sonneteers 
and lutanists," it is all part of his slowly and painfully 
evolving artistic consciousness.
He reminds the judges that they had viewed the entire 
affair incorrectly because they had made the mistake of 
identifying his sensibilities with theirs. Caponsacchi is 
trying to make a case for himself, although he himself is not 
always conscious of it, as a person who had succeeded in trans­
figuring the real objects of his everyday world and seeing 
them in a way in which the judges will never be able to see 
them unless he can awaken in them the same sense of creativity 
which he has found in himself. The judges had, he knew, 
viewed him as "the hot-heated youth" who now "lets his soul 
show," and who now exposes "The mundane love that’s sin and 
scandal too." (VI, 129-30)
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To state it matter-of-factly, Caponsacchi wants 
desperately to make a case for his own mythic structuring of 
reality. Although this contention will be dwelt on at more 
length in the next chapter it is best to state it now because 
early in his "counsel" to the judges he is obviously not sure 
that he understands it. Caponsacchi has already separated 
himself from the institutional ethic that the judges follow; 
thus he knows that he is up against it. How change their 
mind, he thinks, when he has not yet even been able to 
resolve the conflict within himself? To them, it has to be 
a mundane love. Spiritual love, for them, is a dead myth. It 
has no more reality for them than Fra L^ppo's projected paint­
ing of the Madonna which he plans to re-vitalize by sticking 
his head in at the bottom of the painting. Caponsacchi wants 
to make, in this world of dead Law which he faces, a living 
reality out of a myth which he knows the judges regard as 
unreal. Later on in the monologue he tells them, with severe 
anguish in his voice, that his rescue of Pompilia was some­
thing ^  did, exercising his own creative abilities, and then 
acting. It was, he says, "my miracle/ Self-authorized."
(VI, 920) I made it, he says, without help from judges, from 
Law, from learning, from a riddled, fragmented society. Law 
and society generally form the outer fringes of his world. At 
the hard center is his feeling that some kind of "bending 
down," a hand reaching out, is at the heart of his convictions 
about life and moral purpose and action. He tries to explain
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to them that he learned this from Pompilia. After he sees 
her in the window she comes out on the terrace: "she could 
almost touch/ My head if she bent down; and she did bend,/ 
While I stood still as stone, all eye, all ear," (VI, 722-24) 
But he feels a conflict within himself because he is unable to 
reconcile his orthodox function as a priest in the infected 
Arezzo environment with his partially realized success as a 
maker of living myths,^
Even within this uncertainty, however, lies the posi­
tive belief that nothing can be done unless one acts. We 
cannot, he argues, discover the truth without action of some • 
sort. And it is Caponsacchi's concern, as it ostensibly is 
the judges', to establish the truth. He wants to "Burn out 
ray soul in showing you the truth," (VI, 149) Yet he is at 
pains to show them that the truth is not an entity that lies 
whole somewhere, waiting to be uncovered. Truth is something 
which grows, evolves and changes. Truth is something which 
is in part created by the very people who are engaged in a 
search for it. Caponsacchi actively employs the legend of 
the "quest" motif in his search, because the notion of the 
quest requires more than depositions and testimony and talk;
iMy colleague, Robert Stevens, states the problem in 
another way: "Caponsacchi's education to truth results from 
his bilateral quest for fulfillment. His conscious search is 
for spiritual reality; his mythological search is for the ful­
fillment of his various identities," See "Robert Browning 
As A Myth-Maker in The Ring and the Book" (Unpublished Ph.D. 




The last time he stood before them, they had told him 
what a priest's duties were. But he wants them to understand 
that a man's duty, "be he in priesthood or at plough," or 
sitting on a judge's bench, is that "he is bound, better or 
worse, to act." (VI, 159) And he wants to make it clear that 
on his previous appearance before them it was their mistake, 
not his, and that they must acknowledge it. Pompilia and 
he are both out of it. It is the attitude of the judges which 
is now important. He tells them bluntly, "You were wrong, 
you see." (VI, l4l) Certainly the world will not come to an 
end because of their error, and other mistakes will be made.
The important thing now is that they realize the implications 
of the discovery which he and Pompilia have made. He wants to 
show them the "truth/ For a moment, show Pompilia who was 
true'/ Not for her sake, but yours." (VI, 171-73)
Caponsacchi dimly perceives that his ability to re­
order and change the objects of his reality must extend beyond 
his own personality. He must be able to share his creativity 
with others in a dynamic interaction which demands that each 
person derive his creative inspiration from the world in 
which he lives, but that each person also contribute to the 
world his own creative abilities.
3
In his earlier appearance before the judges Caponsacchi
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was unable to convince them that Guido had written the letters 
presumably from Pompilia, and that Guido had intercepted 
Caponsacchi•s letters and sent on to Pompilia letters of his 
own invention but with the priest's forged signature. The 
Judges could hardly take him seriously since they probably 
knew that he had written many another billet in his time or 
had advised other young gallants on how to compose theirs.
In fact, the whole episode fits what they knew of the young 
priest's general reputation. The problem, as they saw it, 
lay in his surprising lack of discretion.
Caponsacchi cannot offer, even now, any factual proof 
that Pompilia did not write the letters to him. He is unable 
to prove that Guido intercepted his own letters and composed 
them anew. The reader, at this point, might feel obliged to 
search carefully through the imaginative evidence that 
Caponsacchi does offer. The passionate young priest is ab­
solutely convinced of Guido's evil, and was before the murder. 
But how can the judges be convinced, in spite of all that has 
gone before, that Caponsacchi is right?
Caponsacchi answers the judges with a double analogy. 
He had told them that he had once seen a painting of the 
Madonna by Raphael hung in his church one day. When he saw 
Pompilia he was reminded of this painting. He asks them to 
recall the painting again. What if, he says, a sly verger 
had at that point sidled up to him with a scorpion, claiming 
it too had been made by Raphael, mere venom from the Madonna's
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mouth? It would obviously be absurd. Thus, he can no more 
believe that the Madonna's mouth could issue forth venom than 
that Pompilia could have written the letters. He felt the 
poison in them from the start, and since he has already estab­
lished for himself the Madonna-like qualities of Pompilia, he 
knew, with imaginative rather than factual reasoning, that 
Pompilia could not have written the letters. This is more than 
enough proof for him.
The picture of the Madonna he remembers begins to be 
more than a mere analogy in his mind. He begins to alternate 
between an allusion to the painting and the window where he 
expects Guido to ambush him. There is indeed a scorpion 
threatening Pompilia, and Caponsacchi fuses both analogies 
for the first time when he says "the pest/ Was far too near 
the picture, anyhow." (VI, 679-80) He is now no longer 
speaking analogously. The scorpion is not part of the paint­
ing, yet there _1^  a painting and it is no longer the orthodox 
picture by Raphael which Caponsacchi is referring to. No, 
the "pest" Guido is too near the picture of Pompilia. "I 
will to the window," he says, and the reader gets the first 
scant impression that Caponsacchi is seeing the window in 
more than just a concrete way.
But Caponsacchi must make the judges understand this 
use of the imagination on his part. He wants to show them, 
by using his own creative imagination (so they can themselves 
exercise the same ability) that he knew Pompilia did not
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write the letters. He can only answer them figuratively and 
metaphorically, because the factual evidence is not enough. 
And Caponsacchi would insist, as Browning actually did (in 
I, 705), that his fancy is one fact the more, that his fancy 
is needed to inform the proceedings of the trial. In the 
final analysis, Caponsacchi can only answer them mythically. 
With his knowledge of the Madonna’s legendary history, and 
her desire to "bend down" to help suffering humanity, 
Caponsacchi exercises not merely a symbolic transfer from 
the Madonna to Pompilia. He begins to transfigure what he 
knows of the one into the other. It is not an instantaneous 
process, although the feelings that inspire his growing 
artistry are quite immediate. Such is the way that he comes 
to know Pompilia's "truth."
Now he senses that he must accept Guido’s challenge 
and go to the window. And what he sees there, in a single 
instant in time, helps him finally to fuse the painting of 
the Madonna with the window-picture which he will paint of 
Pompilia. But it is not possible for the reader to under­
stand Caponsacchl’s art unless he also perceives the manner 
in which Caponsacchi slowly separates himself from the 
authoritative sources of faith and love, Christianity and Law. 
As the Pope is later to point out, "Here comes the first 




As Caponsacchi continues his impassioned speech to 
the judges the reader learns more and more about the trans­
figuration that has taken place in his life and his art.
To begin with, Caponsacchi is regarded by the world- 
at-large as a potentially productive man; he is a member of 
the nobility, representing the aristocracy of the human spirit; 
he is priest, scholar, courtier, and comes from one of the 
most prominent families in Arezzo. He is supposed to be 
one of the finest representatives of society, with his duties 
laid out before him. Yet, before his meeting with Pompilia, 
he is stagnating. In his occupation as priest, he has 
materialistically been very successful. He is a young man 
who "bears watching" by his superiors. Within the hierarchy 
of the Church, he is "on his way up."
But Caponsacchi is confronted by the anxiety of doubt 
and meaninglessness. He has difficulty separating the 
trivial from the significant. He suffers inwardly because 
the institution of the Church has obliterated God and sub­
stituted law, authority, and tradition. These are all products
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of society. He sees that one’s movements must receive the 
sanction of society. And thus he must ask the question, 
"From whom does society receive its sanction?"
He comes to a position where he perceives that he 
has been motivated by little goals. Unwilling to give up 
worldly pleasures, he is accepted by the Church without 
stipulation. The Bishop tells him glibly that he need not 
renounce the world. "Nay, keep and give it us’/ Let us have 
you; and boast of what you bring." (VI, 309-10) Therefore 
he can continue being a "fribble and coxcomb" without break­
ing his vows. He rises in the Church, taking promotions 
rapidly. He is diligent at his post in the Maria della 
Pieve in Arezzo, and also keeps pace in upper-class society 
where "beauty and fashion rule." He is good at cards, knows 
the latest fashions, and also advises young gallants in their 
love affairs. It is in this kind of society of manners and 
decorum that he is accidentally confronted, one evening at 
the theatre, by the Madonna-like face of Pompilia.
The Bishop tells him that he will be an asset to 
the Church, and reminds him that his ability in "making 
madrigals" will be useful to the Church. It is true that 
Caponsacchi is something of an artist. But in making madri­
gals, as in imitating a priest, he senses that he is prosti­
tuting his talent. What really, he asks, is his duty to 
himself as a man? If he knows what his duty is, and yet does 
nothing, then he cannot do his duty to God or to his fellow
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man. Instead, he develops "A polished presence, a genteel 
manner, wit/ At will, and tact at every pore." (VI, 371-72)
2
As an artist, Caponsacchi paints his own imaginative 
picture of Pompilia. After three or four years of being the 
fashionable young priest, he sees her at the theatre one 
right. She is "young, tall, beautiful, strange and sad."
He sees her instantly with a double vision. She is both a 
living reality and a symbol. For him, she has tropological 
significance. Her face compels him to recall an earlier 
incident in his life. Sitting in church one day, as he 
"got yawningly through matin song," the porters brought in 
a painting by Raphael of the Madonna which almost transfixed 
him as he was confronted by it. Bored at the theatre, noting 
the usual faces, he has a similar reaction upon first seeing 
Pompilia. It is the expression on her face which blunts him. 
And later in his mind, her gaze endures "night and day."
It is "burnt" into his brain, and the "beautiful sad strange 
smile" does not change. (VI, 435-37)
Slowly, creative impulses stir within Caponsacchi’s 
artistic consciousness. His adoration of her is both real 
and symbolic. From this first meeting, he feels a deep 
religious reverence for this profoundly innocent girl, but 
he puts himself into a new role and is able to manipulate 
her as symbol. He associates her with images of light and
I8l
the heavens and the idea of heavenly inspiration. He once 
again refers to the picture of the Madonna in the church.
(VI, 667-73) With subtle artistic control, he contrasts the 
light and the heavenly inspiration of Pompilia with the 
"black teasing lie" and the "black of the ambush-window" of 
Guido's night-time Arezzo world. (VI, 678-95)
But the black of the ambush-window is also the same 
window in which he frames his own picture of the Madonna, 
using the dark Arezzo world as a canvas:
I made
The one-turn more— and there at the window stood.
Framed in its black square length, with lamp in hand, 
Pompilia. (VI, 701-04)
In recalling this scene, Caponsacchi sees it through the eyes
of a painter. The window is the frame, Guido's dark world
is the blackness of the canvas, and the lamp which Pompilia
holds in her hand is a divine light which illuminates her
face. This light is at the same time the painter's brush,
and by means of it Caponsacchi is able to paint a picture
in his mind because Pompilia at the window reminds him of
an altar on which is shown Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows,
one moonbeam penetrating her cell. He has seen this altar,
yet he is creating a new Our Lady.
Caponsacchi is thus thinking on a level not directly
involved in the realistic situation. He is a fashionable
young dilettantish priest. He is also an artist, a maker of
madrigals, a "painter." As an artist, he searches for his
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own idea of the structure of a symbolic reality which will 
be different from the reality represented by the structure 
of institutionalized society. This latter is a reality 
which seems increasingly "unreal" to him, and corresponds 
to the "dream" world of Pompilia's life with Guido. As a 
result, among the many other feelings with which he responds 
to the presence of Pompilia in the window, is the feeling 
of artistic creativity. He later learns that Pompilia is 
an illiterate, simple-minded seventeen-year-old girl. Though 
she has great native intelligence, he could not possibly 
educe from her character the complex symbols he eventually 
employs in "framing" her in the window of his mind. Before 
he knew who or what she was, he experiences her "truth." But 
he is only able to do so because he is aware of the symbolic 
and even mythical possibilities which she represents to him.
When she stands framed within the window, in the midst 
of blackness, with the lamp in her hand, the complexity of 
the situation overwhelms Caponsacchi. The realistic events 
are frightening enough in themselves, since he knows that 
Guido may come springing out of the darkness at any moment.
At the same time, there is something in her sad, strange 
smile, already impressed upon him at the theatre, that is a 
part of her. Her face suggests almost unendurable suffering. 
In fact, it suggests many things which belong to her as a 
person. This is part of Caponsacchi's "mundane passion."
This tall, thin, lithe girl is a physical presence in front
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of hlm. He senses In her the loneliness and despair which 
unite her with him In a common human bond.
But Caponsacchi, with his strong Intellect, and his 
artistic consciousness, relates this human bond to his own 
vague notions of an Imaginative reality. He associates 
her with the Raphael and then with Our Lady of the Seven 
Sorrows, both famous In the Madonna's legendary history. He 
must. In short, "re-order" and re-shape this experience If 
he Is to act. Otherwise, Guido's night-time Arezzo world, 
and Caponsacchl's own function as social, fashionable priest 
In an Institutionalized society, will pressure him Into a 
conventional reaction, and he will do nothing.
Consequently, Caponsacchi emerges as the strongest 
Illustration of what has been Identified as Browning's 
pluralist world.^ In such a world, where avenues to ultimate 
truth are frustrated, and conflicting beliefs and values pre­
vail, man must realize the plastic nature of reality, must 
help mold, shape and change that very reality of which he Is 
a part.
Just as Browning, by rounding out his "ring," helps 
to re-shape reality for the reader, so too does Caponsacchi 
help to re-shape the reality of his Arezzo world by painting 
his window-picture of Pompllla. It Is only because Caponsacchi 
can view Pompllla symbolically that he Is able to see the
^See Chapter I, p. 2, above.
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possibilities of a new kind of reality. These symbols are 
operative in the artistic consciousness of Caponsacchi. He 
is aware of some of their Implications. In fact, he "worries" 
these symbols of light and darkness, of love and death, turn­
ing them over, feeling them out with his painter's brush, 
alternately calm and passionate. He calls the recognition 
scene between them "my miracle/ Self-authorized and self­
explained." (VI, 920) It is his miracle because by mani­
pulating the symbols in the window he sees the possibilities 
of imaginatively creating a new kind of reality. Within such 
a reality he himself may discover the purpose behind Pompilia's 
call for help. In his "painting" he first searches for the 
answers to the questions that have plagued him earlier:
"What is my duty to my fellow-man? And what is my duty to 
God?"
3
Caponsacchi deliberately tries himself out in new 
roles, sometimes as the heroic St. George, sometimes as a 
maker of madrigals. It is part of his new reality.
But he is not the only one of Browning's characters 
who makes this attempt. In Fra Lippo Lippi, Lippo has the 
kind of vision, as J.L. Kendall has pointed out, that enables 
him to be an artist in life as well as an artist on canvas.^
Ij.L. Kendall, "Lippo's Vision," VNL, iB (Fall, 1960),
18-21.
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Lippo is claiming for himself potentialities which he believes 
are available to all human beings. "The world and life's 
too big," he argues, "to pass for a dream." His business, 
as with all of us, is "a laugh, a cry, the business of the 
world." He searches for new meanings, new levels of reality.
He is tired of painting the old saints in their one-dimensional 
world. He derives his artistic inspiration from life and 
believes that "life in turn should be illuminated by the 
universal use of artistic i m a g i n a t i o n . H e  relentlessly 
puts the old values to the test. "What would men have?" he 
asks, "What's it all about?" He is convinced that each of 
us has a hand in helping to shape the reality in which he 
lives. "God uses us," he explains, "to help each other so,/ 
Lending our minds out," To find the world's meaning, he adds, 
is his "meat and drink." The old laws, the old institutions, 
the old conventional modes of painting, are not much help to 
him. Instead, he will put himself down in a corner of the 
picture that he plans to paint of the Madonna. Out of this 
corner, he will come "As one by a dark stair into a great 
light." He is intruding into the midst of God, the "Madonna 
and her babe," and "Lillies and vestments and white faces," 
all pure of soul but lifeless, without the necessary meaning 
that makes up the world. Who enters the picture but Lippo?
"IJ— / Mazed, motionless and moonstruck--I'm the mani" Lippo
^Kendall, p. 20.
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wants to inform this old legend— almost worn-out now and 
lifeless— with new meaning by using the constructs of his 
own imagination.
It is the "grey beginning" for Lippo, but Andrea del 
Sarto has lived in the placid twilight with his love, his 
life, his all, for years. The artistic inspiration that Lippo 
derived from life, and the molding of segments of reality 
which he brought to all lives by the use of the artistic 
imagination, are realized intellectually by Andrea. But 
Andrea feels a sense of loss because he cannot regard him­
self as creator rather than the thing created. It becomes 
apparent that his yearning for the patronization of greatness 
is a grasping for an external substitute for something lack­
ing within. He recognizes, like Lippo, that one must paint 
the flesh, the fact, the beauty of the world. But Andrea 
necessarily sees beyond Lippo and knows that the painter must 
have something more than the ability to reproduce the world's 
lights and shades and lines on canvas. Lippo made the dis­
covery that the artist's materials lay in the "gold" of world­
ly things. Andrea, because he strongly feels the lack of it, 
saw the need for the individual--artist or no--to supply that 
alloy of wax and honey which makes the gold workable.^ He 
calls it the artist's soul. Although he is more aware of its 
significance than Lippo, he can really articulate it no better.
^Ideas derived from personal communication with a 
colleague. Barton K. Johnson.
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Pompilia has the same strivings toward creativity, 
and as we shall see, Pompilia makes her myth of a marriage in
heaven a living reality. Yet Pompilia herself is no myth
hut a fact. She is human and Caponsacchi can believe in her. 
To him she is not a miracle. She only resembles the Madonna.
She is a part of the capabilities of mankind. He reminds
the judges that "l assuredly did bow, was blessed/ By the 
revelation of Pompilia." (VI, I865-66) Caponsacchi sees in 
her one of the best things that human beings can achieve, and
it is a quality, he tentatively thinks, that can be discovered
in us all. In fact, he believes it is having its effect on 
the judges. "I am glad I helped you," he tells them. "She
helped me just so." (VI, 1866)
But the Christian myth has been so corrupted that the 
forces of such people as Pompilia and Caponsacchi are only 
successful once in a while, because such forces will always 
be opposed by the overpowering strength of worlds similar to 
those of Rome and Arezzo. Caponsacchi and Pompilia attempt 
gropingly to formulate new laws. By means of their deep- 
seated imagination, through participation in the world of 
"pure crude fact," they relentlessly struggle with forces 
that tend to restrict and distort the plastic nature of 
reality.
4
Caponsacchi is pulled by the powerful feelings within
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hlm. He cannot, at first, define them with any articulate­
ness. Thought does him no good, because "no such faculty 
helped here." (VI, 944) After his dark encounter with Pompllla 
at the window he paces the streets of Arezzo. He cannot 
rationalize his experience by means of logic. The lessons 
he dutifully learned In his studies of Plato and Aquinas 
do him no good. He knows that he Is passing "into another 
state, under new rule." (VI, 964-65) To explore the pos­
sibilities of this new state of existence he Is compelled 
to think Imaginatively and creatively.
Hence, for him, the daytime world of Arezzo which 
operates as the accepted norm, and Is supported by organized 
Institutions, can only be a hindrance to him In attempting 
to understand the new symbols which he has discovered In and 
through Pompllla. Nor Is his own scholastic training of 
any help to him. He now has an "initiatory pang," which rises 
to an "ecstasy" that "outthrobs" the pain that accompanies 
It. (VI, 973) He has been married to the Church. But he 
now must break that union. In order to finish his painting 
of Pompllla and create a new union.
But Caponsacchi does not finish It. What he feels 
about this experience he cannot reason out. He cannot really 
articulate It. To the vulgar he Is a "priest In love." And 
he himself cannot always distinguish between his passionate 
feelings for her as he gazes at her Illuminated by the lamp 
while she stands In the window, and the face he "frames" In
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his painting, the face of the young Madonna who suffers be­
cause of her love for humanity.
He indirectly comments on his confusion to the Judges: 
painters would say that "Her brow had not the right line, 
leaned too much"j it was without the Greek profile proper for 
the portrayal of a martyr. He has, in a sense, made her in 
his painting to carry too much significance. The line of 
her brow "seemed bent somewhat with an invisible crown/ Of 
martyr and saint, not such as art approves." (VI, 1991-92)
Her lips and eyes seem "careful for a whole world of sin and 
pain." As artist, he is aware of the physical defects in her 
profile because he is aware of her as a woman. He has been 
too easily influenced, he says truthfully but with an ironic 
implication, by the "trivial outside of her face/ And the 
purity that shone there." (VI, 1985-86) Thus, neither 
Thomistic inquiry nor conventional modes of painting will 
serve his purpose.
Prom another point of view, he does not seem aware 
that these realistic defects are the same ones which he has 
transferred to the canvas of his painting, that artistically 
he is not able to understand the difference between the 
mundane passion which he feels for this ignorant, innocent 
seventeen-year-old girl and the divine love which is re­
flected in her face as he frames her in the window of his 
painting. He does not completely understand the meaning of 
the symbols he has used in fashioning his new reality (a
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reality which corresponds to Pompilia's new saint, new son, 
new century, at the beginning of a new year).
Besides, he tells the judges, he is "as good as out 
of it." (VI, 2075) In a sense, he says, he can only play 
"with an imagined life," a life of painting, of finishing 
his picture, which means for him, "To live, and see her learn, 
and learn by her," (VI, 2085) and from "such communion" to 
awake "To the old solitary nothingness." He does not yet 
realize that there will be, or could be, a vital connection 
between his playing with an imagined life and doing his duty 
as a priest. Instead he can, as Pompilia says dreamily,
"wait God's instant men call years" and in the meantime "hold 
hard by truth and his great soul," and "Do out the duty"
(VI, 1841-43) which he has discovered in the light of 
Pompilia's lamp, the duty embodied in his unfinished window- 
picture .
CHAPTER X 
A jvrURDER BY MARRIAGE 
1
The principle of love stands at the center of 
The Ring and the Book and it is in Pompilia's dialogue, 
in Book VII, that this principle is solidly established 
in the narrative of the poem. Browning makes it clear 
that the principle can only be understood by its operation 
in the facts of a temporal existence. Thus the reader is 
obligated to understand why Browning conceived this principle 
to be inexorably linked to the marriage and murder of 
Pompilia, why the blood of the victim is related to the 
slaughter of the lamb.
It is not simply that because of her marriage, 
Pompilia is murdered. Browning intended that the marriage 
itself be equated with murderj yet Pompilia's flowing blood, 
passing through the fire of Guido's furious stabbings, is 
converted into a bridge for her marriage in Heaven to Capon­
sacchi, Guido, the representative of the dark world of 
Arezzo, becomes the ironic instrument of Pompilia's trans­
forming into a reality what she has felt as an instinct all 
along. She is raped and murdered, but by passing through
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the pollution of Guido's evil destiny, she carries new life 
and new blood within her and begins building the bridge to 
Caponsacchi, her soldier-saint.
Pompilia is slowly, relentlessly murdered after she 
is married off to Guido by her foster parents. Of course, 
as she implies, one might say that each of us is dying all 
the time. But for her, the strong sense of being alive and 
functioning has been so large; for twelve years she was 
happy in her innocence and ignorance.
Pompilia is lying on her deathbed in the hospital 
at Rome, the victim of twenty-two knife wounds, telling her 
story to the attending nuns. She has already taken the last 
rites. Tonight, she knows, is her last one. Since the birth 
of her son two weeks before, she has liked life only in­
differently well. Slowly murdered for the four years of her 
marriage, finding temporary purpose in her pregnancy and the 
birth of her son, discovering non-temporal purpose through 
her love for Caponsacchi, she now looks ahead to her death.
She is not sure her marriage has not been a dream. Though 
individual scenes of the marriage break through the wall of 
her memory, their stark reality operates conversely and gives 
them an unreal grotesqueness. Isolated, they bulge outwardly, 
hurting her sensibilities, raping her mind, muddying the white 
patch of pure snow. (VII, 793) She is beautifully childlike. 
At seventeen, she can neither read nor write, but a purity 
suggesting the Holy Mother surrounds her. She names her son
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Gaetano, after a recently canonized saint. The old saints 
are too busy, she says; they have too many to look after. 
Besides, she had five saints looking after her and it seemed 
to do her no good.
She tells the nuns she has developed a bad memory 
over the last four years. For this reason she can hang on 
to life for a while. Her memory is foggy; it helps dissipate 
the horror. Her age bothers her. When her son reaches her 
age and asks "’What was my mother like?’/ People may answer 
■‘Like girls of seventeen’--" (VII, 67-8) She hopes people 
will say she looked old for her age, perhaps as much as 
twenty. Furthermore, the name Pompilia is not a common one, 
and possibly that will help her son to keep her apart from 
other girls her age.
Her childlikeness is balanced by her deeply maternal 
concern for her son's future. She knows the handicaps he 
faces. He will never know a father, because, Pompilia insists, 
no one fathered this child. He will have no family, no name, 
not even Pietro’s nor Violante’s, since they "must not be my 
parents any more." (VII, 99) So she names her son after a 
new saint, in order to "begin anew." The old saints are 
"Tired out by this time," (VII, 107) much like the world.
Her murder, she now perceives, has been a gradual 
affair. Up until recently she had not realized that other 
women led different lives because it was "step by step" 
that her life grew "so terrible and strange"; the evil seemed
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to steal about "on tiptoe, as It were/ Into my neighbourhood 
and privacy," (VII, 119-20) When her rescuer finally came 
by torchlight he found her "familiarized with fear," lying 
next to the wolf. In the darkness of the wolf's lair.
Marriage fooled her In other ways too. "Everyone 
says," she begins, "that husbands love their wives,/ Guard 
them and guide them, give them happiness;/ 'Tls duty, law, 
pleasure, religion." Well, she says simply, "You see how 
much of this comes true In mine I" (VII, 152-55)
She relates what happened on the night of the triple- 
murder. She was sitting next to the fireside with her mother 
and father the day after New Year's, discussing her son's 
future: they heard a tap at the door. She thought at the time 
that It was perhaps the country woman, who had been caring for 
her child, coming with news of him. (VII, 60-5) For soon 
It would be the New Year, and there was a new child, a new 
Innocence, a new saint, soon a new century, and It was time 
to begin anew. But It was not news of Innocence at the door. 
Her father had been out sight-seeing and was telling them 
about a dramatic representation of the nativity that he had 
seen at a church that day. "There's the fold," Pietro said, 
referring to the people In the manger. To Pietro, everything 
In the play had seemed lifelike, the sheep all together and 
"big as cats." And such a shepherd, "half the size of life,/ 
Starts up and hears the angel--" Pietro would have gone on 
but "at the door,/ a tap: we started up: you know the rest."
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(VII, 265-66) Instead of an angel, a monster waited outside 
the door; instead of Christ, Satan, instead of divine good­
ness, a horrible, nameless, motiveless evil, the more gro­
tesque because it seemed absolute, unending, forever.
When she was twelve her parents suddenly informed 
her she must marry a cavalier. One of her friends had told 
her cavaliers, when they weren’t busy slaying monsters, de­
voured girls. But when she first saw Guido he did not look 
very devouring. He was old, not even as tall as she, "Hook­
nosed and yellow in a bush of beard." (Vll, 396) But even 
then he did not seem harmless. And she felt like something 
"strange or contraband" as she walked up the aisle of the 
Church of San Lorenzo. Her mother grasped her so tight she 
momentarily Imagined that they had come to see a corpse. 
Waiting at the altar was an "unpleasant priest," Guido's 
brother Paul. The evil was there in the church. She felt 
it as the heavy church door locked out help behind them. The 
tapers shivered on the altar. Suddenly from behind the altar, 
instead of Christ, out popped the incredible Guido, "Hawk- 
nosed and yellowness and bush and all." (VTl, 443) The 
fantastic replaced the real as evil enshrouded the church 
and its altar. Innocence stood before the shrine of Christ, 
her hand joined in marriage to the satanic world of night time 
by candlelight. The images of a nameless form of horror 
stack up in her memory as she struggles to tell her story, 
lying on her deathbed. She tells her listeners that the real
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seemed to have become the unreal, "sheer dreaming and im­
possibility." The history of me, she says to the nuns, "is 
what someone dreamed." There, in the church, she discovered 
another side to the world, where the very values abhorred by 
her goodness were now presented to her as the norm. This is 
the way things are, her mother told her. Pompilia thought 
little, benumbed by it all, still trusting the behavior of 
adults. Now, four years later, the scenes revolve spinningly 
around her; her memory busily tries to blot them out.
3
Painfully she continues her story. At home, she 
relates, she heard them arguing, and rushed into the room. 
Pietro, red and angry, was shocked at what had been done.
He had known nothing of Violante's plans for the marriage.
"You have murdered us," he shouted at Violante. "Me and your­
self and this child bride besides!" (VII, 492-93) It was here, 
she says, that she began to see the truth, that "Something had 
happened, low, mean, underhand,/ False, and my mother was to 
blame." She realized that she was "the chattel that caused 
the crime." Pietro insisted that Pompilia leave the room.
He asked Violante: "Do you want the victim by/ While you dis­
cuss the value of her blood?" (VII, 525) She stood bewildered, 
an innocent, virginal, bloody sacrifice, entering a world 
turned inside out. Her murder was only beginning, the result 
of a marriage and the establishment of a system of values in
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diametrical opposition to the feelings which hovered guardedly 
over her innocence.
Violante won over her husband by a specious argument. 
She attempted to restore the traditional, normative values 
of Rome in place of the "torchlight treachery" of Arezzo which 
Guido began to represent in Pompilia’s eyes. He is titled 
nobility, she argued. Therefore Pompilia gets both a husband 
and a noble name, a family that is deeply rooted in time, 
solid, respectable, going back for generations; this along 
with a "palace and no end of pleasant things." (VII, 55^)
The Count was "the kind of man to keep the house,” not young 
and unstable, but mature, wise and judicial. She has arranged 
for them all to live and die together in Arezzo, "a Tuscan 
town,/ Not so large as this noisy Rome," (VII, 566) Violante 
entreated her pardon, but Pompilia asked: "Pardon what?/
You know things, I am very ignorant." (VII, 571-72)
Ever since her marriage, Pompilia says, everything 
has been "one blank,/ Over and ended." She calls her marriage 
a "terrific dream." It was a dream because dreams never 
last, "daylight doses of plain life" soon return. Her marriage 
was simply the "note of evil: for good lasts." (VII, 595) N qW, 
after the stabbing, she finds it difficult to follow Don 
Celestino’s advice and forgive Guido, for she cannot possibly 
forgive a blank. She realizes Guido has his own justification 
because he was cheated into thinking she was bringing him 
wealth. "Marriage gave me, broke the compact so." She now
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admits that in order to punish the parents Guido had a right 
to mistreat her. As his wife, she now sees that it was her 
duty to stand between Guido and her parents and blunt the 
edge of Guido's resentment. But one has to see in order 
to do this, and Pompilia tells us that she did not see at 
that point because "I was blind."
Further, she could not, after her marriage, consider 
the possibility of allowing Guido to sexually consummate their 
union: "I felt there was just one thing Guido claimed I had 
no right to give nor he to take," (VII, 721-22) because they 
were in estrangement, "soul from soul." At the time, she 
continues, she consulted patriarchal, traditional authority 
on her visit to the Archbishop, but he held her blameable. 
"*Twas in your covenant," he said, and she had been taught 
that he stood for God. But she knew that she had made no 
such covenant, that Guido married her for her money, that 
their souls "stand each from each."
Even at the time the Archbishop struck her wrong; his 
argument seemed staid and worn away by its constant repetition. 
The old laws in the Tuscan town of Arezzo were not the ones 
she felt. They seemed part of the Count's world by night.
All the institutional machinery--the seats of authority and 
law and truth--collapsed in front of her. The wolf's body 
lying entwined in hers overpowered her senses. But it hap­
pened :
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So, home I did go; so, the worst befell:
So, I had proof the Archbishop was just man.
And hardly that, and certainly no more.
In the world of Arezzo she found that the very qualities of 
life which corrupted her were offered to her as desirable 
goals. Her husband did consummate the marriage and the "last 
stay and comfort" within herself was forced from her. "Hence­
forth I looked to God/ Only," she says. "Henceforth I asked 
God counsel, not mankind." (VII, 859) Mankind had not then, 
nor has it now, the answers for her, because the world of 
mankind is not her world, but a "terrific dream." Only 
Caponsacchi, she says, has the "lustrous. . .soul" which per­
ceives her.
Her child she gives outright to God, and "not to any 
parent in the world," in order that it will be safe. Her 
only other obligation before she dies is to clear the name of 
Caponsacchi. "The glory of his nature," she says, "Shot 
itself out in white light, blazed the truth/ Through every 
atom of his act with me." (VII, 922-23) She will remember 
once more for his sake the sorrow, because he still lives 
and is belied. Her love gives her the strength to continue.
4
Pompilia tells us how she first saw her soldier-saint:
I had been miserable three drear years 
In that dread palace and lay passive now.
When I first learned there could be such a man.
(VII, 947-49)
She first saw Caponsacchi at a public play. Guido himself
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lurked behind, anxious to find any excuse to rid himself of 
her. It was he who built a non-existent relationship up in 
her mind, declaring that the young priest had been haunting 
the street-corner and the side of the palace, "Publishing my 
shame and your impudence." He asked her:
"You are a wanton,— I a dupe, you think?
"0 Christ, what hinders that I kill her quick?"
Whereat he drew his sword and feigned a thrust.
(VII, 1028-30)
The incredible murder continued as she was killed a little 
day by day. Through a twisted series of circumstances set 
up by Guido and her maid, Margherita, Pompilia was slowly but 
irrevocably drawn into the plot with the young priest. Each 
day her maid whispered his name into her ear, brought letters 
and urged her response. Not knowing the man, the name Capon­
sacchi itself became distorted: "That name had got to take a 
half-grotesque/ Half-ominous, wholly enigmatic sense." (VII, 
1329-30) The inside-out values of the Count's world by
candlelight continued to turn and twist around her. She had
only seen Caponsacchi once, had never talked to him, but his 
name symbolized the manner in which the Arezzo world cor­
rupted everything it touched. She identified his name with 
the rest of Guido's machinations.
She did not care what they did, for that matter. It
no longer was of importance. Long ago she had tried to stop
the sin by obtaining a divorce but the usual instruments of 
man's dark world, the age-old social institutions and estab-
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llshments which controlled her life, had again refused.
Another thought then became uppermost in her mind. Why not 
kill herself, since it did not matter, she had been murdered 
a dozen times anyway, her body raped, her soul polluted. But 
when she discovered that she was pregnant she knew that she 
could not take two lives at once. "Not to live, now, would be 
. . .wickedness," (VII, 1257) she thought. And thus, for 
the first time, she acted, joining forces with Caponsacchi. 
When she met him face to face, she says, and entreated him 
for help, he answered simply, "I am yours," the first words 
she ever heard him speak, (VII, 1447)
They escaped to Rome. Each day of his help gave her 
neW'strength. She lived, functioned, and fled now for the 
sake of her unborn child. She felt it as a command from 
Heaven to bring this child into life. She now knew that 
"Prayers move God; threatà, and nothing else, move men’"
(VII, 1624) And suddenly she was safe, away from that "Arezzo 
noise and trouble"; her baby was later born. Now, the evils 
she suffered no longer matter, "the end crowns all. The judges 
judged aright." (VII, 1648-49)
Thus, on her death-bed, she can pardon Guido because 
it is not with her that he must make amends but with God.
In fact she thanks him. She has finally received her divorce:
whereas strange fate 
Mockingly styled him husband and me wife.
Himself this way at least pronounced divorce 




She pardons him because he did not make himself. "His soul 
has never lain beside my soul." Whatever he touched seemed 
to be ruined. He infected everything with a plague. Yet he 
also saved her, she now realizes. "I am saved through him/
So as by fire," (VII, 1738-39) Her child is not Guido’s child 
at all, "only his mother's, born of love not hate I" She will 
have her rights to her child in "after-time" even though it 
seems "absurd, impossible today." (VII, 1764-65)
She is near death, almost through with her story.
Only one thing--and that the most important--remains, She must 
again speak of Caponsacchi, "the lover of my life, 0 soldier- 
saint,/ No work begun shall ever pause for death." What she 
sees she knows he sees that much more. She cannot find the 
"true word" that can convey what she means. "He is ordained 
to call and I to come I" (VII, l8l4) He is a priest, she says, 
and cannot marry,
which is right 
I think he would not marry if he could.
Marriage on earth seems such a counterfeit.
Mere imitation of the inimitable:
In Heaven we have the real and true and sure.
On earth, she says, marriage-making is centered around
"gold so much,--birth, power, repute so much, or beauty, youth
so much." (VII, 183O-32) But in Heaven marriage is as the
angels, because they "Know themselves into one, are found at
length/ Married." (VII, 1834-35)
Thus Caponsacchi has not long to join her; he merely
has to wait that "instant men call years." Through such souls
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as Caponsacchi’s, she concludes, God gives sufficient light 
in the Count’s world of blackness "For us in the dark to rise 
by. And I rise." (VII, 1845)
5
By Pompilia’s death, through a murder, the result of 
a marriage. Browning completes the circle of his ring by 
establishing the meaning, significance and operation in fact 
of the principle of love. For Pompilia and Caponsacchi, fly­
ing in the face of society’s institutional ethic, there can be 
no marriage on earth, because in this world men can only be 
moved by threats, not by prayers or love. The darkness, the 
evil of the wolf in the lair, comes when the principle of love 
and its significance in marriage is lost and buried in the 
rigid, institutionalized establishments set up for the pur­
poses of birth, power, gold and repute.
Browning surely must have drawn a brilliant analogy 
when he read over the old Roman murder case, slowly equating 
it with the gold ring of his wife. His task was to marry 
this ring and the old yellow Book, to see them unified into 
his poem. The Ring and the Book by means of the concept of 
love. The old yellow Book was without a unifying principle; 
the ring contained the principle but was by itself pointless, 
unbound to the dark world of the Book. Browning used the ring 
to inform the facts of the old Book, to join fact and fancy 
in writing a "book shall mean beyond the facts."
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Pompilia is thus not only an all-embracing state­
ment of love; she is also the bridge between marriage on 
earth and marriage in Heaven, She is the bloody sacrifice: 
her murder is her highest attainment; her death necessary in 
order to sustain the white patch of snow in the Count’s world 
by night. She is both victor and victim, the receptacle for 
the evil directed against her, yet the giver and sustainer 
of goodness.
The murder was inevitable because it was the result 
of a conflict of mythical absolutes--Guido the absolute rep­
resentative of a dark satanic world; Pompilia the eternal 
representative of the lightness of purity. Browning early 
equated murder with marriage in our minds. They could only 
by synonymous in an ethical system of "old saints, tired out 
by now," a world of old cliches mouthed not by God’s rep­
resentatives on earth, but by man’s representatives in a 
sick-infested European society of darkness. In the Count’s 
world by night, murder, like other inverted values, becomes 
a desirable norm. But Browning exposes the irony of Guido’s 
double-edged knife when he demonstrates that out of an 
institutionalized, dark-corrupted marriage which brings 
murder, there emerges love and the possibility of a final 
marriage in Heaven. It also brings new hope in the form of 
Pompilia’s son; it brings a re-examination and reassertion 
of God’s intentions from the old Pope, and it suggests the 
possibility that a new working of an old law is possible on
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earth, where the concept of love could be. If not a working 
principle, at least a goal to reach for, the object of our 
quest, signifying and enlarging the "pure, crude fact" of 
human existence.
CHAPTER XI 
FOR US, THE LIVING 
1
The creative dimensions of Pompilia*s character ex­
tend backward and forward through The Ring and the Book. In 
her, in a figurative sense. Browning rests his case; her 
artistry is one of living: she grows to maturity, not in the 
dark world Guido has created for her, but in the new reality 
which she evolves with Caponsacchi. Her ordinary history 
is "what someone dreamed"; her implication is clear: she is 
beyond and apart from the real world; she considers it a 
dream world, not because she is escaping from life, but be­
cause she wants to live and cannot--not in the world as she 
has come to know it.
She is a beautifully ordinary girl; but she must reach 
beyond the world Guido has imposed upon her. In order to do 
this, she is obliged to fall back upon her own inner resources. 
Let it be known, she says, "That 1 had been the mother of a 
son/ Exactly two weeks." (Vll, 13-14) As Guido destroys, she 
creates. Motherhood is only the beginning of her activities; 
it is her first "truth," The reason that she named her son 
"Gaetano," was so that he might represent a new saint with a
206
207
new way, a new dream, a new desire— "All these few things I 
know are true," she tells the nuns. "Will you remember them?/ 
Because time flies." (VII, 35-7) She does indeed know a 
"few things" and she finds her new truths on her own; none 
helped her except Caponsacchi. Dying in the presence of the 
nuns, she is still making discoveries, creating her own truths 
before their very eyes and hearts.
At seventeen she humorously feels old. But she means 
it; she 3^ old. Through her experiences and her imaginative 
abilities she is able to transfigure objects she sees in 
paintings and sculpture and they become alive within herself. 
The statue of the Virgin that she used to pass by always 
"got my rose," because the babe that sat upon the Virgin's 
knee had an arm broken off; "you pitied her the more,"
Pompilia says. Like the Virgin, she creates a bond between 
herself and others by "bending down" with a rose, or a candle, 
or the soft touch of her fingers on Caponsacchi's forehead.
The statue of the Virgin and the babe was broken off because 
of its "Thin white glazed clay," much, Pompilia begins to see, 
as humanity; and you pity humanity the more. (VII, 80-l)
She is envious of those people who know how to write; 
since she is illiterate, she must write her son's name in a 
different way. She wants to be set off from other girls her 
age so her son can remember her name. Since Pompilia is not 
a common name, it may help. But her striving for a niche in 
her son's memory is only the beginning; she wants a place in
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what she hopes will be his new reality, which she believes 
she has helped create for him. She Is convinced her lot Is 
different "From any other woman's In the world." (VII, ll6)
"I looked up to the sky," she says. In telling of why she 
named her son Gaetano, "And took a new saint to begin anew." 
(VII, 102-03) Although her remarks about her age are 
touchingly appropriate for a girl of seventeen, nevertheless, 
behind lies the plain truth that she Is growing; she Is too 
old for this world. She knows too much about what It calls 
Its "truths." Beginning with her child, she had put her own 
creative abilities Into making up her world, and It Is here, 
she sees, that the real truths lie.
The surface facts of her life place her In Guido's 
world; this part of her she hopes her son will Ignore when 
he comes to know of her. Perhaps, she says hopefully, he 
will "get to disbelieve It at the last," because It Is "sheer 
dreaming and Impossibility." (VII, 109-10)
2
As a child she first began to relate her creative 
abilities to the ordinary reality she knew at the time. Her 
childhood world was no nightmare, but Idyllic. But she realizes 
now that her tendencies to "half-create" what she sees were 
exercised by her then. "Since there hung a tapestry on the 
wall," she says, she and a neighbor friend named Tlsbe began 
to hunt for each other In the scene that was depicted. Tlsbe
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was the figure with the half-moon on her hair, spear in hand, 
"Plying, but no wings." And Pompilia, Tisbe tells her, had 
green leaves growing out of the ends of her fingers, and all 
the rest of her looked brown and rough as if she were "turned 
a sort of tree." (VII, 3^9) Now, Pompilia explains to the 
nuns, "You know the figures never were ourselves/ Though we 
nicknamed them so." And, drawing the point of her analogy, 
she says, "Thus, all my life," have things been this way, 
regardless of whether they have been real, like the twenty- 
two daggar wounds in her, or not real, like the mythic scene 
in the tapestry; real or not, it all "looks old, fantastic 
and impossible." (VII, 186-200) It is because, she thinks, 
everything she touches is a "fairy thing that fades and fades" 
into unreality. (VII, 3^9) Even as child she could create 
for herself; she was able to exercise her consciousness in 
seeing herself in a role which symbolized another way of 
looking at human experience. Recollecting the tapestry scene 
now has a new significance for her; it seems more real to her 
than the daggar wound because it left out Guido's evil world.
But from such a contrast comes the confusion of "what 
was/ With what will be,— that late seems long ago." (VII, 
210-11) She is not certain if even the truths she is so con­
vinced of are not mere fancies. Even her son, she fears, 
"withdraws into a dream," like all the rest.
It was because things got started wrong from the begin­
ning— from the moment when Violante paid a price for her from
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her real mother, a dying prostitute. Pompilia believes that 
Violante did wrong when she swore in open court that Pompilia 
was her natural child, Pompilia believes that "God plants 
us where we grow" (VII, 301) and she grew up living a lie.
The fault kept pricking away at Violante*s heart, as if, even 
then, the first promissory notes to Guido had already been 
signed. Violante desired to make amends for her error and 
Pompilia perceives that "This brought about the marriage." 
(VII, 321) She conceives of herself as a wild-briar plucked 
by Violante to grow out of the "wild-beast•s way"; yet the 
wild beast cams any way because Violante "Fancied she saw 
God's very finger point/ Designate just the time for planting 
me." Violante regarded herself as God's agent, planting her 
adopted daughter "In soil where I could strike real root, and 
grow,/ And get to be the thing I called myself." (VII, 331-32) 
That is. Violante wanted to make it right with Pompilia. For 
after Pompilia had a husband, at least she would find that 
what "seemed" the truth would actually be the truth; she 
would, in other words, no longer have to worry about unreal 
parents because now she would have a real husband. And so 
everything would be "— All truth and no confusion any more." 
(VII, 337)
Now that she is a mother, she finds it easy to forgive 
Violante. Even while dying, she is for the first time no 
longer in pain. She sees "strangeness" rather than misery 
in that inverted world into which she grew up. It is all
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over now and there is no more danger, "For past Is past."
3
Thinking imaginatively and creatively, she draws 
numerous analogies. Referring to Caponsacchi as "my friend," 
she is reminded of their journey of flight, when on one oc­
casion they are forced to stop at a hovel to get food. As 
they walk into this "hovel" dogs and cats begin to snarl at 
them. All life, Pompilia says, is like this hovel. And her 
reality is outside the hovel, outside life, outside time.
Her marriage, she thinks, was like a debased coin, and she 
used it to purchase the praise of Violante and Pietro. She 
wanted to please them, even though she did not understand 
why she should marry. She hardly knew what a husband meant 
and supposed that "this or any man would serve." (VII, 4ll) 
Besides, being naive, she was better off. It was, she says, 
like the time the ugly, fierce-looking, scrawny-bearded doctor 
came to treat her when she was sick. One drop of a bitter, 
black stuff on her tongue and she was cured. Though the 
doctor was frightening and ugly, his medicine "beautified him." 
For all she knew at the time, why should not Guido’s kind of 
medicine beautify him?
She can speak of her situation in an impersonal, 
detached way. There is nothing you can do, she says, in 
dealing with a man like Guido. "You stand/ Stupefied, profit­
less, as cow or sheep." (VTI, 673-7^) She is now objective
212
about it, even analytical. If you try to repair the first 
mistake with him, you merely "anger him just twice." This 
was because there was no way she could have known Guido’s 
true motive, no way that she could have realized that he was 
deliberately trying to drive her into infidelity.
Guido’s creations, she sees, are so different from 
hers— the letters he forges, the lies he tells her--as if 
his ability to exercise his mind and imagination had doubled 
back on itself. (VII, 69O) She comes to understand that "in 
my ignorance I was just thwarting Guido’s true intent." (VII, 
695) It was outside her understanding of the way human beings 
think and live and believe to see that Guido wanted Capon­
sacchi and her together, wanted both of them "taken in a 
crime." (VII, 699)
If she made an error by behaving so unknowingly, it 
was because she was genuinely unknowing; the notion of an 
illicit affair with Caponsacchi was not something which 
occurred to her and which she dismissed. Being the person 
she was, the notion could not have occurred to her at any 
time. If she "fell into such fault" of being so ignorant of 
men’s ways, she wisely suggests that Guido may, conversely, 
have overreached himself because of a "perversity of brain." 
(VII, 705) She sees what Guido never saw--that she and Capon­
sacchi were people of integrity. Guido, she points out, 
tried to "make me and my friend unself ourselves," (VII, 707) 
to be a different man and woman than what they were. Thus,
213
she reasons, Guido could never have succeeded. He could not 
create from materials (such as Pompilia and Caponsacchi) that 
were alien to his creatively destructive process.
And the final irony, as she sees it, is that, though 
Guido's "whole sad strange plot" met disaster, he actually 
succeeded in bringing them together, but for all the wrong 
reasons. This is why she is indebted to him, and for all the 
right reasons.
4
Pompilia is now clear on what happened and her own 
part in it. She made a major error; it was not really a 
fault since, under the circumstances, she could not be held 
accountable. Yet it was a mistake: she made the mistake of 
mistrusting her own organism. People in authority were the 
customary oracles for telling her what was right and what was 
wrong. And she had been trained to accept their Judgments 
unquestioningly. There was nothing really different here; 
she was doing what other girls her age always did. When she 
went to the Archbishop for counsel in regard to Guido's 
insistence that their marriage be consummated, she was ex­
pecting at least a receptive audience. But the Archbishop 
declared she was "blameable" and "Nowise entitled to exemption 
there." (VII, 727) And she obeyed, she says, because "he 
stands for God." But now she sees that she was wrong in not 
trusting the deepest part of herself. And she knows that the
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Archbishop gave the wrong advice; "Though he was thrice Arch­
bishop" he would still be wrong. "Now I have got to die and 
see things clear," she says, realizing that she could not 
afford to follow what the deepest part of her knew was right 
in a world controlled by the Guidos and the Archbishops.
Death only can enable her,to follow the demands and the 
principles that she feels within herself. You either obey 
blindly and do their bidding and live in their world, or you 
see clearly and die.
The world she has helped to create for herself is not 
really possible in Arezzo--at least not for her. But she 
does have a world--one which she has helped slowly to fashion; 
she sees its possibilities even in the kind of life she is 
leaving behind; she hopes that her son— especially since he 
is a man--will be able to make the most of them. Caponsacchi, 
of course, will have to "Do out the duty" in present life 
before he can take full advantage of their new reality and 
their marriage in heaven.
She admits that Guido did not try to use deceit in 
consummating their marriage. He did not say it was because 
of their "souls’ yearning" and that their souls should "mix 
in flesh." (VII, 775) In fact he argued the reverse: since 
their souls did stand "each from each. . ./ Give me the fleshy 
vesture I can reach." (VII, 78I-83) At first she resisted 
him— the only reaction possible for her— but her "heart died 
out at the Archbishop’s smile" as she remembered his refusal
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to help her.
The difficulty was in the atmosphere; the world of 
Guido was all around her. Each place she turned she seemed 
to meet him or someone who stood for him— one of his dark 
representatives. There was the bland smile of the Archbishop 
and the leering innuendos of Guido's brother, Girolamo, who 
was trying to seduce her in her own house and with Guido's 
full consent. There were the shrugs of the Governor of 
Arezzo; when she stood in his chambers she suddenly heard 
"the cold cruel snicker close behind" and turning, she saw 
Guido, winking at the Governor, the situation well under 
control.
She sought help from a friar whom people called "The 
Roman," begging him to write her parents and make them aware 
of the situation, that even if they hated her, they would 
hate her as they do "gnats and fleas,/ Even the scorpions!"
For this kind of hatred she would rejoice. But nothing hap­
pened, In the prison darkness of Guido's world, Rome and "The 
Roman" were no different from Guido; the friar was as helpless 
as she. She appealed to friends and relatives like Guillichini, 
but he could not go to Rome with her because "A flying gout/ 
Bids me deny my heart and mind my leg!" (VII, 1308) She 
tries Guido’s cousin, fat jolly Canon Conti, who first threw 
the comfits into her lap, and who often protected her in 
Guido's presence by laughing at Guido's baleful countenance.
But, he tells her, carrying her away to Rome is "above my
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strength." He argues that Guido is too deadly. He "has 
claws that scratch, shows feline teeth." (VII, 1315) He 
is too formidable a foe and Conti would rather deal with a 
dog "twice the size." She cannot know if Conti is in league 
with Guido like some, or afraid of him, like others. For 
her, it makes no difference. He is irrevocably caught up 
in Guido's world and can hardly help himself. What leads 
her to suspect him, however, is that even he suggests Capon­
sacchi .
He reminds her that his brother-priest is much bolder 
and much braver than he. He's her "true Saint George,"
Conti tells her, "Though you drop eyes at mention of his 
name." (VII, 1329) It seems incredible to her that the world 
of darkness can continue to close in on her like a heavy 
fog, to envelop her brain, to engulf her senses. She had 
heard the name Caponsacchi so much, from so many different 
people, that it no longer stood for a person; it came to 
represent the very world she lived in; it symbolized the whole 
"terrific dream" of her life--"half-grotesque, half-ominous, 
wholly enigmatic," as she so brilliantly characterizes it. 
(VII, 1329-30) It is like what would happen to any by-word 
or broken bit of song which originally has a true meaning 
but which slowly undergoes transformation and corruption, 
changing as it passes from mouth to mouth, mixed with a 
"sneer or smile," until it soon comes to mean nothing but 
"ugliness" and "shame."
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The idea of escape itself had come to seem like 
"distemper" and "dreaming" and the name "Caponsacchi"--not 
the man but the name--seemed to turn the whole idea "Into 
a mockery and disgrace." (VII, 13^0) The evil was so built 
up around her that she could not work her way through it; it 
sidled up to her in half-measures at first; as she peeled off 
one layer there was always another; it was at times fleeting, 
puzzling, frightening, but growing, spreading, enveloping her, 
choking her off. It was hard to know how to fight it; it 
never seemed to come at her directly or at once. She did 
not even know how to recognize her foes and who or what they 
were.
It must be, she explains, that it was "step by step" 
that everything seemed "to grow so terrible and strange."
(VII, 118) She grew up living a lie; the days and years 
passed; she married after heated arguments between Pietro 
and Violante; she was unthinking in her innocence and ig­
norance; and all the while the tortuous, winding atmosphere 
of evil "stole on tiptoe, as it were,/ Into my neighbourhood 
and privacy." (VII, 120-21) She could not tell when it was 
directly in her presence and when it was not. It "sat down 
where I sat, laid. . .where I lay," and then, after so many 
years, "I was found familiarized with fear." (VII, 122)
Seeking the sun (VII, IOO3), what saves her is the 
torch held up by Caponsacchi in the dark cavern of Guido's 
world— the satanic figure both wolf-like and snake-like.
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wound around her and in and out of her, slowly squeezing the 
life out of her (VII, 122-29) as he takes the "fleshy vesture" 
which he wants to "rend and leave Just fit for hell to burn!" 
(VII, 784)
5
All along, her only defense has been within herself. 
But she doubts: she asks herself the question. Are things 
really as they say they are? Or are they as I feel and know 
they must be? Can she still be following the right road 
In the face of such negation? No, she argues, the world of 
dark caverns and torchlight cannot be real; that world has 
to be the nightmare, the "sheer dreaming," the "impossibility." 
The reality Is the one she feels within herself, not only 
the knowledge of her ^ pregnancy, but the trust In life which, 
rather than knowing empirically, she feels Imaginatively.
But her trust In herself, her faith that her way Is 
the right way, must be substantiated by more than Just In­
tuition or Instinct. She Is faced with the problem of how 
to do this, when everything around her seems to deny what 
she feels.
Caponsacchi Is her grip on reality. With him she Is 
able to continue to help create the "real" world, a reality 
which for her Is the only one possible. She knows It Is 
God's. She knows It exists. Despite Guido's efforts to 
clutch her In the dark caverns of his soul, to hide her from
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the sun, she knows the light Is there, illuminating what is 
real and true. She is never once completely fooled by any 
of them. Those men who "stand for God" she comes to dis­
trust as much as she does Guido.
In March, after she first sees Gaponsacchi at the 
play, Guido accuses her of a liason. Gaponsacchi is always 
around, Guido lies, haunting street corners, waiting for his 
chance. But Pompilia thinks nothing of his accusations, since 
they are no more than his usual rantings. Nor does she care 
what he does. She longs for death and if it is to be by 
Guido's sword, so much the quicker. There is a thing worse 
than death, she tells him, and that is life. (VII, 1049-50)
Then Margherita, Pompilia's waiting-maid, takes up 
the chant begun by Guido, sounding the name that is soon to 
become so unreal to her. The people who speak the name 
"Gaponsacchi" thus pervert it--Guido, whom she cannot even 
comprehend, and Margherita, who is, she knows, having an 
affair with Guido with little attempt at secrecy. And 
Margherita will not let the matter rest. Each day she pours 
more poison into Pompilia's ear. "Good cause for jealousy," 
she tells her, "cures jealous fools." (VII, IO58) Besides, 
Guido is already convinced that Gaponsacchi is her intimate, 
so why not turn it into a reality? If she does nothing, the 
"priest will perish" and Pompilia will "grieve too late."
(VII, 1083) And thus shall the "city-ladies' handsomest/ 
Frankest and liberalest gentleman/ Die for you." (VII, 1084-86)
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But Pompilia is not swayed. She senses there is 
something wrong with Margherita’s argument. For one thing, 
Margherita is Guido’s mistress and she is probably acting 
under his orders. Even if Margherita is speaking the truth 
there is nothing they can do but trust in God. Pompilia's 
argument is more compelling than her maid’s. She tells 
Margherita that people would become insane, "Seeing such 
evil with no human cure." (VII, 1100) Her argument is based 
on the nature of Guido’s evil. Since she has already asso­
ciated him with a satanic nether-world, it is obvious that 
at this point she believes that there is no human cure for 
Guido’s evil because it is not a human evil, but a super­
natural, satanic one. It would make no difference what they 
did. Being human beings, they cannot cope with what is not 
human. It is at this point that Pompilia is at her most 
passive and the nearest to suicide.
But Margherita will not let up. She begins to bring 
the forged letters written by Guido. As the situation grows 
more fearful, Pompilia on one occasion faints, and as she 
is coming to Margherita, "ever on my trace," whispers 
"Gaponsacchi" in her ear. But all Margherita’s efforts are 
in vain: "I listen while you speak,/— Assured that what you 
say is false." (VII, II66-67) She brilliantly turns Mar­
gherita ’s methods back upon herself. "While you profess to 
show him me,/ I ever see his own face." (VII, II85-86)
It is the face she remembers seeing at the play, and each time
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Margherita lies, Pompilia remembers the truth through the 
truth she saw in Gaponsacchi’s face. Thus she knows he could 
not have written the letters. And this is not instinct on 
her part. Deriving inspiration from the truth imbedded in 
his face, she creates that face within her own imagination.
She figuratively speaks of the problem of truth, 
since she has been talking about its intrinsic qualities.
She tells the nuns that it seems strange to assume that what 
she has been telling them is the truth; she had not thought 
until now that it could be otherwise. All the things she 
has been telling them, she suddenly realizes, she has been 
telling them as though those things were all true. Maybe it 
might be considered "idle and inopportune." But how, she 
argues, could it be anything else but the truth? She points 
out that, even when she spoke to those people that were them­
selves untrue and could only take the truth "in through a 
lie," she still spoke the truth. Now, she concludes, she is 
speaking the truth to the "Truth's self"— that is, to the 
nuns through a death-bed confession--and this time there can 
be no doubt, because God "will lend credit" to her words, 
since they are God's agents and cannot corrupt the truth 
through lies.
6
On an April morning, in the fresh spring, right after 
Easter, Pompilia awakens with the absolute realization that
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she is going to have a child. The vistas of her reality-- 
always somewhat latent before— begin to open up before her.
Her knowledge is like a broad yellow sun-beam that was "let 
fall/ Prom heaven to earth." She calls the sun-beam a draw­
bridge which has been finally let down for her to begin to 
cross over. Through the rays of the sun dance flies and birds. 
"I too am to go away," she says as she steps out on the 
terrace. "I too have something I must care about." (VII,
1229) Just as the birds know their paths and their courses 
so well as they bring sticks to build their nests— to this 
particular window and no other— so now does she have "purpose
and. . .motive too,/ My march to Rome, like any bird or fly!"
(VII, 1245-46)
"Tell Gaponsacchi he may come !" she orders Margherita. 
And that evening as she steps out on the terrace she feels 
the bond that unites them, that isolates them from all the 
people she has met in Arezzo. There stands Gaponsacchi, with 
the "same silent and solemn face" that she first saw in March
at the theatre. She is relieved that it is the same face
that she has imaginatively kept alive in her memory. She 
sees now that she wasted his strength at the theatre but here 
he is "still at watch/ To save me yet a second time." And 
with "no change/ . . .though all else changed in the changing 
world!" (VII, 1415) The fact that he has not changed in the 
midst of the "Arezzo noise and trouble" confirms her belief 
in him. She knows what he knows: that there is a hard core
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at the center of them that will never change.
She tries to explain why she struck back at Guido 
when he caught up with them during their escape. She had 
been passive for years, but now, with Gaponsacchi helpless 
in the hands of Guido's henchmen, she says, "I did for once 
see right, do right," (VII, 1591) She no longer feels that 
she cannot fight Guido's kind of evil. One must, she says, 
finally turn and take action if he would have his wrong 
"observed by God,"
Now that she has moved from a passive to an active 
state, now that she is fleeing, escaping, asserting herself, 
she sees that her former passivity was not as "right" as her 
actions now. But now she has purpose and motive; she feels 
the importance of acting, of moving, of taking a stand.
She strikes back at Guido, she says, because "Prayers move 
Godj threats, and nothing else, move men I" (VII, 1624)
She realizes that she used to pray to men like the Governor 
and the Archbishop as though they were God, and she should 
have threatened them instead; she was praying to the wrong 
people. She rips Guido's armor off with the swipe of her 
sword, but it was truth that saved her, she maintains, and 
"not the vain sword nor weak speech." (VII, l64l)
She now sees that the judges were right in her trial 
in May; they sent her to a convent which enabled her to get 
away from Guido and Arezzo while in her pregnancy. In the 
convent she found peace; there she begins to consider what
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has happened to her and what it means. She wants to "under­
stand somewhat of my past" and "Know life a little." (VII, 
1666) But she has her gain, has "enjoyed/ As well as suf­
fered" in her life, and more importantly, Gaponsacchi has 
helped to give her a "foretaste, , ,/ Of better life begin­
ning where this ends," (VII, 1669-70) Her reality, she 
knows, is still being created and will continue to be so 
in her "heaven,"
Her reality includes forgiveness, but whether or not 
she forgives Guido is irrelevant; she will pardon him. "I 
give him for his good the life he takes," (VII, I710) But 
more importantly, she is grateful to him for murdering her.
She is, ironically, in his debt.
7
In mid-twentieth century parlance, Guido gets his 
divorce "Italian style," And Pompilia is sharply aware of 
this. Only by murder can he rid himself of his marriage 
contract. And only by being murdered can Pompilia be entire­
ly free of him. This way, Pompilia says, by murdering her, 
Guido "at least pronounced divorce," The blood coming from 
her twenty-two knife wounds "flies forth exultingly," The 
red blood washes her white, and it gives thanks for the blow.
She believes there is still hope for Guido, even though 
for her own part she knows that "We shall not meet in this 
world nor the next"; but she believes that Guido can be
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touched by God’s shadow.
Pompilia Is deeply aware that her own personality 
was ideally suited for bringing out the worst in Guido.
There was "Nothing about me but drew somehow down/ His hate 
upon me." (VII, 1725-26) In fact, it is for this reason 
that Guido can be "somewhat, . .excused" because Pompilia 
sees that "hate was thus the truth of him"— that Guido found 
truth in hatred, just as Pompilia knows that the real truth 
for her— one that she has, on the one hand discovered, and 
on the other hand, helped create— is love, "I am saved 
through him/ So as by fire." (VII, 1739) She emerges from 
the fire of his hatred, and the twisted truths therein; he 
saved her by murdering her; otherwise, her polluted soul and 
body would still be craving a disinfectant for the plague 
she contacted from him.
Her own truths are complete. She cannot articulate 
them but this is of no importance. "Why should I doubt He 
will explain in time/ What I feel now, but fail to find the 
words?" (VII, 1760-61) She shall have her "rights" in "after­
time." When she thinks of these truths, they seem "absurd, 
impossible today," but they are part of all those things which 
are "not explained" but simply "known." But, as she realizes 
she is very close to death, she saves her last breath to 
describe to the nuns the most important truth of all.
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Death does not end the work, she says to the nuns, 
but she is really addressing Gaponsacchi. If she were alone, 
she tells him, it would all be a failure. But she knows he 
is there with her. "0 lover of my life, 0 soldier-saint," 
she cries, "Love will be helpful to me more and more/ I ’ 
the coming course, the new path I must tread." (VII, 1788-89) 
For the first time, we see how completely love is 
at the base of her world, that her world is beginning to 
take shape, that she and Gaponsacchi have helped to define 
its boundaries; it is a world made possible only by their 
own creative efforts; it is, she knows, a different kind 
of insight from the world of Rome and Arezzo. "Tell him 
that if I seem without him now,/ That's the world's insight."
(VII, 1791-92)
He symbolizes for her love at any and every level. 
From their action, she maintains, "no touch/ Of harm came." 
She knows that it was "all good, all happiness,/ Not one 
fleck of failure!" (VII, l803-04) When she opened the door 
that fateful night she thought it was Gaponsacchi, with all 
his "great heart" and "strong hand." She would have sprung 
to these, even if they had been "beckoning across/ Murder 
and hell gigantic," (VII, 1811-12)
She will not be excluded from her heaven. She will 
not be denied the life she and Gaponsacchi have worked so
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hard for. It is a world apart from Guido; it is the world 
of God’s light, of God’s love, of a universal sympathy, 
bending down "For us i ’ the dark to rise by,"
"And," she says, "1 rise." (Vll, 1844-45)
CHAPTER XII 
ARCANGELI'S PACE FOR THE WORLD TO SEE
1
Arcangeli's deepest regret is that "Guido was 
foolish enough to c o n f e s s . H e  is grateful, however, 
that he has a nobleman to defend, in a case that is being 
discussed all over Rome. Further, added excitement is 
caused by the thousands of people coming into Rome because 
of the Festival, during which time the case will be heard.
Arcangeli speaks and thinks in superficial terms.
Park Honan^ points out the three types of sentences which 
Arcangeli uses: short and exclamatory; short, but with 
alternating Latin and English phrases; and "incremental" 
sentences. The short, exclamatory sentence ("Why, work 
with a will, theni Wherefore lazy now?" [yill, 6^ ) expresses 
Arcangeli's generally high spirits. The Latin-English 
phrases are those the lawyer uses when he is in the midst of
^R. T. Flewelling, "The Ring and the Book: A Study of 
Sophism," Personallst, 2 (October, 19^1), p. ÉÉÔ.
%rowning's Characters, (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1951;, pp7 276-77.
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composing his defense for the trial. The incremental sen­
tences are those "in which clauses and phrases often have an 
interlocking connection with one another, the object of one 
clause becoming the subject of the next," As Honan points 
out, the particular kinds of syntax which Arcangeli employs 
are "psychologically revealing," On occasion, the lawyer—  
hard at work— plods through his arguments. The phrases are 
dull but in sequence (VIII, 1106-1446), He lapses into 
"long, additive sentences with interlocking parts," when he 
is not hard at work, but thinking of getting home to the 
birthday celebration of his son Giacinto, and of the treasure 
box of the miserly grandfather, (VIII, 23-36)
These sentences expose Arcangeli: "Erupting in 
exclamations, plodding wearily through sequences of short 
phrases," Arcangeli's mind wanders and he allows himself to 
indulge in the interlocking, associative qualities of the 
cumulative sentence, as one image (his son's birthday party) 
leads to another (his buxom wife hovering over the grand­
father) and this to another (the grandfather's wealth and 
stinginess), and yet others (the grandfather's treasure-box, 
the parchment or will within it, what provisions for his young 
son are in the will or should be); finally his meanderings 
lead to a conclusion, namely that he must "prime the old 
man with his best Orvieto" wine,^ Arcangeli is of relatively
^Honan, P, 278,
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Shallow mind, a civil servant who is lazy, whose mind 
"explodes, plods, or wanders," but who cannot think with 
complexity, vigor or imagination. Homan notes that in a 
monologue of I805 lines, Arcangeli's lack of complexity and 
depth is indicated by the sparseness of his syntactical 
patterns. The Pope's monologue contrasts effectively with 
Arcangeli's since the Pope demonstrates all the qualities of 
intellectual depth that Arcangeli lacks.1
Had Guido not confessed, Arcangeli was already pre­
pared with an elaborate system of innuendoes to show that 
Gaponsacchi was the real murderer. Since this cannot be done, 
he "goes over the points one by one, how he shall impress 
the Pope with his knowledge of St. Gregory, St. Jerome, and 
St. Bernard, all of whom say that a man must defend his 
honor."2 He will try to anticipate Bottini's argument that 
there was too much delay between the cause and the crime by 
pointing out that there was no actual interval, since Guido 
used his first real opportunity. The fact that Guido delayed 
even further after he reached Rome can be explained, thinks 
Arcangeli, by the religious sentiments which were aroused 
in Guido by the then-current Feast of the Nativity. (VIII,
1075)
^E.D.H. Johnson, The Alien Vision of Victorian 





It is helpful to think of Browning and the Pope as 
being analogous in the way in which they view the murder 
trial. Figuratively, Browning is the real lawyer at the 
trial, not Arcangeli. Browning supplies the imaginative and 
psychological insight which Arcangeli needs but does not 
have. In like manner, the Pope has some of this insight, 
which E.D.H. Johnson refers to as "intuitive,but which 
I prefer to call "imaginative" or "mythic"; this insight has 
love at its base. The Pope is looking for meanings in a 
corrupt society and he is certain he has found them in Pompilia, 
Johnson says the Pope’s discovery comes about because of the 
"naked simplicity" of Pompilia's feelings, because of her 
"yielding to the promptings of primitive instinct," Here, 
Johnson states, the Pope perceives "the operation of a moral 
sense about which civilized society knows nothing.
But surely this is not precisely what Browning had 
in mind. One gets the idea that Johnson is speaking of the 
concept of the noble savage, of a return to some pristine 
state in nature or man, where man's instincts are irrefutably 
right. Browning, more than most, would recognize the folly 
of this position.
Browning can only point up through the function of
^Johnson, The Alien Vision, p. 128.
2lbid.
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the character of Arcangeli the sort of society and institutions 
he is indicting, and through Gaponsacchi and Pompilia the 
sort of values needed for a new kind of society. There are 
not too many words available to him because the words— just 
as the objects they represent— have also been corrupted.
The values the poet is seeking are not "uncivilized." 
Arcangeli's values are shallow, limited in application, non­
intellectual, non-conceptual, unimaginative; in like manner, 
the institution of government which Arcangeli represents 
contains the same characteristics; but on this higher level 
such values become powerful, cruel, impersonal, meaningless, 
and at all times operational and far-reaching, so that they 
affect the lives of each citizen in Rome, Arezzo, and Italy 
generally.
Arcangeli is— in an ironical sense--a normative figure 
in the poem because he is the most characteristic of the pro­
fessional class in Rome at the time of the murder. Conversely, 
Guido is not a normative figure. Flewelling, in dividing the 
characters in The Ring and the Book into three classes, puts 
Apcangeli, Bottini, and the Pope into "the Officially Inter­
ested Group"; Half-Rome, Other Half-Rome and Tertium Quid 
into the "Generally Interested Group"; and Guido, Gaponsacchi 
and Pompilia into the "Specifically Interested Group.*!
However, Arcangeli's function is generally similar to that 
of Half-Rome, Other Half-Rome and Tertium Quid. All of these
Ipiewelling, pp. 215-23..
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characters reflect similar tendencies towards having reality 
engendered upon them, rather than helping to shape the reality 
in which they live. All are materialistically oriented, self- 
indulgent and reflect certain kinds of insecurity. Each, 
however, reflects some traits peculiar to his own class and 
background.
Arcangeli, for example, as a professional man and a 
civil servant, reflects those qualities of Roman jurispru­
dence which are normative in Roman society but which are 
impugned in the poem, by both the poet in the poem (I, 824-29), 
and the Pope, and finally, with self-righteous indignation, 
by Guido himself. Arcangeli is occasionally vicious, occasion­
ally stupid. And his personality is carefully delineated in 
order to separate what Honan calls the "domesticated sensuality" 
of his family life from the "routine and unimaginative pro­
fessionalism" of his position as a lawyer.^ These two sides 
of his character only meet psychologically within him. None 
of his audience at the trial is aware of his being any other 
than a powerful lawyer in the courts.
3
Arcangeli does not really understand the implications 
of the murder case, nor does he think of Pompilia with the 
objectivity and insight which the Pope and Gaponsacchi 
demonstrate respectively. Often during the trial, in his
^Honan, p. 152.
234
maunderlngs, he thinks of food. The animal Images used by 
other characters In the poem to describe Pompilia— "lamb, 
rabbit, fish, and pigeon"— are the same Images Arcangeli 
uses when he thinks of getting home to dinner that evening. 
Honan, In pointing this out, asserts that It Is because 
Arcangeli views the world In general— "people, the law, 
Pompilia"— as Important "only as they are able to contribute 
to his own well-being and bodily satisfaction.*^ Truth and 
justice are means to the realization of Arcangeli's own 
system of values— a system based on sensual pleasure, good 
food, a rich table: "What In the world," he asks, "should 
a wise man require beyond?" (VIII, 1778-79)^
For Arcangeli, Guido Is not the villain, nor Pompilia 
the heroine. With his dim vision, he sees Guido as an In­
sect or bee or elephant. Pompilia Is a fox or an owl.
Arcangeli Is unable to "induce" the truth from the facts of 
the case, since truth does not reflect his personal philosophy. 
For him, the villain In the case Is his legal opponent,
Bottlnl, whom he pictures as "a dog, a beast, a ferrett, and
. . .as an ass."^ Honan sharply demonstrates that Arcangeli's 
use of animal Imagery reveals an "underlying self-satisfaction, 
as well as voluptuousness. . , .and mental laziness."^ He Is 
a deadening mediocrity who, because of his position, can
llbld., p. l84. ^Clted In Honan, p. l84.
3nonan, p. l84. ^Ibld.
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inflict much damgge on others in the name of justice. In 
actuality, he shows a "total blindness to people and to 
issues that lie beyond the mechanics of his profession on 
the one hand and his family circle on the other."!
Even when talking of something else Arcangeli often 
uses Images or terms connected with food. His son, he says, 
will soon be "trying his milk-teeth on some crusty case." 
(VIII, 12) As the trial wears on he thinks', "I cannot stay 
much longer stewing here" and has to catch himself when he 
adds, "Our stomach. . .1 mean, our soul— is stirred within." 
(VIII, 1385) Gluttony actually "informs and to some extent 
dictates the nature of all his thoughts and a c t i o n s . With 
such a view of experience, the truth that might be deduced 
from the murder case is irrelevant to Arcangeli, since, in 
his view, it neither "feeds nor sustains" him. As a result, 
he is not interested in even the possibility of Pompilia*s 
innocence or Guido's guilt. Guilt and innocence are not 
related to the richness and variety of his table, his sense 
of well-being, the Roman society that he knows, nor the courts 
he practices in. But these are the values that make up his 
rationale for existence and which he sees as being operational 
in the world in which he lives.
Besides his preoccupation with food, Arcangeli is also 
fond of Latin phrases. According to Honan, approximately one 
verse in five in Arcangeli's monologue contains some Latin,
llbid., p. 185. ^Ibid.. p. 200.
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and slxty-one verses are altogether Latin. It was not Brown­
ing’s intention to use the Latin phrase merely to give the 
monologue a more realistic atmosphere. Actually, Arcangeli's 
peculiar use of Latin again exposes certain facets of his charac­
ter. His "legal language represents the outward-facing pro­
fessional side of his make-up." This is the only part of Arcan­
geli that the court sees. Browning's intent is next to "reveal 
the human being behind the formal front." Arcangeli demon­
strates his attitude toward his own professional nature in 
the first Latin used in the poem when he thinks of his son 
Giacinto engaged in the amare conjugation. (VIII, 4-8) Here, 
the familiarity with which he mixes Latin and English reveals 
Arcangeli's "light-hearted, casually detached. . .partly 
comic view" of the professional side of his life.^ When 
he finally gets down to work at the trial we hear more Latin 
as Arcangeli laboriously submits his brief: "P-r-o Pro 
Guidone et Sociis," he slowly writes, spelling the first 
word out. "Count Guido married— or, in Latin due,/ What?
Duxit in uxorem?— commonplaceÎ" (VIII, 128-29)2 The usual 
Latin phrases do not satisfy Arcangeli. Despite his experience 
with Latin, the phrases do not flow, "for he is striving to 
build a careful image of himself as he goes along."3
It is in areas such as this that Arcangeli is intent
llbid., p. 222. 2cited in Honan, p. 223.
^Honan, p. 223.
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upon applying his artistry. He wants to select the correct 
Latin phrases, but only to insure that he is presenting the 
best image of himself to the Court, and not for any good that 
it might do Guido. Similarly, to satisfy his sensual cravings, 
he can imaginatively conceive of the luxurious table that 
awaits him at home once the day's work is done. His creative 
abilities are thus largely distracted from doing their real 
work. Instead of applying them to the case at hand, he is 
unable within himself to separate his work from his pleasure.
As a result, without exercising properly what artistic 
abilities he has, Arcangeli indulges in pompous, inflated 
Latin phrases. He is more concerned with the professional 
mask that he will present to the public than he is in develop­
ing any sense of integrity with himself. And one should 
not overlook the fact that Arcangeli has the ability, just 
as all people do. His use of metaphors in comparing the case 
to different foods, his comparisons of animals (killed and 
stuffed for the table) to the principals in the case, demon­
strate clearly this ability. When he expresses his obvious 
and deeply selfish love for his eight-year-old son Giacinto, 
it is with the sensual imagery of food and wine. As he at­
tempts to construct the proper Latin phrases for the case, it 
only serves to remind him that Giacinto has reached a parti­
cular verb conjugation in school and, his mind working by 
association, this reminds Arcangeli of his son's birthday 
party that evening. In each case, Arcangeli moves from one
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idea to the next, applying his creative abilities to each 
scene as he calls it up in his mind. He does not attempt 
to exercise any artistic control over these images; he moves 
without much discrimination from one to the next; the only 
control he demonstrates is when he is ploddingly but care­
fully constructing the proper mask of the powerful profes­
sional lawyer of the Roman courts.
Slowly, as the day wears on, we see the "actual 
process of a character's constructing a social face" for him­
self. The "simplicities are rejected" and "fantastic figures 
of speech are seized up." Human beings like Pompilia and 
Guido are "jammed into stock roles." By the end of the mono­
logue Arcangeli is larger and more complete and his Latin 
"represents the final, pieced-together, polished, comically 
grandiloquent Arcangeli that the world is to see."^
llbid., p. 224.
CHAPTER XIII 
ARCANGELI'S DEFENSE : THE IRRELEVANCE OF GUILT
1
Arcangeli’s defense of Guido is inevitably bound up 
in Arcangeli’s own personal philosophy. Two questions are 
important in understanding the arguments for the defense at 
the murder trial: (l) Within the context of the poem, what 
sort of values are reflected in Arcangeli’s attitude and 
how are they related to the social and political institutions 
which he represents, and to the society of which he is a 
part? (2) What is the poet’s intention in representing 
Arcangeli as a sensuous, irresponsible, purblind mediocrity?
We have long had fairly good evidence, based on John 
M. Gest’s study of the actual murder trial, that the lawyers 
for both sides were not only competent, but felt rather 
strongly about the ethical values underlying their profession.^ 
Although it is perhaps impossible to identify Browning’s 
intention with any preciseness, particularly since he main-
^The Old Yellow Book, Source of Browning’s "The Ring 
and the Book," (Boston: Chipman Law Publishing Co., 1925), 
pp. 600-25. See also, William C. DeVane, A Browning Handbook 
(rev. ed.j New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955)7 P. 341.
239
240
tained, as he grew older, that he had remained true to the 
facts of his source material, the poet's intention may never­
theless be "induced" from the facts of The Ring and the Book 
just as Browning induced the truth from the facts of The Old 
Yellow Book.
Arcangeli's ostensible defense for Guido is simply 
that Guido murdered Pompilia and the Comparini in order to 
defend his honor; that Guido's concept of honor, which lay 
at the base of his entire view of life, could not possibly 
allow either deceit or adultery, "Honoris causa," Arcangeli 
says, "so we make our stand." (VIII, 424)
It is here that Arcangeli needs to exercise his 
creative abilities with as much intensity as he can manage.
If he is going to make a case for Guido at all, he must do 
it by dazzling the judges with the metaphorical possibilities 
of the concept of honoris causa. He indeed does make the 
attempt, but he simply cannot stick to the case. At times, 
when he is going well, some word or image will remind him 
again of his son, his hom$, the food that awaits him, or 
the mask he wants to present to the Court, and his artistic 
abilities are dissipated on these interests rather than on 
the case at hand— on the concept of honoris causa which he 
has chosen as his defense.
Arcangeli wants to invest this concept with as much 
importance as possible. "Honour is a gift of God to man," 
he blandly states. It is "precious beyond compare." (VIII,
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458-59) Thus, had not Guido murdered, the implication is 
that he would have been disobeying God's dictum, Arcangeli 
places Guido in a position somewhat analogous to Hamlet as 
he listens to his father's ghost. But Arcangeli's argument 
is largely counterfeit since it is based on the false assump­
tion that such a concept of honor as he will base his defense 
of Guido is actually operative in Roman society. Arcangeli 
does not distinguish between a code of honor which might 
possibly have been embodied in the original idealistic values 
of a noble class, and the superficial, face-saving, largely 
corrupted code of honor operative in the Roman society of 
the late seventeenth century. Certainly the original code 
of honor would not have sanctioned murder. Arcangeli glibly 
blurs this distinction. Although Arcangeli's concealment is 
no doubt deliberate here, nevertheless the confusion he 
succeeds in establishing only rebounds to work against him, 
because he has not taken the trouble to think imaginatively 
and creatively about the concept of honor, and its historical 
and ethical antecedents.
For one thing, such thinking is not really indicative 
of Arcangeli's world-view. Honoris causa is simply another 
Latin phrase. Arcangeli is familiar with the legal pre­
cedents connected with it. He cites some of them; one he 
cannot remember, and in his nonchalance it is clear that the 
Latin phrase represents a legal defense and has no ethical 
meaning for him. It is a pragmatic means to a pragmatic end.
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In reality, Arcangeli*s defense of Guido is an in­
advertent apology for his own life, Arcangeli is trying to 
get Bottini to meet him on his own grounds. Essentially 
he is asking: "is Guido's guilt or innocence relevant here?" 
Bottini refuses these terms, not because he believes that 
justice must triumph, but because he believes that everybody 
is hopelessly corrupt and guilty, and as Fisc he has a 
professional and mechanical obligation to strive for a con­
viction. Arcangeli and Bottini are caught up in the inverted 
values of their profession and their world. Arcangeli does 
not want to use his creative abilities in an attempt to under­
stand where his argument breaks down (just as the Roman society 
does not want to know where the moral fabric of its insti­
tutions breaks down). If Arcangeli admits even to himself 
that Guido's guilt or Pompilia's innocence is relevant then 
he must question all the basic motives and values of his 
own way of life. Thus Arcangeli psychologically cannot afford 
to apply his artistic abilities where he needs them. He 
cannot make such an investigation, since he in some way must 
sense that the inverted values that he lives by would then 
break down, his social position would be threatened, his 
justification for existence undermined. In short, he would 
see that then Gaponsacchi and Pompilia were right and that 
he is wrong.
What then characterizes Arcangeli? Is it not the 
fact that he is amoral, both artistically and ethically?
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And is this not consistent with the level and kind of society 
in which he lives? Not only Arcangeli, but all of Roman 
society has deliberately placed Itself outside the sphere 
where moral inferences and Judgments apply. Arcangeli is 
not interested in even realistic and legitimate philosophical 
speculation about the case. He wants to shore up the walls 
of his own personal empire, and in this area he is not lazy 
but industrious. He wants to protect what he has, to do better 
what he is already doing, to get more of what he has already 
got. He has a pleasant home, a buxom wife, a wealthy and 
aging father-in-law, a son in whom he is well-pleased, a 
rich table, an envious social position and a bland complacency. 
These all go if he suddenly develops an imaginative sense of 
right action. No, one decides these matters in each specific 
case. One identifies the area, draws boundaries, and does 
not let any issue in that is not relevant.
And guilt, for Arcangeli, is not relevant.
2
But why, poetically, is Arcangeli presented in this 
way rather than in another? One must be careful to avoid 
the "intentional fallacy," but within the terms of the poem 
the reader can see clearly that Just as Arcangeli helps 
round out the ring, so too does he help round out the philo­
sophical framework of the poem. As E.D.H. Johnson has demon­
strated, the world in which this poem lives and breathes is 
a pluralistic world. It is a world of "maybe," as William
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James would say. It is an indeterminate world and no one 
point of view, no one person, no one system, has access to 
the ultimate truth. Pompilia, Caponsacchi and the Pope rise 
above these limitations by helping to mold the reality of 
the world in which they live. But the other characters in 
The Ring and the Book help to "compound the indeterminancy 
of this pluralistic w o r l d , b y  exercising their creative 
abilities without any accompanying instinct toward right 
action. In Arcangeli's case. Browning is able to show what 
happens when one does not attempt to cope with an indeterminate 
world but allows it to control one's own destiny, Arcangeli 
does not want to sense the plastic nature of reality, which 
James insisted upon.
As a result, although Browning accepts a pluralist 
universe, he is able to demonstrate the limits and dangers 
of this attitude when it has no orientation, by turning it 
over and examining it from different points of view. (Such 
an examination is inevitable, since it is itself pluralistic 
in origin and mwthod.) Involved in pluralism is the precarious 
but necessary principle of "suspension of judgment." Browning 
himself was often able to employ this principle successfully, 
both in his art and his life. However, the application of 
this principle can also be unsuccessful, even calamitous.
It accounts, in part, for what Johnson in another context
l"Robert Browning's Pluralistic Universe; A Reading of 
The Ring and the Book," Tft. 31 (October, I96I), p. 38.
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referred to as the "ctirious ambivalence" of so much of Brown­
ing’s poetry.^ It also explains why Browning was admired in 
his own time but "for all the wrong reasons." Suspension of 
judgment inevitably involves a kind of Janus-faced urbanity, 
inevitable compromise, and a confusion among intellectual, 
artistic, and social principles. As Johnson puts it, "The 
mask had, after all, got mistaken for the face."^
In the character of Arcangeli, Browning can demonstrate 
what happens when a man suspends his judgment to such a degree 
that he no longer has the capacity to make judgments. In 
a like manner, the mask that Tertium Quid assumes in order 
to ingratiate himself into the favor of his social superiors 
becomes his face, and he ends up displaying the "born 
skeptic’s inability to make a choice."3 Thus the character 
of Arcangeli serves to reveal the underside of the very 
point of view which is poetically asserted in the poem. And, 
in Arcangeli's case, the dangers are evident. Arcangeli is 
smug, sensuous, and complacent. He is unable to see beyond 
himself; he creates his own little reality with his son at 
the center. The external world he accepts as a "given."
He regards it merely as an extension of his own values. If 
the world is indeterminate, if points of view are constantly 
in conflict, then one can ohly obey the dictates of fashion
iThe Alien Vision, p. 217. ^Ibid., p. 218.
3johnson, "Robert Browning’s Pluralistic Universe,"
P. 24.
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and accept what is given with all its amoral implications.
What should a wise man require besides? he asks ingenuously.
Yet Arcangeli is not unaware of the role he is play­
ing in court. He knows that here he is on the "world's 
stage"; that he muèt "play the man in public, vigilant for 
law,/ Zealous for truth, a credit to his kind." (VIII, 1769-70) 
He feels no moral compunctions about such behavior. He ac­
cepts all of his roles with equanimity. They are part of his 
"given" world, with all its spiralling, elusive, paradoxical, 
inverted values. Caponsacchi, too, accepts the same kind 
of world, because these are the facts as any man who is not 
a fool knows them. But unlike Arcangeli, Caponsacchi does 
not believe that these facts are intractable. He believes 
that the facts of existence are viable, that by imaginative 
reconstruction he can help shape the very reality in which 
he lives.
Caponsacchi reaches a level of insight which Arcangeli 
will never attain. Caponsacchi recognizes duties beyond him­
self, beyond his social circle, and by means of a new language 
is able to partially realize his obligation— his duty to 
himself, to his fellow man, and to God. Pompilia provides 
Caponsacchi with a sense of direction and purpose. But 
Arcangeli derives no inspiration from the example of Pompilia 
which is right in front of him. He has values, but they seem 
curiously in limbo, unrelated and hanging in a moral void.
Such considerations as Caponsacchi enters into would seem
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irrelevant to Arcangeli. They would be "not to the business," 
Arcangeli thus helps to round out the multi-faceted, 
revolving, alternately dark and dazzling components of Brown­
ing's pluralistic world. Because of this pluralism Arcangeli's 
reality turns inwardly upon himself. He separates the world's 
business from his own personal pleasures. His goal, which 
is even more firmly established later when we meet him again 
in the last book of the poem, is to "strain every nerve"
(XII, 359) in behalf of his son. His love for his son is 
not extended outside his little reality. He does not see 
its necessary relationship to the ethic of the institutional 
machinery which he represents professionally. He does not 
see that the paternal instinct he so obviously has for his 
son is similar to the deep maternal instinct Pompilia feels 
for Gaetano.
Had he applied his imaginative abilities to these 
kinds of relationships, Pompilia's "truth" could have been 
as evident to him as it apparently was to the Judges. When 
Caponsacchi maintained that he wanted to show Pompilia's 
truth not for his own sake, but for the sake of the Judges, 
he presumably would want to show it also for Arcangeli's 
sake and for the sake of all suffering humanity.
Arcangeli's concern is far removed from this, how­
ever. His most immediate problem is winning his contest with 
the real villain of the case.
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"Bottini," he cries in a momentary feeling of triumph, 
"burn your books, you blazing ass I" (VIII, l804)
CHAPTER XIV 
THE RHETORIC OP THE TRIAL 
1
Bottini refers to himself as "Law’s son." (IX,
1560) He is proud of his filial connections, but sardonic 
about their implications. When he concludes his speech to 
the Judges, he declares with mock servility that he himself 
is impotent, that only Law, "helped by the acumen of the 
Court," can make truth triumphant. "What other prize than 
truth were worth the pain?" (IX, 1569) he asks rhetorically, 
giving the Judges what he knows they want to hear. He is 
aware that the inflated talk about the search for truth is 
all part of austere courtroom procedure, that the dignity 
and high seriousness of the Roman tribunal is part fact and 
part sham, and that the real contest is between Arcangeli 
and himself.
As Fisc, or prosecutor for the people of Rome, Bottini 
has his reputation at stake, and is obliged to strive for 
a conviction. Since Bottini must establish the rightness 
of the ordinary processes of the Law, at the same time that 
Guido has indicated that only Law can satisfactorily explain 
and Justify his actions, Bottini finds himself in something
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Of a dilemma. Guido’s appeal is based on his presumption 
that, whatever he has done. Law will step in and protect 
him, Bottini objects to this post factoAtttitude. He points 
out that had Guido brought in his case before he considered 
murder, he might have received some redress. Bottini is, 
of course, aware that Guido has already received partial 
redress from the courts from his previous trial in May; but 
his point is that the judges in the Hall of Justice would 
probably be inclined to be favorable towards him again. In - 
any case, Bottini gets across a point that, under other 
circumstances, might have been considered a commonplace: that 
Law was not created at the convenience of men like Guido, 
but rather, that Guido is one part of all the people who 
must obey the law.
Law, says Bottini, admits Pompilia’s indiscretion.
Law looks upon Pompilia’s affair with Caponsacchi with a 
brow "maternally severe," but Law considers such a flaw in 
Pompilia as being understandably human. Bottini is arguing 
that Law— and he has by now managed to invest it with anthro­
pomorphic characteristics— regards the murder as an instance 
where the punishment exceeds outrageously the crime. Adultery 
is common, forgivable, even under normal circumstances; add 
to this that conditions were not normal in Guido’s household 
and Pompilia’s adultery is not only understandable but in­
evitable .
Bottini, in his assertions, must first fend off
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Arcangeli's accusations; he chooses to reply on much the same 
level and in much the same tone as his "fat opponent* had 
asserted— that Pomp,ilia has committed the adultery. He con­
siders the possibility of her innocence but it does not 
appeal to him; he is hard-hearted, he seems to say; he is 
not Fisc for nothing, he seems to suggest; he has been around 
law-courts too long not to know that people who break the 
law are occasionally weak-willed, particularly in such matters 
as crimes of passion.
He is obliged to establish the ignorant, child-like 
and innocent nature of Pompilia; this in turn makes it 
necessary for him to consider the possibility that Pompilia 
did not commit adultery. From his point of view, it damages 
Pompilia's case to argue on these grounds. The Court, and 
the people of Rome, are too worldly to consider the possibility 
seriously. It is better, Bottini feels, to lean toward the 
possibility of adultery (without actually admitting anything) 
and then demonstrate that the punishment far outweighs the 
crime. Thus, in the final analysis, the People's case is 
identical to Arcangeli's defense: Bottini feels the punish­
ment by Guido does not fit the crime which Pompilia committed; 
Arcangeli afgues that, honoris causa, the crime more than 
merits the punishment. The case becomes a matter of degree 
rather than kind. The arguments on both sides are typically 
pragmatic, utilitarian and relative. They are based on the 
typical behavior of the people of the times. Prom Bottini*s
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viewpoint, we would all more or less succumb to this kind of 
behavior; it is in the nature of us to have affairs, to lie, 
to forge letters, to assume guises of respectability and 
unimpugned dignity (like the Court) or guises of innocence 
and naivete (like Pompilia) or guises of wounded pride and 
damaged honor and reputation (like Guido) or guises of moral 
obligation, fiery dramatic denunciations, and priestly duties 
(like Caponsacchi). These are all roles we play, the masks 
we conveniently take on and off, depending on where we are 
and what we are doing. Most of Bottini's statements either 
declare or imply that human beings are like this. Bottini 
has no sense of the heroic in man; if a man's reach should 
exceed his grasp— or a woman's— it is not for heaven, but 
for other, more immediate and practical needs, such as 
financial problems or complex marital and interpersonal 
difficulties— what Pompilia called "gold so much— birth, 
power, repute so much,/ Or beauty, youth so much." (VII, 
1831-32) Bottini assumes that these are the basic motiva­
tions. When people play roles it is not a matter of creating 
better or worse realities for themselves. People assume 
roles of dignity, integrity, heroism, innocence, generosity 
and the like in order to realize more practical ends— that 
it is all a game and we all have to play it. It is in this 
sense that he understands Guido's protest and appeal to Law; 
Law's stepping in is also part of the game. Bottini knows 
why Guido expects to be protected, just as other noblemen
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have been protected by the mask of Law for hundreds of years.
In Guido's case, Bottini argues that Guido simply went too 
far. It is after he has established this vital point that 
he goes on to tack on the vestures of some of Law's supposed­
ly metaphysical attributes; only then does he claim that 
Law can "display, make triumph truth"; in the meantime 
he has successfully argue* the case on practical grounds; he has 
answered Arcangeli's challenge in their private contest; and 
he has done it all under the guise of "Law's son"— his own 
role that he mock-seriously sees for himself. Law is a 
good mother, he implies, knowing the nonsense behind his 
statement. More deeply, he believes that Law is made up 
of a myth— that people like him and Arcangeli help sustain 
that myth— but once one starts believing in his own non­
sense, as Arcangeli seems to do, then he is in danger of 
slipping as a lawyer; he gets in dangerous and shadowy 
territory. One needs to remember that people operate under 
the guise of pretense and convenience; this applies to Law 
as it does to anything else,
"still," he says, "it pays," (IX, 1577)
2
A major issue in the trial is Pompilia's innocence; 
this is the issue which both Bottini and Arcangeli deliberately 
confuse. It is not to the advantage of either lawyer to con­
sider her innocence. There is no search for truth here, be-
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cause truth Is an irrelevancy.
Although both argue on the same grounds, Bottini's 
intentions are broader than Arcangeli's. He is able to move 
up and down across the various layers of motivation and pre­
meditation which lie behind the actions of many of the people 
involved in Pompilia*s death. However, he is not successful 
when he does this, because his "artistic" instincts are 
used for personal gain; Bottini does not have a sense of 
sympathy with others; he pays lip service to this "poor, 
luckless girl" and her innocence, but from his rhetoric, 
from his use of irony, from his "asides," it is obvious 
that he is unaware of Pompilia's "white light." Cook calls 
attention to this when discussing Bottini; he states that 
Browning wanted to show "how utterly men fail to recognize 
the highest when they see it." And this shortcoming is com­
pounded when it is found in the law, which has been appointed 
to defend the just.l
Hence, though Bottini*s legal strategy is no doubt 
effective, it is well to point out that, being the kind of 
person he is, there was no other strategy that he could 
have made use of. His prosecution turns curiously into a 
defense as he feels complied to explain Pompilia’s behavior, 
rather than prosecute Guido's crime. He succumbs to the 
temptation to exercise his artistic abilities in painting a
iQook, Commentary, p. 182,
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portrait of Pompilia which is nowhere close to the truth.
He begins to run through a series of "What if*s" and he here 
damages his case; he puts himself in a position of defending 
Pompilia*s guilt while he is all the while asserting her 
innocence. The fact that he will even take up Arcangeli*s 
charges against Pompilia is proof ensugh that he is not 
convinced of her innocence; but to answer the charges— even 
while maintaining that they are non-existent— with a string 
of absurd rationalizations almost turns the tt±&i into a 
mockery. Rationalizations themselves require creative ability, 
particularly creative ability that is mis-applied. The real 
Pompilia is lost somewhere in this artistic shuffle, and 
it is up to the Pope to rediscover the "white light" and 
hard core which is at the center of Pompilia's personality.
3
Bottini gets caught up in and is seduced by his own 
artistic abilities. He has exposed his own belief that life 
is a matter of role-playing 6hdt that roles are put on and 
off for the sake of convenience. Law, too, has a role to 
play in this drama and previously for noblemen it also was 
put on for the sake of convenience. If noblemen got into trouble 
they could usually count on Law to put on its austere vest­
ments and with some legal hocus-pocus, get them off with a 
slap on the wrist. Law fools Guido in this respect, largely 
because Bottini is successful in reversing aristocratic
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society's usual attitudes about Law's function.
But Bottini cannot leave well enough alone. As he 
prepares his argument, he looks upon It as a painter might 
regard his finished canvas, or a rhetorician might look 
upon the artistically persuasive techniques of his speech.
He compares himself to an epic poet and says he's going to 
plunge right Into the middle of this murder and this mar­
riage. (IX, 217-18) He Is not going to paint a portrait of
the whole family— just Pompilia. (IX, 162-70) And then, 
after going through his absurd and damaging statements In 
which he all but admits the charges that Arcangeli lays 
against her, he says It Is difficult for a painter to do 
justice to such perfection, to paint a true efflglem of a 
saint. (IX, 1397-98) Bottini wants to satisfy everybody's 
suspicions and then allay them; It means nothing to him, 
except the artistic satisfaction he takes from overpowering 
his audience.
The trial Is like a play and he, as the principal
playwright, wants to weigh carefully the effects his artistry
will have on the {Judges, on his legal opponent, Arcangeli 
and Indeed, on all the citizens of Rome.
He begins his speech by a lengthy analogy Involving 
a painter whom Bottini Imagines to have been commissioned 
by the Court to paint Joseph and Mary's flight Into Egypt.
The painter, Bottini declares, cannot be just a good draughts­
man) he has to go to the very bone of the bodies he portrays
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on canvas, in order to get at their inmost secrets; he needs to 
signify "each notch and nodule." (IX, 36) But even after 
this is completed, the work of the artist is not all done.
"Not a whit I" says Bottini. The painter must now rise to 
art’s surface from her depth; he has been to the innermost 
core of the painting; now the painter must begin to paint 
his way out, as it were; this, indeed, is the hardest task 
of all.
But this is what Bottini implies he will do. He 
will get to the very core of the principals of this murder 
trial; he will analyze and legalize with his artistic brush 
strokes operating at full strength, and get right down 
to the bone of the people in the trial; he will get to the 
heart of the matter; once inside, with his painter’s eye, 
he will begin to work his way back toward the surface after 
uncovering layers of premeditation, motivation, lies, forgeries. 
Illicit love and spurious heroics; he will "display, make 
triumph truth."
The only trouble is, unlike his painter in the analogy, 
who is a true artist and is totally committed to his art,
Bottini does not believe any of it. While committed to the 
law, he does not believe in the law, and instead of attempt­
ing to extend his own values and his own reality, Bottini 
corrupts his artistic talents by creating in a sort of vacuum; 
it is because he cannot define the true reality; he does 
not know where it is; he cannot identify it; all he knows
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is the mask, the role-playing, the stage-acting. He does 
not assume a role, as Caponsacchi does, in order to test 
out new aspects of reality; he plays the role to extend the 
very world of non-reality and fakery that he knows so well. 
Thus his creative abilities are subverted because Bottini 
does not really have any goals for them; he uses them be­
cause they fascinate him. The result is that they rebound; 
he is inspired to use his artistic abilities but he has no 
clear idea of "what for." He does not really need them for 
his case; in fact, when he uses them in connection with 
answering Arcangeli's charges about Pompilia’s motivations, 
he gets into difficulty; instead of working his way back 
up to the surface of the trial, as he has told us he is going 
to do, he gets in deeper and deeper as he loses more and more 
control over the false portrait of Pompilia that, he is 
creating.
And the only purpose is the short-term satisfaction 
he gets from manipulating the principals involved, and from 
the material gain he realizes. He can only end by saying 
sardonically and philosophically, "Still, it pays." (IX,
1577) In this sense, as an artist, Bottini genuinely "sells 
out. "
CHAPTER XV 
THE POPE AS LAW 
1
Innocent XII must call upon the utmost Imaginative 
resources of his mind to finally pass judgment on the case; 
in this way he helps to create the very decision which be­
comes objectified in the poem.
He is eighty-six years old and, sitting alone in 
his study, with only a table and a chair and a light, he 
has been examining the relevant documents pertaining to the 
case all day long and far into the night. A messenger has 
been for hours standing outside his door, waiting to carry 
the Pope's decree back to the prison where Guido resides.
It has rained most of this cold February day. : There 
is a winter chill about the city, the rain turning into an 
icy mist, the sky gray, the walls of the Vatican forbidding 
and gloomy. The Pope has no audience; he is alone. Yet, as 
he soliloquizes he summons before him a number of imaginary 
listeners and his tone and the things he says are appropriate 
to the people whom he is addressing. He talks to his alter 
ego, the person he was before he became Pope--Antonio Pigna- 
telli of Naples. He addresses many of the principals involved
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either directly or indirectly in the case: Guido, Marzi- 
Medici (the Governor of Arezzo^, the Archbishop, Pompilia, 
Caponsacchi, the Comparini and an "hypothetical tribunal of 
'educated' men."^ The Pope also carries on a lengthy imaginary 
conversation with Euripides. And, much of the time, he ad­
dresses himself to God, whose presence he feels even when 
he is addressing others. Thus alone, the Pope has more 
freedom in reviewing the case than he would were he speaking 
to a real audience.
As he begins his soliloquy we quickly learn that 
he has already made his decision. After wrangling for more 
than a month, the Court has found Gtzido guilty. Guido's 
lawyers instatitly appealed to the Pope on the grounds of 
clerical privilege. The Pope has only just received the 
appeal. He does not delay. After thurougftly examining all 
the pleadings, legal documents and other pertinent arguments 
in the case, he states that "Truth, nowhere, lies yet every­
where in these," (X> 228) and what is found in those documents 
is enough to tell him that "today/ Is Guido's last." (X, 336)
Even though he has already made his decision, we 
discover that he has not really "made" the decision at all.
He must make it now, as an artist makes an object. As he has 
been studying the documents during the day, he slowly unravels 
the intricacies of the case, rather like a writer or poet
^Honan, p. 151. Honan discusses the Pope's various 
listeners and how, in this way, the Pope can move freely 
through the issues of the case.
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gathering material for his next book. The matet&al has no 
form; it is merely a collection of pleading»and other extra- 
legal pamphlets and letters. The Pope knows, at the end of 
his survey, what his decision is, just as a poet knows what 
his book will be, but he has not yet given it an articulate, 
artistic form. Thus he feels morally obliged to structure 
the decision, to objectify it, to give it a reality of its own.
It is not that he mistrusts his judgment. But he 
must question it. He realizes that he is human and fallible, 
yet all he can do is proceed in spite of it. God, he reasons, 
gave him "So much of judging faculty, no more." (X, 265)
If his decision proves to be a mistake, he will have no 
apologies to make. He knows that given all the circumstances 
he has done his duty and done it well. In short, he knows 
that his motives are pure. "l stand on my integrity," he 
tells us. I have no fear at all. "And if I hesitate,/ It 
is because I need to breathe aWhile." (X, 276-77) He feels 
a need to rest, to review the motivations of the actors in 
this drama; he wants to see the seeds behind the acts, "the 
tree."
2
The Pope explains "why Guido is found reprobate."
(X, 398) And we might remember that in theology the term 
"reprobate" refers to one rejected by God, excluded from 
salvation and lost in sin. When Guido began in life he had
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most of the things necessary to make that life satisfying.
He had a "Body and mind in balance, a sound frame,/ A solid 
intellect." (X, 402-03) He had the "wit to seek,/ Wisdom to 
choose, and courage wherewithal" (X, 403-04) to cope with 
any of life's experiences. Of course, the Pope concedes 
he had drawbacks. But what is life without them? Here on earth, 
in our first stage of living, stumbling blocks can be turned 
$nto stepping-stones if we meet the challenges.
Thus, says the Pope, here is Guido, and he has the 
same appetite for life àâfthesrèjrt Dfsùsof But he "lacks 
food." (X, 413) Instead his eyes begin to search for out­
lets; he "pines/ After the good things just outsidé the 
grate." (X, 4l8) Part of the make-up of his personality is 
that he has less qualm in being greedy and grasping than what 
man ordinarily is furnished with inside himself. On the 
surface he accepts God's rule and recognizes the Church.
In fact, he pushes himself as far into the Church as a layman 
could. But he clothed himself with the protection of the 
Church so that he might violate the law with impunity. His 
brothers Paul and Girolamo are no better and joined the 
Church for the same kind of protection. But Guido is the 
most irreligious because he is "religion's parasite." (X,
453)
The Pope continues, "l find him bound, then, to begin 
life well." (X, &77) He had the advantages of birth, breed­
ing, social position, and had the Church as his guide.
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Instead of expandlng2fgom these advantages Guido 
"shrinks up like the ambiguous fish." (X, 485) He separates 
his flesh from the shell and begins to steal around by moon­
light preying on others. He crawls with the "loose and
free,/ Sand fly and slush-worm at their garbage-feast,/ A 
naked blotch no better than they all." (X, 497-99) He has 
forsaken his nobility, slipped out of the Church, "Plays 
trickster if not cutpurse," places his "body and soul/ 
Prostrate among the filthy feeders." (X, 501-02) And then, 
when Law catches up with him at last, as he is feeding on 
his "carrion-prey," the incredible Guido points to the shell 
he crawled out of and "left high and dry" and says "* the case 
out yonder is myself I’" (X, 506) But no. Law finally told 
him, here is the real you. Law had its prongs out, probing 
carefully among Guido’s peers, the "Congenial vermin" with 
whom he associated. That shell is none of you. Law told 
him, as they begin to slowly get their hooks into his flesh.
Here is what we want.
"For I find this blafek mark to impinge the man," 
the Pope tells us. That black mark consists in the absolute 
fact that Guido believes "in just the vile of life." (X, 511) 
Are such things as "Low instinct, base pretension,"— are these 
the truth? Over his vile nature Guido put on the mask of 
honesty. It is a falsehood "scale on scale," one falsehood 
overlaying the other, so that it is difficult to get down to 
Guido's true nature. The honor and faith he pretended to were
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a "lie and a disguise," and the Pope extends this observation
to Include mankind. Most are like this, he admits. "All
say good words," but do bad deeds; "so thrive mankind!" (x, 519)
In Guido's case, the very sum and substance of his
soul can be found In his marriage. The Pope tells us that he
will test out his judgment of Guido by once again examining 
that marriage In the light of all he now thinks and believes 
about Guido.
To begin with, Guido entered Into the marriage con­
tract without the motives that should have prompted him to 
marriage. He took the farthest means that were appropriate 
to the action to achieve the proper ends of marriage. "The 
best, he knew and feigned, the worst he took.* (X, 535) It 
was because his "worst" was so bad that Guido Is being judged 
so harshly. There are marriages of convenience^ and although 
the Pope does not pause to comment on them, the Implication 
Is that Guido's marriage was so much more, so much less, and 
so much worse, that the usual marriage of convenience. If It
^Even though Browning Is artistically justified In
committing what Is really an anachronism (since the Pope seems 
to have a nineteenth century Victorian attitude toward mar­
riage, rather than a seventeenth century Italian attitude)
It Is curious that he did not find another means for ex­
pressing the Pope's beliefs. (See Cook, p. 199, P. 209) Of 
course. It seems apparent that the poem's historical level 
Is the least successful of the various levels upon which 
the poem operates. At any rate. It has always caused the 
most difficulty, and led to the most misunderstanding among 
critics. Early scholarship on the poem was preoccupied with 
Browning's presumed faithfulness to his source material; each 
time Browning deviated from his source, there was often an 
Implied accusation In the remarks of particular critics,.as 
If he had no artistic license to do so.
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had been that simple, then all would have been well. Mar­
riages of convenience are one thing; marriages out of greed 
and evil are another.
You see, in Guido's case, "Not one permissible im­
pulse moves the man." (X, 536) What is his truth? Why, his 
instinct, he claims. It is that which "stAkksmmn past level 
of the brute." A brutish appetite becomes a truth of its 
own. The appetite is a "lust for money: to get gold,— /
Why, lie, rob, if it must be, murderi" (X, 540-43) Guido 
lures his victims into the "clutch of hate" by a love that is 
mere pretense. This is what he did in the case of the Com­
parini and Pompilia. Guido saw all the possibilities. It 
was as if he had drawn a picture in his mind: first he would 
drive the old couple out of his house "stunned and echoless" 
and then "feast on their heart" with the "lamb-like child his 
prey." (X, 557-58) Then, after he had plundered them to "the 
last remnant of their wealth," he would turn to her, who was 
past hope of receiving help in this world, "mute and motion­
less,/ His slave, his chattel, to use and then destroy."
(X ,  564)
When the Comparini tricked him, he satiated his malice 
by punishing her. The Pope believes Pompilia's revolt was 
inevitable and justifiable. But she did not attempt this at 
first. She was resigned to die and in this way she foiled 
Guido's simple cruelty. Guido, seeing this method blunted, 
developed a "consummate lie" regarding a love-intrigue that
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he claimed existed between Pompilia and Caponsacchi.
We know that the letters are false, the Pope argues. 
It is not a matter of "just handwriting and mere authorship." 
(X, 650) The letters are false to the body and soul of 
Pompilia. Ironically, the letters eventually achieve their 
effect: for the two are brought together. The Pope admits 
that once wife and priest stand together where no wife or 
priest should be, "there is passion in the place,/ Power 
in the air for evil as for good." (X, 66O-61) It could have 
gone either way, the Pope argues. When they meet, we see 
the danger, the "Promptings from heaven and hell." (X, 662) 
But the window in which Caponsacchi first saw her is a shrine, 
the "pavement of the street is holy ground." There is no 
bard to describe in verse "how Christ prevailed/ And Satan 
fell like lighthing," (X, 67O-71) that night at Pompilia’s 
window.
Why talk about it? the Pope asks. What does the world 
do when they are told the truth but liêothe more? Here is an 
example of the "gift of God who showed for once/ How he 
would have the world white." (X, 68O-81) But the white 
is lost in the world’s gray. It is almost as if Caponsacchi 
and Pompilia were born with "a new tribute.,./ Champion of 
truth." (X, 683) And they used that tribute to protect them­
selves "Of their new noble nature." (X, 685) Courage is what 
they had and used. Here is Guido, hoping to take them by 
surprise at Castlenuovo, but "how fares he when face to face/
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With Caponsacchi? Who fights, who fears now?" (X, 693)
Guido quakes like a coward, becomes even more fearful when 
his own sword is raised against him by his wtfe.
In the trial itself, the Pope believes the judges 
were not too far off the mark when they sent Caponsacchi 
into exile and Pompilia into a convent. But Guido learns 
nothing from the trial and continues to find his sport in 
"torch-light treachery." (X, 723) Months later, after the 
birth of his son, Guido's heart is stirred to murder. Instead 
of thanking God, and cutting his soul free from thinking about 
the case, Guido shouts, "'Soul, at last the mire is thine!'" 
And in that mire Guido will henceforth wallow.
The murder itself did not succeed because "Guido must 
needs trip on a stumbling-bl&ck/ Too vulgar, too absurdly 
plain i ' the path!" (X, 811-12) Guido, a resident of Rome 
for thirty years, neglected to secure the necessary ticket 
to ride horses out of Rome's gates. If he had, he would 
have easily reached the Tuscan border and have been protected 
by that "Satire of a sentence" haâded down by the Court in 
Arezzo. To what can we accredit this mistake? What is it 
but the "Touch of the fool in Guido the astute!" (X, 852)
The Pope realizes, too, that Guido curses the omission more 
than he does the murder. Moreover, it was actually a stroke 
of luck that he did not get the ticket because his four 
friends were planning to murder him on the way back to Arezzo, 
since he had withb&ld the money he had promised them. Thus,
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the Pope maintains, right up to the last, "greed found itself 
at odds/ With craft in thee." (X, 863-64)
This is the way the Pope finds Guido: he is the 
"midmost blotch of black" that can be discerned in "this 
group of clustered crimes," (X, 868-69) The Pope can also 
detect the others hovering around in the cave now exposed 
to daylight, Guido's brother Paul is in some ways even 
more reprehensible, "This fox-faced horrible priest," WVy, 
he says, "mere wolfishness looks well,/ Guido stands honest 
in the red o' the flame," (X, 88O-81) compared to the^sickly 
yellow that Paul has used to pass for white. Paul has 
managed to stay clear of the trap and even though his case 
will not come up in the Pope's time, there will be a judgment 
levied against him.
The youngest brother, Girolamo, is a hybrid— part 
violence and part craft--and he has one other distinctive 
quality which is lacking in the other two, and that quality 
is lust. He is more than a match for the "yellow and the 
red," His case, too, is reserved, but it will come due.
Then there is the mother, that "gaunt grey nightmare" who 
gave "these three abortions birth," (X, 911) She has turned 
motherhood to shame.
The four assistants who went with Guido, "These 
God-abandoned wretched lumps of life," were "country-f01k" 
and had not been exposed to "unwholesome civic breath" or 
the "curse o' the court," (X, 927-28) TThey were also young.
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with their lives still ahead of them. They did not follow 
Guido out of loyalty. He said to them, "'Anywhere, anyhow 
and anywhy,/ Murder me some three people, old and young.*" 
Murder them even though you have never heard their names, 
"'and be paid/ So much.'" (X, All four instantly
agreed without demur.
The Governor of Arezzo was one of those "Complacent 
lookers-on that laugh," shake their heads, but would never 
interfere, because that would make &hat is bad worse. Marzi- 
Medici, the Governor of Arezzo, is indeed a "Pit representa­
tive of law." (X, 973) What diEd he give but "A shrug o' the 
shoulder, a facetious word/ Or wink, traditional with Tuscan 
wits." (X, 978-79)
As for the Archbishop, here is one of the Pope's own 
subordinates, just as the Pope is subordinate to God. Here 
is one chosen by God and Pope to "do the shepherd's office" 
and feed the flock. But when this one particular lamb pressed 
within the reach of his staff, the woiCPpanting after her, 
the shepherd could only turn and flee.
"Such denizens of the cave," the Pope concludes,
"now cluster round/ And heat the furnace sevenfold." (X, 
993-94) Even in this cave's darkness there is a stray 
"beauty-beam" of light, much to the despair of hell.
3
Pompilia is the "First of the first." She is "Perfect 
in whiteness.." (X, 1005) He asks Pompilia to stoop down to
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him, "Give one good moment to the poor old Pope." (X, 1006)
In this murder case, the Pope sees a symbol of the world's 
corruption. He is "Heart-sick at having all the world to 
blame." (X, 1007) It is obvious to him that Guido is a 
disease of the times. He feels the sense of failure in his 
own office. As head of the Church, he sees the Church's 
culpability in the crime. Pompilia's whiteness is a beam 
which lights up the world's darkness. "Let me enjoy the old 
clean linen garb," (X, IOO9) the Pope says. He is tired of 
seeing what the world offers— man trying to intellectualise 
and rationalize, man putting up his knowledge because he 
lacks faith. Pompilia is "earth's flower," growing among 
this dark climate.
He admits that "It was not given Pompilia to know 
much,/ Speak much, to write a book, to move mankind." (X, 
1019-20) It was her "purity and patience," the faith she 
held fast to in spite of the "plucking fiend," which enabled 
her to rise. If there is any virtue in "right returned for 
wrong, most pardon for worst injury," (X, 1026) then the 
Pope might finally have "Just the one prize," that he is really 
unworthy of, after ten years of being head of the Church.
He is like a gardener who has tilled his barren ground all 
the long day and now, as it grows toward dusk, he discovers 
"At least one blossom" to make him proud. The seeds which he 
planted in the best section of his garden, growing, "made 
fat by the master's eye," yield a "timid leaf," and"uncertain
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bud." While here is a seed planted by chance, "sprang up 
by the wayside ‘neath the foot/ Of the enemy," (X, 10^1-42) 
This flower "breaks all into blaze,/ Spreads itself, one wide 
glory of desire." (X, 1042-43) It sprnfti out to welcome 
and incorporate the sun's light that it loves. "My/ Flower, 
my rose," he says, "I gather for the breast of God." (X, 1046) 
He has much to praise in her, but the thing he praises 
most is that she was obedient to the end. She acted "Accord­
ing to the light alloted" by law. That is, she obeyed the 
laws and customs regarding women in her time. She was first 
dutiful to the "foolish parents," then "Submissive next to 
the bad husband." (X, 1051-52) She proved herself so patient 
that she could "rise from law to law,/ The old to the new," 
until she suddenly was promoted by God to a "new service."
This new duty was to no longer bear her oppressors, but 
"henceforth fight." She was to "Endure man and obey God."
(X, 1060)
She despised life so much she did not wish to continue 
it until she learned of her new duty. God told her "'Value 
life, and preserve life for My sake.'" (X, IO65) She did, 
at the first prompting at what the Pope calls God, "And 
fools call Nature," heard, comprehended, and accepted the 
obligations laid on her, "Mother elect, to save the unborn 
child." (X, 1075) There is a common pact among them all,
"brute and bird, reptile and the fly" to "worthily defend 
that trust of trusts,/ Life from the Ever Living." God, the
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ever-living, entrusted them with the obligation of bringing 
forth life. And this, iBnspite of Guido and all his machina­
tions, she did. She won the victory. "Go past me," the Pope 
says, "and get thy praise." The Pope feels the power of her 
faith and her new reality. And he hopes that she will be 
"not far to seek/ Presently when I follow if I mayI" (X,
1092-93)
4
The Pope tells Caponsacchi that he is not so very 
far from Pompilia himself, this "warrior-priest." (X, 1095)
He is the "Irregular noble scapegrace," whose actions prove 
that in the whole business he was "faulty." Yet, the Pope 
says, "ours the fault," because we are the ones who "still 
misteach, mislead, throw hook and line," and play with our 
priests as though they were timid birds.
But here was one who denied their teachings, here is 
one who "shut fire/ I ' the stone," one who could leap from 
the mouth of the Church "at sword's first stroke," and act 
in "lamps of love and faith." Caponsacchi displayed that 
true kind of chivalry, "That dares the right and disregards 
alike/ The yea and nay of the world." (X, 1114-15)
"Do I smile?" asks the Pope. Am I indulgent with 
this wayward son? "Nay, Caponsacchi, much I find amiss,/ 
Blameworthy, punishable." (X, 1127-28) In Caponsacchi was 
"this freak/ Of thine, this youth prolonged though age was
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ripe." (X, 1128-29) Caponsacchi delayed his maturity, turned 
aside from his responsibilities. Instead he put on a "masquer­
ade in sober day," and even that disguise had two changes of 
costume, for he was from time to time in either the "hypo­
crite's disguise" or the "foolâs costume." (X, 1131-32)
Yet beneath this lie the Pope sees Caponsacchi's "healthy 
rage" when the latter first encountered Guido and Pompilia.
Of course, the Pope sees that Caponsacchi was partially 
drawn toward the affair because it gave him an opportunity 
for "impulsive and prompt self-display," (X, 1146) and he has 
no wish to revoke the penalty the priest received when he 
was banished to Civita for three years. But Caponsacchi's 
reaction to Pompilia was immediate and unerringly right. It 
was "such championship/ Of God" that the Pope looks for in 
vain from those self-styled gallants who gave Pompilia no 
help at all, while Caponsacchi, disguised in "mask and motley, 
pledged to dance not fight,/ Sprang'st forth the hero." (X, 
1167-68) And the Pope finds it easy to believe that Capon­
sacchi stayed pure throughout the battle. The Pope sees that 
Caponsacchi was undoubtedly tempted by Pompilia's physical 
presence. Was the "Temptation sharp?" There is no question 
of it. And we should thank God that it was. The stronger 
the temptation, the more strength it gives to the man who 
can meet and masterllt.
Those churchmen who were trained to cope and care for 
Pompilia's needs failed her, and all because of the very pains
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the Church went to In order to train them. Then, along comes 
a society priest— who used his sword-hand to compose ditties 
on the lute, whose "sentry-station," rather than being at 
the Church door, was usually "at some wanton-J.-s gate"— this 
man pushed forward and showed his mettle. "Well done/" the 
Pope commends him. You should be glad, he tells Caponsacchi, 
that you have "let light into the world," even though it 
was by means of "that irregular breach o' the boundary."
And now that he has found his path, he should continue to 
march assured, "Learntdg anew the use of soldiership." More­
over, he will continue to learn anew those other qualities 
which in the depths of his heart he has always known. The 
Pope sees Caponsacchi's new order of things: "Self-abnegation, 
freedom from all fear,/ Loyalty to life's end." (X, 1208-09) 
This is the new reality. The Pope knows that Caponsacchi 
in the face of everything--all the forces bent on destroying 
his way--has re-created the beliefs which exist in the life 
and heart of heaven.
What impresses him is that he sees that Pompilia and 
Caponsacchi bear kinship to him; they know that the case 
ultimately does not contain both right and wrong; the Pope 
sees the same thing; so too does Guido. Those other principals 
in the drama, however, never see this. In the case of Half- 
Rome, The Other Half-Rome, Tertium Quid, Arcangôll, and 
Bottini, though they might argue for one side or the other, 
or as Tertium Quid does, for both sides, they all fail to
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see the fallacy of sophistlcatedly assuming that there is 
both right and wrong in the case.
The Pope sees the problem clearly. When he comes to 
a consideration of the part Pietro and Violante pààyed in the 
drama, he characterizes them as being examples of this am­
bivalence in Roman society. The two of them trudge somewhere 
between "the best and worst." (X, 1212) They are the "Make­
shift, starved samples of humanity," They are both "Foul 
and fair,/ Sadly mixed natures." (X, 1217) They were "self- 
indulgent,— yet/ Self-sacrificing too," They had a love for 
their child which was remarkable, yet they also exercised 
craft, avarice, vanity, and spite. They must accept their 
death, taught what happens to "The ambiguous creature," Man 
must, the Pope insists, commit himself. He cannot have 
both the white and the blakk, in an attempt to neutralize 
the effects of both. White cannot neutralize the black, the 
Pope contends. Nor can good compensate for the bad in man, 
or absolve him either. "Life's business," he says, is 
after all "just the terrible choice." (X, 1237)
Caponsacchi, after years of such ambivalence himself, 
recognized the white instantly when it flashed in front of 
him at the theatre, and he did not deny the truest part of 
himself; he met the challenge, made his choice, and committed 
himself compîètéüis: to his own beliefs. In committing himself, 
he brought these beliefs to life and made them real.
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The Pope must now turn to a reconsideration of his 
own fallibility. He says he does not doubt himself nor his 
judgment. It is difficult enough, he admits, to find truth 
in the "human sphere"; yet he claims that his eyes have 
grown sharp by use. He knows he has the imaginative ability 
to "find truth," that he can separate "the shine from shade." 
(X, 1242) He suggests that actually all people have this 
talent, if they would exercise it. He has found truth, only 
"As a mere man may, with no special touch." (X, 1243) He 
knows that the talk in Rome is that he is senile, but he 
believes the problem is not one of reasoning so much, but 
one partly of "hard work and good will." The other part of 
the problem is handled by "A habitude that gives a blind 
man sight,/ At the practised finger-ends of him." (X, 1247- 
48) The Pope has a feel for the truth, for recognizing it 
when he touches it. Furthermore, he is willing to risk the 
consequences of his decrees. He admits that in the case 
before him he might be making a mistake. But this is the 
way it has to be.
The Pope considers the arguments people might ad­
vance against his ability to pass judgment. He claims his 
"poor spark had for its source, the sun." This is the best 
we have and we must use it. "All that I do and am," he states, 
"Comes from the truth." It is truth that he has either seen 
or surmised. It is the only kind of truth he knows and all
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he knows he speaks. He might have misinterpreted heaven's 
message, but how could he know anything if he did. If people 
deny the light he shows, "shall I too lack courage?" (X, 1298) 
Certainly he is taking the risk that he might be making a 
mistake. But does that mean he is supposed to leave his post 
like those people whom he now blames for leaving theirs?
In a prayer, he acknowledges to God that man's mind 
is like a convex glass which gathers in all the "scattered 
points/ Picked out of the immensity of the sky," (X, 1311-12) 
Within man's mind, these points reunite, they are our heaven 
on earth, "our God revealed to man," Here in our mind God is 
revealed "as a whole proportioned to our sense," (X, 1316) 
"There," (which, the Pope admits, is nowhere, but we do not 
have other words to describe it) God is "absolute immensity," 
Different and diverse modes of the life God has made come to 
know Him, This involves the purpose of life. Thus the Pope 
asks parenthetically, why do any of us live except for love? 
And how can we love unless we know Him?
The Pope argues that in the story of Christ we find 
a tale of God's, told by "the world's mouth," but credible 
nevertheless, "I love it with my heart," the Pope says,
(X, 1349) Moreover, he has tried it with his reason and be­
lieves it to be sound. Regard it in this way, he states.
Man's mind is the most superior on earth. But do we not find 
that there is a matter of cause involved?
The Pope argues closely, almost confusingly, as he
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unravels the Intricacies of his own complex judgments. Thus, 
man is "strong, intelligent and good" up to that height or 
point which he conceives to be possible for himself. Man has 
had enough of the "low" in life. Leave that to the other 
animals. Man wishes to soar to the conceivable height. Man 
wants to find the cause of all those effects he sees in the 
world. He sees them as evidence that some works in the world 
were not made by man. Thep they are probably God's.
But let us try to speculate from another point of view. 
Suppose we Judge the worker by the work? It is not always 
easy to see God if we consider the world's evidence by itself. 
We find strength, yes, and intelligence. But goodness? "Not 
to the human eye in the present state." (X, 1364) In other 
words, in this world, we seem to always be lacking "just the 
instant which this tale supplies/ Of love without a limit."
(X, 1367-68) This is the reason the story of Christ means so 
much to the Pope; here we find a love that is "Unlimited in 
its self-sacrifice." Just as strength and intelligence seem 
always never to reach a limit in man, so too is love unlimited.
What is beyond the tale? I feel in the dark here, 
past the tale, the Pope says; I feel what I cannot see and I 
still have faith. Of course there is sin and sorrow in the 
world but the Pope can believe in the dread machinery because 
it was devised by God to bring out the moral qualities of man. 
The central moral quality, acquired through pain, is that we 
learn that we love and in turn are beloved. Thus we are
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"creative and self-sacrificing too." Eventually, we are 
"God-like" ourselves. When Christ said, "'I have said ye 
are Gods,'" was it said for nothing?
In our fallibility, truth might pass through a spec­
trum before it hits man's eyes. Is it so important that we 
cannot perceive the absolute, independent truth? Perhaps what 
we see is the truth in a new form suitable for our eyes, just 
as the beasts cannot see the truths that we see. What does 
it matter so long as the effects are the same? What care I, 
the Pope asks, if God strikes our hearts with a gloved hand 
or a bare one? And the Pope is not much perplexed by the 
riddles of this world which have not yet been solved.
The Pope's belief is that "life is a training and a 
passage." We are here for a short time. "The moral sense 
grows but by exercise." He must continue to use his, even 
though he is old and near the end of his own life. Man on 
earth is on probation; he is being initiated into Godship.
He is set here "to make/ A fairer moral world than this he 
finds." (X, 1417) He is morally obligated to guess at that 
which will be known hereafter.
Let us consider the present problem. Here is a case 
which seems to deny what he has just said. For Pompilia,
"a faultless creature," has been destroyed. Sin has "had 
its way i' the world where God should rule." (X, 1421) We 
see "Pompilia lost and Guido saved." But note the "irrele­
vant circumstance" of the Pope's interference into the case.
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Does Guido win after all?
Nor should it astonish us in the end that there are 
men like Guido who can "reject and disbelieve," who can "sub­
ordinate the future to the present," who can sin and yet not 
have the slightest fear of sinning. Even so, the Pope would 
still point to the foremost fact that "Life is probation and 
this earth no goal/ But starting-point of man." (X, 1^35-36) 
What does astonish the Pope is the fact that most 
of those who find faith, "these favoured ones," should sud­
denly turn away from faith with a kind of "double-zest."
What do these faithful few do to keep their "robes of white 
unspotted by the world?" (X, 1452) Here is that Aretine, the 
Archbishop, who is under the Pope as the Pope is under God.
The Pope points out that he "armed and decked" this "Champion 
of the faith" and pushed him forward to the position he held 
when Pompilia came to his door pleading, "'Protect me from 
the fiend.'" No, the Archbishop told her, for Guido is 
headstrong and dangerous. "'He needs some bone to mumble, 
help amuse/ The darkness of his den with.'" (X, 1462-63)
Has the Church been wrong all the time in training 
men like the Archbishop to be weak when they need to be strong? 
Have we sapped their strength by too much teaching? Have we 
"Made an archbishop and undone a saint?" (X, 1469)
Then there was the poor, lowly Friar who reneged on 
his promise to help Pompilia. Here was a man who was used 
to the hard life and strict discipline. Certainly no reason
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for strength to be at ebb here. And yet the Friar con­
cluded, "'Great ones could help yet help not; why should 
small?'" (X, 1483)
"These are the Christians" the Pope Is talking about, 
"not the worldlings, not/ The skeptics." See hoVf they 
"thus battle for the falthi" (X, 1485-86) The Convertîtes 
who housed Pompilia after the trial, are "prompt to testify/
To her pure life and saintly dying days," But Immediately 
upon her death they file suit In court laying claim to all 
her possessions on the legal grounds that say that a convent 
Is entitled to the possessions of proved prostitutes and 
adulterers. See how the "dove's note changes to the crow's 
cry?" (X, 1509) Why, the Pope cries, "scripture yields no 
parallel to this I"( X, 1524)
6
The Pope Is thus confronted with the stark fact that 
"the representatives of the Church have been discredited by 
his Investigations."1 He despairs over the knowledge that 
the "faithful few" are no more faithful than the rest. Can 
this be the end and outcome of all his service? What kind 
of fruit Is his own time yielding, this "seventeen-hundredth 
since God died for man?" Is this "the best yield of the latest 
time?" (X, 1533-34) Is this all he can take with him?
What Is worse— and "how can I blink the fact?"— Is
^Cook, Commentary, p. 202,
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that the orthodox channels whereby men are trained to serve 
God have been the reverse of that for which they were inten­
ded. Instead of doing good, the Church has apparently taught 
men to be obdurate to good. The Pope cannot ignore the 
fact that love and faith are supposed to spring from authori­
tative sources. But in the case before him, he cannot 
help but observe that love and faith have come from those 
not commissioned to bring it. "For see this priest," the 
Pope says, "this Caponsacchi, stung/ At the first summons."
(X, 1555-56) He is asked to "play the man, pity the oppressed," 
and he does. He does not pause. He strikes any and all of 
his foes, sets out to right wrong at any risk. See the man!
"All blindness, bravery and obedience I" (X, 156O) Did he 
say blind? "Ay, as a man would be inside the sun,/ Delirious 
with the plenitude of light." (X, 1564) Such a man, if he 
rush straight in, "how shall he go wrong?" (X, 1564)
So, during all this, "Where are the Christians?" We
gave them truth, righteousness, faith, salvation, and the 
spirit— even the word of God. "Where these?" the Pope asks. 
"Slunk into cornersi" (X, 1569-70) The Pope knows that 
there are friars of this order or that who would protest 
his harsh judgment and point to the "martyr-mark" they 
have left at every point when the Church called upon them.
But he is not beguiled by this, because in spite of himself 
he must "speak loud what truth speaks low." Either they 
give "better than the best, or nothing serves!" (X, 1578-79)
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Since they have not, the Pope has little to show 
for his stewardship to God. "And is this little all that 
was to be?" he asks despairingly. "Where is the gloriously- 
decisive change" that Christian conversion is supposed to 
bring, that he, as God*s Vicar on earth, is presumed to be 
responsible for? After all, the metamorphosis from "human 
clay to divine gold" is what justifies the price we all pay. 
This consummate, intricate, sophisticated, complex approach 
we have evolved in the present time seems to yield not a 
single "grain more than the vulgar got/ By the old smelting- 
process years ago." (X, 1621-22) And if this is sad, does it 
not lead us to suspect the very power who created man, body 
and soul, and then "Ordained salvation for them both, and 
yet../ Well, is the thing we see, salvation?" (X, 1629-30)
Is this the best we can do, this ambivalence we see in the 
present age? Does this not lead to doubt everlasting?
7
"1/ Put no such dreadful question to myself," the 
Pope tells us. He does not feel the necessity of asking such 
a question. Within his circle of experience has always burned 
a central truth— a power, a wisdom, a goodness— in short, God. 
You see, he tells us, "I must outlive a thing" before I know 
it is dead. If he lasts longer than it does, he knows it 
is no more. This is why his faith will never be gone until, 
say, he outlives the faith that there is a sun. If in the 
end he lies dead somewhere, "ashes to the very soul," then
284
"Someone, not I, must wail above the heap, ’He died in the 
dark whence never morn arose.’" (X, 1738) As far as he knows, 
day will always succeed the deepest night. His speech will 
always be that "throughout the darkness" that darkness will 
end and "’The light that did burn, will burn!’" Clouds can 
obscure that light, as they are doing in his own time, but 
that does not mean that all would be bright if they were to 
dissolve. Clouds are necessary to sooth the eye which would 
otherwise be blinded by the blaze. Naturally, faith has its 
weaknesses. This is the way it must be, because it is the 
very weakness in faith that supplies the "incentive to humanity," 
that tells us that on earth nothing has absolute strength; 
hence we have a need to help and to be helped. "How can man 
love but what he yearns to help?" (X, I652) And that which 
man regards as a weakness within his strength, the angels 
know it is a stronger strength yet.
Such a weakness made strength is a re-enactment, a 
recreation, a thing made new, of the first laws that God put 
forth; it is a repetition of that miracle which is "The 
divine instance of self-sacrifice" that never ends and always 
begins for man.
Thus, the Pope fervently believes that as for himself, 
he could never miss his footing in this maze we call life.
"No," the Pope says, "I have light nor fear the dark at all."
(X, 1659) There is a weakness in his faith which makes his 
faith stronger yet. This is why he knows the light is there.
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If he was strong— if the thing he sought was already there—  
there could be no need for faith, nor ultimately, life. There 
would be the absolute perfection, which would amount to no 
more and no less than a literal "living end."
i-
8
The Pope must raise and resolve the question of those 
men who lived before the coming of Christ, What if some 
Greek bard or philosopher— say Euripides— were to come for­
ward and put to him an important question? "'I was born 
not so long before Christ's birth,'" he tells the Pope, Your 
creed tells me that I lived under conditions that I could 
in no way escape, "'Whereby salvation was impossible,'"
(X, 1688) Those impulses of the good and fair, of the pure 
and true, which men like Euripides might have held were 
"Being without a warrant or an aim," a rather sterile "felic­
ity," Such phrases as "Know thywelf," or "Take the golden 
mean" die just as quickly as the man who speaks them,
Euripides argues that since he was born to perish 
like the brutes, then why should he not live brutishly and 
by the brute law? But instead, he points out, he became 
an athlete in the gymnasium, a philosopher in the schools, 
a painter, a musician, and he then combined all these glories 
on the tragic stage. He adopted virtue as his rule of life.
He "'waived all reward and loved for loving's sake,'" "'And, 
what my heart taught me, I taught the world,/ And have been
286
teaching now two thousand years.'" (X, 1712-13)
Euripides asks the Pope to examine his work. Perhaps 
his plays have pleased, perhaps they have displeased. But 
this is only incidental. For his plays "'shall teach/ For 
truth's sake,'" (X, I?l6) He did this years before Paul 
ever spoke. He asks the Pope, "'How nearly did I guess at 
that Paul knew?'" His picture was true in his own time, 
he argues. For he asserted then that there was both good 
and bad, strong and weak, wisdom and folly, in the world.
How can he have said there was no God, when someone so 
obviously ruled outside man's self? He made the gods a 
symbol for the hidden forces, the blind necessities of 
nature.
And what gods do, man has a right to criticize, 
to applaud or condemn. Why should he fear the truth? Man 
should be bold and concentrate on that which concerns him 
most— "'The law of his own life,"" (X, 1755) He must de­
cide for himself "'Which law is virtue and not.vice,** (X, 1756) 
Now, Euripides wants to know, how could he have done 
any better under the circumstances? He had only fragmentary 
truths to go by. The Pope and his age now have the sunrise.
The forces and necessity Euripides postulated have grown into 
God, Those beings who seemed so contrary and irrational and 
whom he called gods, proved to be God's maniform and multi­
form operation.
It was midnight in my time, Euripides argues. Would
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the Pope dare pretend to punish him for creeping around on 
all-fours, finding his way in the dark? Nowadays it is 
different. Now the Pope and his kind reward teachers of 
the truth, " 'Who miss the plain way in the blaze of noon.’*"
(X, 1784)
"How should I answer this Euripides?" the Pope asks.
Our trouble is, "We have got too familiar with the light."
(X, 1793) More and more, we are suffocated by the false 
light of earth. We hear earthly demands that "mankind serve 
God/ For man's sole sake, not God's and therefore man's."
(X, 1820-21) We have come to the point where we can hardly 
distinguish "the sun/ From a mere Druid fire on a far mount."
(X, 1822-23) Thus, Euripides deserves all the more praise 
because he could distinguish the true light from the false one.
But in our own time such insight does not seem possible. 
Now we live for the day, with a kind of "ignoble confidence," 
a "cowardly hardihood" that "Makes the old heroism impossible." 
(X, 1487-89) There is no self-sacrifice involved because 
the false light makes it easy and demands little.
However, the Pope feels a whisper of times to come.
Is there a new age, to be ushered in by his death, which will 
"shake this torpor of assurance from our creed,/ Re-introduce 
the doubt discarded, bring/ The formidable danger back?"
(X, 1852-55) Up through his time the authority of Christi­
anity has never been questioned in settling "heresies" of 
one kind or another. Nowadays we have faith in the report.
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Christianity tells us what we need to believe. But we need 
to disbelieve the report, and believe in the thing the re­
port belies. Is there even now some truth "Unrecognized 
yet, but perceptible?" (X, I871) Is it some truth that 
will "Correct the portrait by the living face,/ Man’s God, 
by God’s God in the mind of man?" (X, 1872-73) In other 
words, we need to substitute a living face for a picture; we 
need to put aside the image of God that man has put there; 
we need to receive the image of God that God offers to man’s 
mind.
A few will rise to the new height, but many will sink 
"to the old depth." A few, even before they knew of this new 
law which the Pope feels is coming, kept the old. The new 
law is a re-creation of the old, but a few will never need 
it. These few hope that someday there will be another 
Pompilia who will come and say "’I know the right place by 
foot’s feel,/ I took it and tread firm there.'" (X, I885-90) 
But so many more, when the new law comes, will fall, and 
take their stand "On what is fact, the lust and pride of
life’" (X, 1890-91)
The Pope sees that the mass of men, "whose very souls 
even now/ Seem to need re-creating" sink "Worm-like into 
the mud" that the new light now lays bare.
9
Thus, the Pope feels a new order coming in. "Do 
not we end, the century and I?" (X, 1902) There is an anti­
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mask that is becoming impatient. He is knocking on the door 
of the new century. "Will I block the way?" the Pope asks. 
Look, says the Pope, "Here comes the first experimentalist/
In the new order of things,— he plays a priest," (X, 1909-IO) 
The Pope is proud and exultant as he prepares to move off 
the stage. "Does he take inspiration from the Church?" the 
Pope asks. Does this man make the Church's rule his law of 
life? "Not he." For note: "his own mere impulse guides 
the man." (X, 1913) In the maze we have asked him to walk 
through, he has in the main taken the right step.
Now, the Pope wants to know, can he teach others 
how to acquit themselves, "Prove why this step was right, 
while that were wrong?" (X, 1922) How should he do it?
And he answers, "'Ask your hearts as I asked mine." (X, 1923) 
But what if your heart misdirects you? Why then, Caponsacchi 
would answer, quit the stage,/ And make amends,— be there 
amends to make.'" (X, 1925-26)
Of course, what of the Abate Paolo? He had his taste, 
and followed his heart too, but his heart told him to follow 
"the lowest of life's appetites." "'I live for greed, am­
bition, lust, revenge,'" he would say. He attains these 
ends by force or guile. Today he is perhaps a hypocrite but 
tomorrow he might be recognized as "'The rational man, the 
type of common sense.'" (X, 19^0) Guido, too, followed the 
same guidance and in turn influenced the four clods whom he 
hired to be at his beck, as ready to murder him as anybody
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else. "These are the world!" (X, 19^7) the Pope exclaims.
Note the first result of the new order of things. 
There they lie, the old pair, "Of the weak head and not so 
wicked heart," and the one true Christian among them, this 
"mother, wife and girl." Those last qualities are three 
traits which seem "to make an angel up." The first step 
in the new order of things was taken on their heads!
Now that the Pope is close to his exit, he knows 
that he still owes his last act, as his first, to God. You 
see, God armed him thus, "With Paul’s sword as with Peter’s 
key." (X, 1957) He is the Pope, and once more he will smite 
with all his strength. "And when I raise my arm," he says 
incredulously, who has the temerity "to pluck at my sleeve?" 
Why, here are Guido’s friends. "The facts being proved and 
incontestable,/ What is the last word I must listen to?"
(X, 1965-66) Is it, "’Spare yet this barren stock’" because 
he might eventually bring forth fruit? Is it, "’So poor 
and swift a punishment’" prevents him from having the time 
to redeem himself? "Nowise!" No, his friends come at him 
from all sides and begin to instruct him the Pope that 
"there’s a new tribunal now/ Higher than God’s,— the educated 
man’s!" (X, 1975-76) They come forth to say that all other 
wrongs Guido could patiently endure, "but touch his honor!" 
Such, at any rate, is Arcangeli’s pleading. And when that 
does not work, in steps "the brisk junior," cuts the knot 
that human and divine law have become entangled in, and
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pleads for acquittal. "'Remit the death,'" he urges, 
"'Forgive. . .well, in the old way, if thou please.'" Allow 
the Count to go free because he may plead "a priest's immu­
nity." (X, 2001) Besides, "civilization" and "the spirit 
of culture" require that he be pardoned. Here is a chance 
for the Pope to open the gates to a new golden age where 
"'Civilization and the Emperor/ Succeed thy Christianity 
and Pope.'" For, you see, the main prop of society is 
the "Supremacy of husband over wife." (X, 2034)
Guido's friends urge the Pope to give his own 
feelings play for once. Forget that you are Pope, they tell 
him. How can a man "whose own life winks o'er the socket 
edge" deal death? Here at the end of his life he should 
not want to upset his own chances. "'Mercy is safe and 
graceful,'" the educated man argues. Moreover, if Guido is 
executed, the Roman populace is bound to think he was ex­
ecuted to "screen a scandal from the Church" by trying to 
exonerate Caponsacchi. The Pope should not delay but bring 
forth his merciful decision. Make Rome happy and ring the 
joyful news throughout the streets.
"I will. Sirs," the Pope answers. Thus, a resolute, 
eighty-six-year old first servant of God has come to the 
end of his decision. For a voice other than the educated 
man's quickens his spirit. " 'Quis pro Domino?/ Who is upon 
the Lord's side?" Guido asked this question of the Court 
and the Pope can only answer, "I, who write" this verdict of
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guilty. (X, 2099-2101)
For Guido the "main criminal, I have no hope," the 
Pope says. Unless there is a sudden change in fate. Unless 
there is a dark flash of truth dealt out to Guido in one
blow and "Guido see, one instant, and be saved." (X, 2127)
The Pope however must avert his face, for he cannot follow 
Guido "Into that sad obscure sequestered state" where God 
unmakes the soul only to remake it again. He must remake it, 
the Pope argues, or else He made it in vain to begin with.
"Enough," the Pope concludes. He can tarry no longer, 
"For I may die this very night/ And how should I 
dare die, this man let live?" (X, 2132-33)
10
The Pope's monologue is the most formless of all the
principals' in the murder case. Whereas in the accounts of
Guido, Caponsacchi and Pompilia, the structure is something 
already accomplished and which they now relate to somebody 
else, the Pope arrives at his decision subjectively and 
emotionally, but he does not feel it objectively. Although 
the Pope realizes the need to intellectually resolve his 
decision, and while he knows that the creative possibilities 
for intellectual resolution are there, he has not yet had 
time to give form to what he feels. Since feelings by 
themselves are not informed, since they are dumb, unthinking 
things, the Pope knows that his decision cannot have validity
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for him until he places the feelings that lie behind his 
decision outside of himself and deliberate about them, give 
them form and shape, give them order and purpose and intelli­
gence. He knows that he has got to prove to himself that 
his decision is not mere whim, but that it is a truth, and 
at this one particular time, for this one particular case, 
it will always be a truth.
In summoning up the various figures with whom he wishes 
to speak, the Pope helps to create his decision by speaking 
through them back to himself. The Pope is thus carrying on 
a conversation with himself, one part of him trying to get 
outside of himself so that he can look back at himself, at 
the conglomerate feelings and separate insights and begin 
building what in essence is already there.
SoraeWtere amidst the mixture of feelings and thoughts—  
all involving the Pope's total personality— the Pope knows 
he has the decision. It is there in the river of his imagi­
nation, flowing, dipping above and below the surface in 
specks and particles. It is a formless, shapeless mass; 
he cannot see it whole; it is a mass of whirling and shift­
ing possibilities; the vital images he needs are separated 
and he must call upon his artistic shaping power to show 
the form behind the fact.
The other actors in this drama proceeded with their 
stories in an order more closely akin to a step-by-atep 
process. They recounted their backgrounds, the marriage
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arrangements, life in Arezzo, Violante‘s confession, Guido’s 
treatment of Pompilia, the flight to Rome, the trial, the 
aftermath, the birth of the baby, the murder, and the murder 
trial.
The Pope, however, has a different sort of problem 
involved. On a literal level, he has no story to tell.
HaIf-Rome was worried about a possibly unfaithful wife and 
used the murder case as a vehicle by which to send warning 
to his wife’s presumed lover. Other Half-Rome, realizing 
the mundane emptiness in his own life, felt the psychological 
necessity of relating the murder as a romantic adventure to 
reaffirm for himself his own false values, Tertium Quid 
saw aspects in the story which might amuse his aristocratic 
acquaintances and thus secure for him a better position in 
upper-class Roman society. Caponsacchi has been asked by 
the judges to appear as a friend of the Court and tell his 
story again, and he consents to appear, not for his own 
sake, but for theirs. Pompilia feels a need to establish 
the truth and tells her story in order to show the truth as 
she knows it. Arcangeli and Bottini find the case pro­
fessionally interesting and use it as a means to raise 
their stature in the legal profession. Guido tells his 
story twice, and in both instances he is pleading for his 
life; because it is his life which is at stake, we might call 
Guido’s second monologue the most deliberately dramatic in the 
poem. (Browning speaks to us in the first and last monologues
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because he feels a need to show us "pure crude fact" mixed 
with a fancy which becomes "one fact the more," Thus in 
the end, he shows us a book which means "beyond the facts," 
the truth beyond any particular person's perception of it, 
beyond any facts that have recorded it.)
The Pope's position is somewhat analogous to Browning's, 
but if we consider only the Pope's relationship to the rest 
of the principals, we discover that the Pope is the only 
person who has no story to tell and no "personal" reason 
to tell it. It is for this reason that the Pope is not 
telling a story but slowly creating a decision. It is for 
this reason that the Pope seems busy gathering the specks 
and particles of the elusive truths as they dance around 
him, rather than going piece by piece through the documents.
This latter procedure the Pope has already completed. He 
has already made his orderly, legalized, intellectualized 
investigation.
He is sad, he is perplexed; he is old and sick at 
heart; he has sat up in his close, bare room in the Basilica, 
above the gossip of this half of Rome, that half of Rome, 
and that curious synthesis which makes up Rome's third and 
different part; he has had very little to do with the trial; 
suddenly every part of it is placed before him.
He needs talk to nobody; and yet he talks with so, 
many in order to get back to himself. He knows that he is 
the only person to whom he can talk. Nobody can "make"
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his decision for him, not even God. He knows that as 
God’s first servant, he has an obligation not only to God, 
but to himself. He realizes that only "better than the best 
will serve." How paint, how draw, how shape and round that 
which he knows is there, waiting for his brush to be applied?
His decision is like a long road. We get on it when 
he does and he begins to lay down his road as he travels 
on it. It is a road that goes through the speeches of all 
his listeners and then comes back around into his own heart 
and mind; it is a road--since he also talks to God— that goes 
to Heaven. But Heaven is not his immediate goal. His 
immediate goal is here on earth; there is a certain anxiety 
within him as he moves and builds his road because he feels 
there is a possibility he will die before he finishes; thus 
it is a road built in a day. The road is a circle; it begins 
and ends within himself. It is shaped like a ring. It 
is the sun, the blinking, pounding white heat of truth ham­
mered into man’s reality.
The Pope knows about truth. It is like a thing you 
can stretch out and put your finger through and then it 
encircles you all about. Yet you cannot put it down; it is 
always growing and evolving and yet there is a hard core 
at the center of it which, like Pompilia, will never change. 
There is a kind of dazzling whiteness, too brilliant some­
times for man’s eyes, and we have to take the light in 
proportion as we are able to receive it without being blinded. 
This is the reason the Pope’s road cannot stay in Heaven; it
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must find the light "inside the sun" like Caponsacchi did, 
and bring it back to us so we can use that light to rise by.
11
It is because of his imaginative abilities that the 
Pope can find Guido "reprobate." What made Guido different? 
Did he face so many disadvantages that he was forced into 
evil? He had the same appetite for life as the rest of us, 
but he began to use his eyes to search "outside the grate." 
(X, 4l8) He had no compunctions in permitting his greed full 
exercise. He apparently always used the Church as a screen 
to protect him. His whole family was indeed no different.
Yet he had the external attributes which should have 
caused him to begin life well. In spite of this, his whole 
soul is blackness for he believed in "just the vile of 
life." (X, 511) Can we call his instincts "truth" just as 
we call our own and Caponsacchi's and Pompilia's. All the 
disguises he wore, all the fantastic lies that he told, are 
they not the result of a truth about evil which he feels as 
deeply as we feel our truths about goodness? Most people 
are akin to Guido to the degree that they offer good words 
but the results are bad deeds. It is an "habitual creed" 
with the world.
But the Pope is blocked from explaining Guido*s 
blackness. He accepts it and he knows it is a fact, but he 
is aware that he must account for it in other ways, for it 
is a link in the chain of vital images that he must gather
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and join together to show the sense of his decision— a 
decision that is actually a moral judgment that he shapes 
and creates himself.
Guido's marriage helps to explain him because there 
he acted in diammetrical opposition to all the reasons one 
might have for marriage. It was not just a simple marriage 
of convenience. From the first Guido apparently saw in it 
an opportunity to extend some of the blackness about himself 
out into the world's light. What astonishes the Pope is 
that "Not one permissible impulse moves the man!" (X, 536) 
Even before he married he had evidently formulated a plan 
whereby he could possess everything the Comparini owned, 
break the back of Pompilia at the same time, and drive them 
all out into the sea.
Now, the Pope asks, what kind of instinct is this?
It is just as base as Pompilia's is high. It seems to move 
according to its own laws and has its own justification. He 
would lie, rob, even murder; he had not the slightest qualm 
about any of it.
The love letters are an obvious forgery and just as 
they could not possibly have been written by Pompilia pre­
cisely because of her instincts, just so they had to be 
written by Guido because of his. As for Pompilia and 
Caponsacchi, once they were brought together, the Pope is 
aware of the danger for both of them. There is no question 
that they were drawn toward each other. Who could doubt
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that Caponsacchi was tempted? Both were passionate beings, 
and there was a possibility there for evil as there was for 
good. But they transformed a mundane scene by a window into 
the. symbols they needed to inspire them on to their goal.
They turned the window where she stood into a shrine. Capon­
sacchi and Pompilia had a "new noble nature" and when "Hus­
band, wife and priest meet face to face," at the inn, which 
truth wins out? Guido's "torchlight treachery" is no match 
for Caponsacchi's "education to truth."
The Pope explains Guido's oversight in not securing 
the necessary ticket to get out of Rome as being the "Touch 
of the fool in Guido the astute I" It was an obstacle that 
was "Too vulgar, too absurdly plain i' the path." (X, 812)
He did not see the need to remove it. It was an oversight 
so characteristic of the world in which Guido lived; the 
fact that he would not be able to bribe the guard never 
occurred to Guido; he took such corruption for granted.
The other characters who hover around the fire in Guido's 
cave— men like his two brothers, the Governor and the Arch­
bishop, the four hirelings— all seem to have thrived in the 
same manner. The sickness of the world had become part of 
its structure; without it, society could not operate. How 
was it possible that among this darkness and disease, a stray 
"beauty-beam" of light suddenly appeared, penetrating that 
darkness, searching for a way to the sky? The Pope knows 
he cannot explain this; he accepts it because it is there;
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ultimately, he accepts it on faith,
12
Pompilia is dressed in "the old clean linen garb,"
In spite of everything she had the will to believe. She 
clung to her faith at a time when the world gave her every 
cause to leave it. The Pope sees that she created something 
of her own within herself that was independent of people, 
society and the world.
The Pope is aware, too, that the people who have been 
carefully trained in the Church have failed in his own time. 
Yet here is a "seed planted by chance" which springs up on 
the side of the road without benefit of the Church’s careful 
guardianship. Right to the last, she was faithful to what 
she understood to be right, according to her ability to 
understand it. And each time, that which she was faithful 
to forsook her— parents, husband, Church--and instead of 
falling back, she rose "from law to law,/ The old to the 
new," She evolved her own reality in a step-by-step process. 
She did not need them because she had the will to believe 
in herself and her faith. This was more real to her than 
anything she saw in the external world. It was her desire 
to defend "That trust of trusts" which God had laid on her 
that enabled her to place her reality squarely against the 
world’s,
Caponsacchi, too, is placed not so very far from
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Pompilia, Although the Pope is aware of Caponsacchi’s 
ulterior motives in becoming involved with her, those motives 
disappeared and he finds the inspiration to act from her 
and what She symbolized for him, rather than from the Church, 
or from his Summa, or fro# the world. Here again, those men 
of the Church arid of the nobility who were trained to give 
service failed and a society priest suddenly sprang forth 
the hero. The Pope is hard-pressed to reconcile this seem­
ing paradox. The Pope regards Caponsacchi as a man who 
has helped to shape a world of his own and has defiantly 
asserted it in the face of the world he has known. That 
world is the ambivalent, complacent, corrupt world of Roman 
society which insists that there is both good and bad in 
everything.
But, the Pope declares, we cannot have both the white 
and the black. Here, it is apparent that the Pope has found 
another segment of his road, another link in his chain. Those 
men who have been trained in the Church have accepted both 
black and white. But Caponsacchi realized that "Life's 
business is Just the terrible choice." (X, 1237) Guido, too, 
recognized this. It is in the choice, then, wherein part of 
one's true reality lies. Guido's commitment to the black is 
final and complete. Yet the black, though it is a truth of 
a sort because it is a fact in the world, is nevertheless 
a terrible falsehood. We know this when we see that, in
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the disease, the corruption, the blackness, the white heat 
of the real truth rises, grows and unfolds like a flower, 
spreading and reaching for the light.
13
Human beings have said that man is fallible. God 
made man perfect, but took away that perfection and told man 
that henceforth this life on earth is "a training and a 
passage" for the true reality in heaven. Pompilia never once 
doubted this, and Caponsacchi saw it instantly when it con­
fronted him. God required man to strive to perfect himself,
t
since he no longer could be perfect. In order to strive for 
this, man is necessarily bound to reach for and create it —  
at least in part, for perfection is not there waiting for 
him on earth, nor is it an entity that he may find somewhere 
in what the Pope calls "The absolute immensity." This 
immensity is too blinding for man's vision and is not accessible 
to him anyway while he is on earth.
The Pope recognizes the difficulty in finding truth
in the "human sphere" and he realizes that his way of find­
ing it is analogous to the way of Pompilia and Caponsacchi.
Just as they know, so too does he know. The problem is, if 
man is fallible, then how does the Pope know he knows? His 
eyes, he tells us, have grown sharp by use. That is, he 
has exercised his creative abilities for a long while.
Yet he denies that he has any "special touch" and he thinks 
that all men have this ability if they would only use it.
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if they would only "give better than the best,"
The Pope characterizes his own creative process as a 
combination of "hard work and good will." It is not a matter 
of high intelligence; it does not require intellection.
Joined with this is a "habitude that gives a blind man sight." 
That is, the Pope knows that his commitment is complete and 
that he has increased his abilities by his habitual exercise 
of them. He has been operating within this framework so long 
that he is like a blind man who develops an unusual sensi­
tivity to things. The Pope claims just this kind of "poetic 
license." He has a feel for the truth at the end of his 
fingertips.
His fallibility stems from his imperfection. The 
source of his imperfection is God. The source of his "poor 
spark" of light is also God. Hfeomust exercise the latter 
in order to reach beyond the former. It is possible that 
he has misinterpreted heaven’s message, but if that is so, 
how has he come to know the things he knows? The Pope draws 
an analogy between the mind of man and a convex glass that 
curves outwardly and traps those scattered particles that 
it is able to gather out of the sky’s "absolute immensity." 
These particles are united in heaven, and man reunites those 
which he traps in his mind by exercising his creative abili­
ties.
The Pope believes we have no reason to live unless 
we love, but that we cannot love unless we know. That is.
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we must see the relationship between our own idea of wholeness 
and the "absolute immensity" of God, When those aspects of 
the absolute which we see reunite in our minds, it is "our 
heaven on earth,/ Our known unknown.* (X, 1313-14) It is 
a "whole proportioned to our sense," Each mode of life 
takes its proper place in God's plan; whether "Angel or 
Insect," it is as "Thous framedst things," (X, 1331) Thus,
God has appointed the Pope to a particular place. The fact
that this is all taking place on this particular planet, 
the fact that he has the duty he has, all come from an 
operation outside the sphere of man. "Incomprehensibly the
choice is Thine I" (X, 1345) the Pope says.
Although man hes strength and intelligence he does 
not always have goodness or love. The Pope sees an analogy 
between the sacrifice of Christ and the sacrifice of Pompilia, 
Each supplies that which the world lacks but needs in order 
to fulfill itself— "love without a limit." The murder 
story, like the story of Christ, discloses a love that is 
"Unlimited in its self-sacrifice," But this is not enough 
to answer the Pope's question about fallibility. Something 
is beyond the tale. The Pope admits that here he must feel 
what he cannot see, yet he still has faith. The dread 
machinery of sin and sorrow which God has set in the world-- 
the blackness of the Guidos, the yellow that passes for white 
of churchmen like Paolo--are used to bring out the moral 
qualities of man.
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Out of evil, out of pain and suffering, we create 
for ourselves the insight that tells us that one must love 
and be loved in return. In this way man becomes simultaneously 
creative and self-sacrificing. That is, we help to create 
the love we have for God and man, and we see the necessity 
of sacrificing ourselves in order to bring that love to 
fulfillment,
Man is on probation; he creates his own moral world, 
by finding and re-creating God's truth here on earth. Man 
creates it according to his own proportion, then expands 
and enlarges his creation by exercising his moral sense; 
his reality grows toward God's,
The Pope cannot help but despair over the failures 
of the Church. The representatives of the Church are 
apparently learning from their teaching the opposite from 
that for which the teaching was intended. The Pope knows 
that the Church teaches that love and faith are supposed to 
spring from authoritative sources. But here is a case where 
the sources of love and faith spring from those who have 
not been designated to bring them. Caponsacchi is like 
a man "inside the sun." That is, Caponsacchi no longer so 
much receives the light of truth as he himself gives it off 
so others can see. No, the Church and all its representatives 
must face the truth. And the truth is that either they must 
give "better than the best, or nothing serves/" (X, 1579)
The Pope is heartsick that this is all he has to show
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to God for his efforts. Apparently people can gain the truth 
just as easily by the "old smelting-process" used years ago 
as they can by the complex, institutionalized machinery that 
the Church now offers. He asks himself if this does not 
lead us to doubt God because we have been beguiled into 
wondering where the right path is that one takes to find 
the right way to truth. But the Pope feels that this is 
an irrelevant question. There is a central truth--God—  
which he believes in. The only things the Pope cannot 
believe in are those things that he outlives. How can I 
know it is d@ad if I cannot outlive it, he asks? As long 
as it outlives him, it has the edge on him. This is why 
the Pope holds to his faith. He cannot outlive his own 
faith.
Here is a murder case which partkkes of the deepest 
night. But Pompilia proves what the Pope believes— that day 
will always succeed the deepest night. If light burned once, 
then there exists the possibility it will burn again. It is 
his faith in the possibility that is his highest reality.
The Pope believes that by exercising our own creative abilities 
we can turn that possibility into a reality for ourselves 
through love and self-sacrifice. He could be wrong and 
someone might someday be making pronouncements over the 
ashes of his soul, but at least he never said it himself while 
he was alive, because there was always the possibility.
The Pope sees the possibility as real because by self-
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sacrificing love we put that possibility into action and 
it becomes a living realijty. Thus the challenge becômes, 
can we see that this possibility is real?^
But does not that give an inherent weakness to 
faith, one might ask? Certainly, for faith is inevitably 
bound up in weakness, since it deals with the unknown which 
we must fear yet face. We are all weak in our faith, hence 
the need we feel to help others. We sacrifice ourselves 
because we know that others need the same help we need. The 
Pope calls this "a weakness made strength." The Pope sees 
that this is a re-creation of an old truth. Our faith with 
its weakness is the other side of God's absolute faith in 
Himself. Our faith stems from the laws that God put forth, 
but it is a "thing made new" by us.
With such a faith, the Pope does not fear at all, for 
he has ample light. His apprehension is that earth has cre­
ated its own false light. There is no self-sacrifice possi­
ble because the thing we seek is already here; thus there is 
no need for the faith that is a possibility. People are 
no longer seeking possibilities but probabilities. We have 
developed a "torpor of assurance" about mankind. Incredibly 
enough, we no longer doubt. People now do not see that 
without doubt there can be no faith. We must doubt in order 
to rise above doubt by faith. This is the only way we know
^Compare Guido's argument, which is the exact reverse 
of the Pope's. Guido says if he is wrong about not believing 
in God and goodness he has had his life, whatever he loses.
If he is right, he has got the single good there was to gain.
(XI, 727-29)
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what cannot be known. We must be confronted by the "formidable 
danger." Even now in his own time there must be some truth 
"Unrecognized yet, but perceptible," that will help us dis­
cover the real light.
In his own time, man has developed his own picture of 
God; it is false because it is man’s God. What we want is 
God's God; that is, God puts an idea of Himself in man's 
mind and man must seek to recognize it.
The Pope feels whispers of this attitude coming in 
the future. He is almost at the end of his life, and he 
is living at the end of a century. He feels that a corrupt 
and dying age has almost run its course. The mask that 
all have been wearing is now Iglng impatiently nudged and 
pushed off the stage by a new "anti-mask." This anti-mask 
is the first experimentalist in what the Pope sees as a 
new order of things. He receives no inspiration from the 
so-called authoritative sources of love and faith. "His 
own mere impulse guides the man." (X, 1913) But that impulse, 
the Pope knows, embodies a complex structuring of the truths 
of reality that Caponsacchi has created himself out of his 
own faith in the possibility.
Thus the Pope rejects the arguments of Guido's 
friends. He rejects and scorns that "new tribunal" which 
is "Higher than God's,— the educated man'sl" (X, 1975-76)
He rejects all argummhts of "civilization" and the "spirit 
of culture." He knows there is a new age, but it is not the
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"golden age" of "Civilization and the Emperor," where the 
strength of society lays in the husband's supremacy over 
the wife.
The Pope's decision itself is first a possibility.
The Pope sees that possibility and by means of the faith 
he has in himself, he transforms that possibility into a 
reality. We can follow his creative processes.
He knows that he knows. This is the first thing.
He says he has so much faculty to judge. God gave 
him no more.
He has done "Better than the best" with what God 
has given him (for nothing else will serve).
Beyond this, he has his faith that what he has done 
is the best there can be; thusr. he knows through faith what 
it is not possible to know.
This faith is a faith— filled with doubt and rising be­
yond doubt— in his own judgment.
More than this, he has faith that even if someday 
his judgment proves to be wrong, it is yet right because he 
acted in good faith.
He knows that just as God embodied Pompilia with 
that "trust of trusts"--to bring forth life--so too God 
has given him a trust as the head of His Church.
The Pope accepts this trust on faith. Thus he 
judges on faith--accompanied by hard work, good will and 
an eye grown sharp by practice— and if his judgment is
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wrong, it is wrongsin good faith. This is the "better 
than the best" that he can do.
But he knows he is right.
He doubt his Judgment. But he never once doubts 
his decision.
CHAPTER XVI 
GUIDO IN ÿRISON 
1
He asks for help. He is innocent, "Innocent as 
a babe, as Mary’s own," (XI, 30) Anybody in his situation 
would have done what he did. "All honest Rome approved 
my part." (XI, 39) Anybody who has had wives, sisters, 
daughters will know what he means.
His lawyers told him even if the Court found him 
guilty he coudd always plead benefit of clergy. But the 
Pope had us all fooled, he says. He is the same hypocrite 
we all are. He was not "the angel in man's likeness."
(XI, 60) "He help?/ He pardon? Here’s his mind and message- 
death,/ Thank the good Pope I" (XI, 6I-62) Is the Pope not 
supposed to believe in mercy, to live and let live? Is 
this not what he stands for? The Pope knows what his deci­
sion means, "and sets me rolling all the same !" (XI, 78)
"Because 1 play some prank my grandsire played,"
(XI, 111) here 1 am, in prison wàÊting to go to my own 
execution. He looks askance at his two auditors— the two 
priests who have come to take his confession. Surely they
must be here for another purpose, perhaps to tell him that
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he will live yet another day. Will they not say something?
He looks at them anxiously, trying to gauge their thoughts 
behind their blank faces. "Will you have the naked truth?" 
he asks loudly. The Pope decided, being old and sick of 
his own life, that he would snuff out mine at the same time. 
"Sir Abate,/ Can you do nothing?" (XI, 86-87) He looks at 
them, searches their faces. What are they thinking? What 
message do they bring?
He calls his two confessors his friends. You know 
me, he tells them. We are all from the same class. You 
went into the Church, I stayed as head of my house, "Friends, 
we used to friskj^" (XI, 87) at one time earlier in our lives. 
Now there is a slash, a "cut across our good companionship" 
t#at was so gay when we were all young. He is like them, he 
says; we^re different from others, because we were put into 
a particular path— "nobles born and bred." (XI, 93) Each 
of our escutcheons is full "Of old achievement and impunity." 
(XI, 94) Yes, being nobles, with their rich heritage and 
their great achievements, they enjoy and have earned a certain 
kind of impunity. They had no care in those days, riding 
across the green, prancing through the meadows. The sun 
saluted, the morning laughed. One time his grandfather 
pulled up his rein, slipped out of his Saddle and stabbed 
a "knave" who dared to jeer at him. Then he got back on his 
horse and went on with the "cavalcade," (XI, 106) Now, 
because he plays the same game his grandfather played, he
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suddenly finds himself in prison, convicted of murder! It 
is a new trap with a novel spring "just set/ By the good 
old Pope." (XI, 114-15)
In fact, his trap is the first one and he is the first 
prize. "Warn me? Why?" Did anybody tell him that the rules 
of the game had been changed? He can see that he is being 
used as an example, as a warning to other members of his 
class. The Pope is now making the law plain past any mis­
take. The prank, the jest, the joke, now has death as its 
penalty. Of course, the Pope is not fooling him; they both 
know that in the kind of society in which they live, it has 
always been regarded as a prank.
Pope the Fifth, or "Pope the Five Hundredth..what 
do I know or care?" (X, 121) So a dagger was whipped out, 
what does it matter? Nobles have always had privilege.
And when they were out riding or gaming or gambling, "Some­
thing of a sudden jerks at somebody— / A dagger is out, 
flashing cut and thrust," (XI, 110-11) and blood flows; it 
is all part of the game and they all played it. Why is 
he being punished for it now?
Thus twelve hours from now and he must try his body 
and soul upon the virtue of the Pope's brand new "engine," 
his new rule. "I'm the first!" He knows that for certain; 
the guillotine awaits him; it is reserved for the nobility.
He wants to tell them about the guillotine because he has 
seen it and hates it.
314
In fact, he will talk about anything, "Let me 
talk," he tells them, "Or leave me at your pleasure." But 
he has to talk, to keep himself busy. "Talk I must," he 
says. What have they come there for anyway except to lure 
him into talk? Perhaps, he says hopefully, they have some­
thing else to disclose, some better news? But for this 
question he receives only silence. All right, "Use your 
ears,/ I use my tongue." But how they will talk tonight 
at their supper when all their guests jump and clamor for 
the news and say "'Welcome his Eminence who shrived the 
wretchi/ Now we shall have the Abate's story1" (XI, l4l-42)
2
Guido knows. No one is fooling him. He tells how 
he became acquainted with the guillotime— the night he was 
a chance witness at the execution of a certain peasant 
named Felice. Felice had made the mistake of speaking 
improperly to a duke and then striking him in the face be­
cause the duke had kidnapped and raped his sister. There­
fore, he was sent to the block. It was the expected thing, 
the usual way in Rome, Later that night the Duke threw a 
party and passed around an obscene picture of the sister. 
Everyone laughed at the jest.
But suddenly, Guido says in mock perplexity, times 
are different. There is another Pope now. "I do the Duke's 
deed," but I get Felice's punishment. Riddle me thati (XI, 277) 
Guido does not like the phrase, "'I lose my head,'" This is
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for louts and clouts like Felice, "How euphemistic! Lose 
what? Lose your ring,/ Your snuff-box, tablets, kerchief I —  
but, your head?" (XI, 28O-81) Guido learned all he had to 
know as a nobleman at an early age. And it was useful 
knowledge in those days "To know the way a head is set
on neck," (XI, 284) and to know what could cause one to lose
it. It certainly was not from pranks!
But the sage says there is not much pain when the 
steal blade drops on your neck, "Who told him?" Guido 
wants to know. "Not Felice’s ghost, I think!" This is 
not the way of Mother Nature, for our head to fall off our 
body. She would much rather have the cord worn away by 
living to a ripe old age, . One dies naturally and well when 
Nature is behind it. But when the process is carried out 
by Art, Art with its mighty engine, the guillotine, then 
Nature is crushed out.
And anyhow why must it be? It would be different if 
all men were good. But men are not good, at least not good 
like Peter. And if he asked Peter, " ’Petrus, quo vadis?'" 
Peter’s answer would doubtless be "’To free the prisoner and 
forgive his fault.’" (XI, 327-28) Why cannot Innocent, the 
good Pope, who has succeeded to Peter's place, "think Peter’s 
thought, speak Peter’s speech!" (XI, 333) Why, Guido asserts, 
"I say, he is bound to it: friends, how say you?" (XI, 332)
Again the two priests give him no answer.
Is the new gospel of Innocent now to be Law and not
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love? Guido thought the Pope believed in love, not law—  
in mercy rather than justice so much. "Christ's maxim is —  
one soul outwéighs the worldi/ Respite me, save a soul, 
then, curse the world I" (XI, 359-60) He tells his confessors 
that he is merely defending himself and that he has "the 
best o' the battle," (XI, 390) The facts are on his side.
At least half of Rome approves of what he did, and all Rome 
asks for his acquittal. But the Pope does not do what all 
Rome wants him to do. What is the matter with this "Vicar 
of the Lord,/ Shepherd o' the flock?" All he can do is turn 
his staff, use the point, "And thrust the shuddering sheep 
he calls a wolf,/ Back and down, down and down to where hell 
gapes I" (XI, 405-06)
The Pope calls him guilty for the sake of a whim. 
Perhaps Guido should confess that he deserves his fate and 
thus keep up the jest and continue the lie until the end.
But he will "sticlf to the truth," even to his last breath, 
the truth that he is "an innocent and murdered man," (XI, 
418-19) And perhaps a rumor might start abroad in Rome that 
the Pope killed an innocent man, "Therefore," he tells the 
priests, "to suppress such talk/ You two come here, entreat 
I tell you lies," (XI, 431-32) and end my life the "edifying 
way," But, Guido tells them positively, "I end,/ Telling the 
truthi Your self-styled shepherd thieves!" (XI, 433-34)
Yes, the Pope is a thief. And thieves hate wolves, because 
wolves damage what the thief has stolen. There is no reason
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why the wolf should compliment the thief by giving him the 
title of "shepherd," or why the wolf should, without spite, 
lick the prong that turns him on the spit. "Eh,/ Cardinal?
My Abate, scarcely thus!" (XI, 441-42)
Guido looks at them and suddenly realizes what he 
has done. Has he accidentally admitted that under his own 
sheepskin he is a wolf? All right then, "There, let my 
sheepskin-garb, a curse on ’t, go— / Leave my teeth free if 
I must show my shagi" (XI, 443-44) Suddenly it is all over.
He undergoes his transformation in front of them. He drops 
all his disguises; his fangs show; his snarl is loud and 
terrifying. "Repent?" he shouts at them. "What good shall 
follow?" (XI, 445) Is he going to be any happier during the 
last twelve hours of his life when at the thirteenth his head 
rolls down the slide? Or is it the happiness of an after­
life? Should he repent to save his soul? But that would 
be a lie. Only truth can save him. So, "Hear the truth, you, 
whatever you style yourselves,/ Civilization and society!"
(XI, 462-63) he shouts at not only them but at all humanity. 
Come on, he screams defiantly, I will fight with all the world. 
It is obvious that the priests intend to do their worst with 
him. It is in their eyes. "You dare no more than death,/
And mean no less," he says. (XI, 469-70) Why should they 
give him any respite? I knew what I was doing, he tells them. 
"I knew that if I chose sin certain sins," and satiated ray 
lust in certain ways that were proscribed to me, "I should
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find you in the path." (XI, 479-81) Thus, when we cross 
blades, I find you the better swordsman. But you want more, 
it seems. You want repentance too. Law attempted to join in 
this adventure, but Law was not enough or else you two would 
not be here, "Did not the Trial show things plain enough?" 
(XI, 511) Were you not satisfied with its results? "'Ah,'" 
you say, "'but a word of the man's very self/ Would somehow 
put the keystone in its place,'" (XI, 512-13) and crown the 
rightness of the proceedings.
All right, Guido flings at them. Here it is. "Take 
the word you want I" (XI, $l4)
3
Defiantly, from the darkness of his wolf's cave, Guido 
peels off layer after layer of his evil nature and slowly 
reveals the bottomless depths of his depravity. The setting 
is visually appropriate; he is in his damp cell, awaiting 
execution, standing in the midst of light and darkness. The 
two priests are there, grimly silent; he looks hopefully at 
them for some word, for a smile to tell him they are Jesting, 
that he has been pardoned all along; he casts about for some­
thing, anything, that will perhaps give him some respite, 
some delay, some postponement.
He hints at what he will later develop artistically—  
that he was born and bred to follow a certain path. Based on 
the way he was raised, on the "way of the world," he murdered
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In good faith. It amazes him that he must pay for his crime 
with his life. Nobody else has ever done so before him.
He knows, and the priests know, and he knows the Pope knows, 
that he is the first to be tried under this new law. They 
are not fooling anybody. Everyone knows that under the old 
law rank and privilege would have been exempted. The simple 
fact is, the nobility has always had privilege. Essentially, 
as Guido sees it, he is being robbed of this basic right.
He inherited the right, has always taken it for granted.
He murdered on the assumption that the right was still his.
In the burgess and pleb class, Guido's crime would indeed 
be murder. But on Guido's level. Law winks and calls it 
a prank, a jest— just some knights out playing around; some 
peasant gets hurt in jest and there is perhaps a mild penalty. 
The knight gets a slap on the wrist; Law occasionally gets 
irritated because the knight is foolish enough to get caught 
in his pecadilloes, but the whole thing is the result of his 
freedom. We must give the knight room in which to ride "up 
hill and down dale."
Why is there now a new law? What is its justifi­
cation? He had no warning that the new law was in effect; 
none told him that it now no longer was a game but the real 
thing. But now, here in the darkness of the prison, he loses 
more and more control of the "truth" and the "innocence" that 
he presented to the world during his trial. All the careful 
artistry that he had wrought when he stood before the judges
320
in their private chambers is now obviously of no use to him. 
His false portrait of himself has failed. He has no need 
any longer to assume the disguise. He keeps searching for 
some last hope in the expression of the two men of the Church 
who have come to shrive him. He cannot afford to stop talking. 
If he does, his whole world will crumble. He must try to 
salvage something; his false portrait of himself he knows he 
must cast off. He keeps searching about, looking for some 
new scheme; surely he will not have to reveal what he is 
really like; he is obviously stalling for time; it is almost 
as if he knows he must keep talking for once he stops talking 
he stops living. He cannot really afford to let anyone else 
speak unless they have the right message. He is in a state 
of numbness, yet there is a growing feeling of panic inside 
him.
In casting about for a solution, he says it would 
be different if all men were good. But, he argues, we are 
not good. We are, in fact, basically bad. He points out 
that the Pope is supposed to demonstrate mercy and love. He 
forgives our badness; he knows this is the way we are. He 
is a shepherd; we are his sheep. In Guido's case, the Shepherd 
calls him a Wolf and will not help.
He admits that he is a wolf; it is a psychological, 
as well as an artistic, necessity for him to do so now. 
Underneath his sheep's clothing— the false art that we saw 
earlier— lies the true Guido, and there also lies his true
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art— an art without order or meaning; it is an undisciplined 
art, a kind of black magic; this time there is no wand, no 
golden key, no rabbits out of hats; now he knows the game 
is up with him. His justification must come from the depths 
of the wolf's lair. This is where he will apply his true art; 
there will be no more facades, no more references to sheep 
and flocks, no more pictures of family pride or impoverished 
nobility.
There is a truth about me, he says defiantly. Yes, 
there is. He knows it, feels it with all the ugliness inside 
himself. Here is where his deepest feelings reside, down 
in the dark lair inside himself. Just as Pompilia and Capon- 
sacchi knew their deepest feelings were the real ones, so, 
too, does Guido. And the deepest part of him knows com­
pletely and finally that there is absolutely no repentance 
inside him. Repentance is impossible. If there were some 
practical end to be gained— to save his life even if it 
meant life imprisonment— then all right, he would put his 
sheep's clothing on again and repent easily enough. But 
as for the truth of repentance, that is not so, and cannot be.
All the people who call themselves civilization and 
society--there is no truth where they are. It is all a 
facade. Society cannot afford to admit its true motivations 
or it would be forced to admit too many things about itself. 
And he will fight them all. He is not afraid of them. He 
admits that he knew what he was doing all along, and he got
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caught, so he must now pay the penalty. But he will never 
repent. The two priests have come because they know, and 
he knows they know, that the legal trial did not really 
solve anything. They are not satisfied. They want to know 
his very self; they know there is something much more than 
what the trial disclosed. Law is just another facade used 
by society for convenience. They want to get behind that 
facade, to make certain that the Pope has guessed right.
All right, Guido will give them the word they want; 
he will tell them what they have come to hear; but when he 
tells the truth about himself, he wants them to know that he 
is also telling the truth about them, about the Pope, about 
everybody. For behind what we style civilization and society 
lie all of us, snarling and flashing in our wolf’s lair.
Now Guido is obliged to try to justify to himself his 
real personality and his real world. He used his artistry 
to show himself as a hero and servant of God. Now he has 
to remove that order, and we begin to see that there is no 
other ordering process he can use to keep himself and his 
world integrated. He attempts to give shape and substance 
to his wolf’s lair, but his artistry cannot give that reality 
a unity. Nor can his creative abilities unify his own per­
sonality, for Guido’s destructive values are tearing that 
personality apart. Guido tries overwhelmingly to crush the 
truth and assert his own powerful, creative evil. But his 




"Then take the word you want I" (XI, 5l4)
With that defiant assertion, Guido brings the face of 
his darkness out into the light for all the world to see.
You see, he tells them, long ago, when societies were 
first established and "things began,/ All the world made 
agreement." (XI, 515-I6) They agreed that certain forms of 
behavior gave off both pleasure and profit. But sometimes 
such pleasures were "extra-legal" and not always allowed to 
be pursued. For example, "You must not kill the man whose 
death would please/ And profit you, unless his life stop 
yours,/ Plainly." (XI, 519-20) It came to be that you had 
to get the thing you wanted by a "public course" such as law. 
Private bloodshed, which had been used in earlier, more 
primitive civilizations, was now no longer allowed.
Now, Guido says, we renounced this kind of license 
and conformed to the law. Whoever breaks the law and helps 
himself to that pleasure and profit which is more than his 
just due must pay the price and receive "pain beyond his 
share." (XI, 528) For whatever else we think, "pleasure is
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the sole good in the world." And always, one's pleasure 
causes someone else pain. Thus we have decided to let law 
watch over everyone.
Of course, this is what we say. We call anything 
wicked that gives too much joy. And then, when someone 
does get too much joy, we are envious and punish him. We 
"nickname" it punishment, but we are acting out of envy.
It is all "quite right 1" because it is the way "the world goes 
round"; (XI, 524) it is what human beings need to psychologi­
cally justify their actions— to each other and to themselves.
Now I was no different from others, Guido tells them. 
In my time I have found it to my advantage also to observe 
the law and support crime's penalty. Like others, Guido had 
no desire to risk his life by infringing upon the law, but 
now that he has done it, he will pay the price. Repentance, 
however, is out of the question. He is not sorry for "law's 
breach" but for his "blunderer's-ineptitude." (XI, 546-4?)
In the first place, there is nothing to repent for.
Is he at fault because he does not recognize that above man's 
law, there is God?s law, which "you Christians recognize?" 
Further, in the second place, there is no one to repent to.
He cannot repent to society since he knows about the pact 
all have agreed upon; he cannot repent to a God he cannot 
see. "Here stands the devil," he says blatantly, referring 
to himself; now why don't you Christians exorcise me? Guido 
maintains that if there ever was such a faith as Christianity,
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it is "dead of age now, ludicrously dead." (XI, 561) 
Christianity itself has become a mask like everything else.
Let us be honest, he says, "Off with it!" (XI, 609) 
"Look in your heart," he sneers at them. Though faith is 
gone, is it not obvious that "Unbelief still might work the 
wires and move/ Man the machine, to play a faithful part."
(XI, 612-13) After all, "Why should things change because 
men disbelieve?" They are still pretending that they be­
lieve. Thus the wires and the machinery are outwardly the 
same. But wait. Supposing he waves his wand and makes the 
false the true? Supposing true Christianity did suddenly 
come into being? What would happen? Why it would be an 
"explosion." You would see "how the fragments fly/ Of what 
was surface, mask and make-believe." (XI, 624-25) All Rome 
would be in a turmoil. People would be serving Christ instead 
of themselves. "Why," Guido laughs, "for your life, you dare 
not tell your friend/ 'You lie, and I admonish you for Christ!'" 
(XI, 681) You would only do that if you were a true believer.
Guido studies his two listeners. You raise your 
brows, he says, but "you know I speak the truth." (XI, 695)
We all recognize pleasure and we all recognize pain. We 
are not going to go around sacrificing ourselves in pain 
when the pleasure is there. We are not going to sacrifice 
ourselves for anything. Perhaps there are fifty or so monks 
and nuns who are true believers and "prove their faith a 
fact." But fifty times that number "squeak/ And gibber in the
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madhouse--firm of faith." (XI, 702-03) One cannot have that 
kind of faith in our particular world. Because they have 
gone mad, "Does that prove all the world outside insane?"
(XI, 706) Do fifty of these "miracle-mongers" match the 
millions of the rest of us who act on the "frank faithless 
principle" that we are "Born-baptized-and-bred Christian 
atheists?" (XI, 708-O9) And does this not give each of us 
as much right to judge as you?
Now 1 would have my faith, Guido tells them, except 
for "a spice of doubt." Christianity is not a sure thing 
and the risk is too rash. For me, he says, it is "double or 
quits," all or nothing. Anything in between only gets his 
contempt, and doubtless God's also, he adds. That is the 
difficulty with Christianity. It is an in-between sort of 
thing. No, Guido says, he will take his pleasure "whatever 
pain it cause the present world." (XI, 727) If it turns 
out that he is wrong, well, he has had his life, whatever 
he loses. If 1 am right, he argues, "I've got the single 
good there was to gain." (XI, 729) It is thus that he takes 
his stand: "Entire faith or else complete unbelief." (XI,
730) Guido's commitment is as complete as is Pompilia's and 
Caponsacchi's.
Faith is no good when misfortune and misery begin to 
plague one's life. "Who holds to faith whenever rain begins?" 
he asks. (XI, 744) Why, people "laugh frankly in the face of 
faith/ And take the natural course." (XI, 750-51) "Down
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they all drop to my low level," he says, because they are 
all like me. Faith is not natural to any of us and the very 
priests whom he is talking to have always cried "Amen" to 
his creed. The primary basis of his creed is "Get pleasure, 
‘scape pain,— give your preference/ To the immediate good, 
for time is brief/ And death ends good and ill and everything." 
(XI, 768-70) What are the implications of such a creed?
"What’s got is gained, what’s gained soon is gained twice,/
And,— inasmuch as faith gains most,— feign faith’." (XI,
771-72)
Well, "brother-like," we all passed this word around, 
Guido says. We recognized it as the mask we had to put on.
And now, suddenly the game is over and these same priests 
who told him it was a jest have now become grave and sober.
I used the old license granted to noblemen and no more 
"dreamed of harm...than snow in harvest." (XI, 78O-81)
I find you very same people "Making me Rome’s example," 
for the "general good," even though we have all got drunk 
on the same wine. "Why my sin, drunkards?" Guido asks.
"Where have I abused/ Liberty, scandalized you all so much?"
(XI, 791-92)
You see, Guido explains to them, if the Church had 
said this present life is sin and that we all should seek 
our rewards in heaven then— having warned me, and not with 
lies but with deeds— that would have been fair. He could have 
taken one course or the other, played wolf or joined the
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sheep's fold. But the Church bade him to put on the disguise 
of sheep's clothing over the wolf's skin. In that way, he 
says, he could "suck blood" and hide the noise by mimicking 
the bleat of a lamb. And now, Guido says fiercely, "Because 
I smack my tongue too loud for once./ Drop baaing, here's the 
village up in arms I" (XI, 820-29)
The first story which he told the Court he devised 
because of its plausibility. It is the way everybody else 
has always done, he argues. In order to justify a thing, 
all one has to do is to cover it with the pretense of 
plausibility. Even the Church does it: "'Saint Soraebody- 
or-other raised the dead:'/ Did he? How do you come to know 
as much?" (XI, 866-67) Why, there is no need to know it since 
the story is plausible and vouched for by a martyrologist. 
After all, "'why should good men sup on cheese and leeks,/
On such a saint's day, if there were no saint?'" (XI, 87I-72) 
Well, Guido says, "I praise the wisdom of these fools, and 
straight/ Tell t^em my story— 'plausible, but falsei'" (XI, 
872-73) This is what the Judges tell him. Now, Guido asks, 
what kind of an answer is that? Certainly my story is false. 
We all knew that from the beginning. Who said anything about 
its truth or falseness? All I was required to do was to 
make it sound plausible. As to whether or not it is false—  
an irrelevant question to begin with— what else could a 
story be "That runs— a young wife tired of an old spouse,/ 
Found a priest whom she fled away with." (XI, 875-76) Here
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Is the very essence of disbelief; the story is too pat to 
be true. But while no one point in the tale was strictly 
true, "There’s that in the tale might seem like truth,"
(XI, 883) to a wretched husband, who could not see clearly 
because of his jealous rage.
But his story— though plausible— was not enough, 
and time is running out, "What hour is fleeting now?"
Guido asks anxiously, aware that each minute he talks gets 
him closer to his death. He wonders what death will bring.
He would ask God a question. Am I to be wiped out? Will 
you "smear/ This soul from all Thy white of things?" (XI, 
936-37) If I am "one huge and sheer mistake,— whose fault?/ 
Not mine at least, who did not make myself I" (XI, 938-39)
What else can he cry out in his rage, since he is "Unable to 
repent one particle/ O' the past?" His rage is also directed 
at all the instruments of society who have put on a mask 
over their mask and now condemn him. The situation requires 
a man of sober sense to analyze it--not the priests who only 
"scrape the surface," He wants a cool logical mind that 
would ask, "before it finishes with a dog,/ Who taught the 
dog that trick you hang him for?" (XI, 949-50) He reminds 
the priests that they both persist in calling his act a 
crime. But the wise man digging beneath the surface would 
see that it was a blunder, "At the worst, I stood in doubt/ 
On cross-road, took one path of many paths," (XI, 953-54)
The path he took, as they can all see in retrospect, was the
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wrong one. But he can prove, by taking them back over the 
crime, that no one, could have warned him that he was on the 
wrong track. "Advise me," he says, as I go back over the 
story, "when I take the first false step!" (XI, 96O)
2
She had "milk for blood"— this thirteen-year-old child, 
pulled away from her toys by "Her so-called mother," with an 
arm around her waist, leading her into that small ground- 
floor room in the Comparini house in the Via Vittoria. She 
went rigid when he touched her. He resented it. "I am young 
in soul,/ Nor old in body" (XI, 1021-22) he tells the priests. 
Thus it was from the first, he claims, that "she begins with 
wronging me," and therefore he is one "who cannot but begin 
with hating her." (XI, 1031-32)
It was all so inevitable, he tells them, inevitable 
from the very start. The feeling of murder began to rise up 
within him from the moment of their meeting and from the 
madness of their marriage. After the ceremony, and once in 
Arezzo, "there we stand againi" He felt it, a something that 
had never been so pronounced before. It caused him to laugh. 
"Why, in the very gripe/ O' the Jaws of death's gigantic 
skull do 1/ Grin back his grin?" (XI, 1034-36) Something 
was stirring inside him, brought on entirely by her actions, 
her "way." During the ceremony, she gets up, "kneels, rises, 
speaks, is silent,— goes." My horse does the same, he says.
I have brought my horse "To stand stock still and front the
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fire he dreads," (XI, 19^5)
How can I help but remember this and "Resent the 
very obedience?" There would have been "compensation in 
revolt," he says, but to obey blindly was the worst thing 
she could have done. After all, one can quell a revolt, but 
not "predetermined saintship." (XI, 1053) His friends began 
to come around and admonish him to treat her right, that he 
and she could at least be friends, even though she was sexually 
cold to him. But no, Guido says, I deserved all of her and 
I wanted all of her, just in the manner of younger men. And 
she resisted every step of the way and became like a plague 
to him. Moreover, the whole problem was compounded "By 
two abominable nondescripts," Pietro and Violante. (XI, 1114) 
The three of them together made a hydra-headed monster which 
he was forced to slay. The mother had a sort of "cunning 
and cant" all her own, "Tempting the sudden fist of man too 
much." (XI, 1135) As for Pietro, well. Cardinal, "you know/
The kind of idiotÎ— rife are such in Rome." (XI, 1137-38)
They are the asses of society with their jokes shed from corn 
and all the while, in the next breath, they are pontificating, 
advising, "Sir Dignity i' the Dumps," spouting their cliches. 
Visualize this fellow, this "quondum oracle" dressed out­
rageously and holding forth in his house at the Via Vittoria, 
"Flaunting his tom-fool tawdry just the same/ As if Ash Wed­
nesday were mid-CarnivalI" (XI, 1154-55)
Here was my unforgiveable sin, Guido says, in toadying
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up to this ass. He asks the priests if they have ever been 
in a similar position, "Have you stooped/ For your own 
ends to bestialize yourself/ By flattery of a fellow of this 
stamp?" (XI, 1157-59) People like Pietro might say, "'You 
love and honor me, of course: what next?’" And Guido’s answer 
turned out to be, "What, but the trifle of the stabbing, 
friend?" (XI, II63) Was I angry about the whole situation? 
"How could I be otherwise?" he asks. These two pretentious 
old fools meant to fool him. But he fooled them instead 
and they got what they deserved.
When they then in turn fooled him by publishing 
Pompilia’s illegitimacy abroad in Rome, the story was believed 
instantly because of the two people who told it. Note "hell’s 
lucky malice" here, Guido tells them. Coming from their 
mouths, the story rang true because "They plainly were too 
stupid to invent." (XI, 1226) Thus there was a "good long 
laugh" at Guido’s expense by his so-called friends in both 
Rome and Arezzo, And when Guido eventually did murder the 
three of them, each stab went the deeper because of a fancy 
he had that at the bottom of each wound was the smirk of a 
friend’s face and he was wiping it out too.
Guido feels that he is spending too much time dis­
cussing "These two ambiguous insects," Pietro and Violante, 
as if it were their actions that really troubled him, "Ay, 
but Pompilia," he continues, finally getting around to the 
subject he has somewhat avoided.
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He admits that, compared to Pietro and Violante, she 
is "of alien blood." (XI, 1288) Why did he extend his claim 
and "exact/ Her portion of the penalty?" (XI, 1289-90) He 
wants to take pains with this part of his story. He wants 
to demonstrate to them step-by-step, "lead her by degrees," 
how she came to be murdered. He begins at that point where 
the Comparini left her alone with him in Arezzo. It was her 
behavior, he says. She was like stone. "‘Bless me or curse 
me,'" he told her. But she would not admit to his existence. 
I tell her "'Speakî' she obeys, ‘Be silent I' she obeys."
(XI, 1319) Everyday it was "the same stone strength of white 
despair," (XI, 1323) and he knew, of a certainty, that it 
would never be otherwise.
When the parents were there, she played the female 
game, cried, talked, flew to the Archbishop and the Governor. 
But once she learned she was illegitimate she withdrew from 
life; she gave up. Prom Guido's point of view, it was the 
worst thing she could have done. Her new game lay in giving 
up the game, "This worst offence of not offending more."
Guido could not tolerate the fact that he did not exist in 
her eyes. He believes that Pompilia instinctively realized 
that this kind of behavior on her part would be the worst 
possible thing she could do to him.
She sits, she stares, she endlessly combs her hair. 
"This self-possession to the uttermost," Guido says, is what 
undid him. It was like "the terrible patience of God," (XI,
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1378) All of which meant, he concludes, that she did not 
love him. And even if she did not, she could have pretended 
love for him. "Here's my slave,/ Whose body and soul depend 
upon my hod," and she cannot utter even one word in order 
to placate him.
She was not willing to begin with a lie--that is, 
pretend she loved him--even if it would end with the truth 
that she actually could love him. Therefore, Guido says,
"I judged, sentenced, and punished her." (XI, 1439}
But why dwell on particulars? he asks. Why try to 
defend my actions? The truth is, I hated her, and for no 
other reason than that it gave me pleasure to hate her. It 
was simply my nature to hate her. The world itself is like 
this. "Why," he argues, "should you master natural caprice?" 
It is simply "Pure naturel" Human beings are like this, and 
if you must blame someone, you will have to find other faults 
to blame. Because, he says, "as God's my judge/ I see not 
where the fault lies, that's the truthI" (XI, 1447-48) And 
for once Guido means every word he says; he is not fooling 
any longer.
2
Guido considers the objection that he-did not have 
to torture her or hate her; he could have turned his marriage 
to account in other ways. But there it is, friend, he tells 
them, you have stumbled on the thing--"The red thing!" (XI,
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1456) Because, you see, practice makes man perfect. And 
he has practiced being what he is for years. He has turned 
it into an art. What if he was again given the chance? Say 
it was "the same marriage and no other wife," you can be 
assured that he would follow the very same path again. "That's 
because/ I'm practised, grown fit guide for Guido's self."
(XI, 1459-60)
He laments his oversight at Castlenuovo. There is no 
question now in his mind that here was his first mistake. I 
was like an artist, he says, and some particular devil tripped 
me up when I had found the "all-but-at-perfection." The line 
of his painting slurred just at that point where "paint leaves 
off/ And life begins." (XI, 1555-56) It is "Artistry's 
haunting curse, the Incomplete." (XI, 1559) This is the only 
way he can describe it; it is inexplicable to him otherwise. 
"Being incomplete, the act escaped success." (XI, 1560)
There was the same incompleteness in the murder itself. 
When he approached the door of tbeir small villa in the 
Pauline district he had a major problem: if there were three 
inside, two might get away, one for certain. And what if 
there were visitors in looking at the new baby? That would 
make even more. They would shout warnings. He felt even so, 
if he could just get to Pompilia, "If only she is stomped and 
stamped on, good I" Miraculously enough, the impossible came 
his way and he got all three. His masterpiece was proceeding 
splendidly at this point. He cannot describe the relief the
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three murders brought him. "Oh, Cardinal, the deep long sigh 
you heave/ When the load's off you." (XI, 1609-IO) He 
should have known, however, that because he was so drunk with 
his own triumph, some reverse was sure to follow. There is 
no other way to account for the "perfect failure" of what 
followed.
Any other day of the week, he says indignantly, and 
he could have bribed the guard and secured the horses without 
the necessary ticket. Yet when he tries the trick, doubles 
the bribe, and even calls himself a Duke rather than a Count, 
he gets nowhere. He even adds to his story "the dead man was 
only a Jew,/ And for my pains find I am dealing just/ With 
the one scrupulous fellow in all Rome." (XI, 1635) It seems 
doubly fantastic to him now since he would have had no trouble 
in securing the ticket for the horses before the murder.
Thus he and his four men had to walk out of Rome and 
collapsed in exhaustion just before they reached that boundary 
which would have placed them outside of Rome's jurisdiction; 
had they got within the jurisdiction of the Tuscan court, 
they would have had no trouble, since that Court had already 
delivered a favorable verdict to Guido. The fact that a 
scrap of paper was his downfall is the "spite of fortune," 
says Guido--just sheer bad luck.
And the worst was, Pompilia was still alive. Otherwise 
even though caught, he could have made up a story about how 
he came to claim his son and heir and again found his wife
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in the arms of "that priest." (XI, 1713) Ironically enough, 
he has recently heard that Pompilia, from her deathbed, for­
gives him, but by living to forgive him, she has also told 
enough of her story to seal his doom. Her forgiveness is 
no good to him. Even more ironically, he has found out that, 
even if he had escaped, his four "rustic swains" had planned 
to murder him on the road back to Arezzo because he had neglected 
to pay them for their part of the job. At least, since at 
the execution he will go last, he can have the pleasure of 
seeing them hang.
His trial, he continues, "bites like a corrosive" 
still, because it too was so completely contrary to what one 
might ordinarily expect. And then, when he saw a cranny of 
light at the end in the person of the old Pope, expecting "a 
little pity. . ./ A little indulgence to rank and privilege,"
(XI, 1775-76) he received the same verdict. "'DieI'/ Bids 
Law--'Be damned!' adds Gospel." (XI., 178I-82) Prom such bad 
luck, Guido claims he has gained strength; he feels as though 
he is a "brave fighter" who can turn defeat into victory.
It is all tied up with his beliefs, he tells them. "l 
think I never was any time/ A Christian, as you nickname all 
the world." (XI, 1914-15) He believes that they know what he 
means. Let us call a "truce" on nonsense, he pleads. Just for 
a moment. Christianity is just a mask, he says, and both of 
them know it. "The rationale of your scheme is just/ 'Pay 
toll here, there pursue your pleasure free!'" (XI, 1965-66)
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And when they do pay the t^ll, are they doing it to propitiate 
a God who devised the scheme in the first place? "irrational 
bunglersi" Guido declares. Thus their "living truth" which 
has killed all pagan gods and all pagan ideas now "Prays 
leave to hold its own and live good days" provided it can keep 
on its grotesque mask. But Christianity discounted in man 
the one thing, the "inexorable need in man for life," (XI, 
1980) Christianity substituted death for life and, though 
man puts on the mask and accepts it, behind his mask he is 
laughing.
In an earlier age, he argues, maybe there were saints 
who starved and froze and imposed incredible disciplines upon 
themselves. But in his age, this has all passed and it is 
"sin on the sly." For most of us, the letter of the Christian 
law is too strict; we obey the spirit, we say. Ah, but,
Guido says, "there’s a wink somewhere." (XI, 2001)
Guido knows the speech they want to make to him. They 
want to point out that he traces all issues to the love of 
life and so do they; however, he has put them on the defensive 
since he knew perfectly well what the password was that would 
soothe the populace. They cannot allow him to play his pranks 
out in broad daylight and then disdain to even give an excuse 
to the world. If he had wrapped up his murder in Christianity, 
it would have been different. It then would not have been 
murder but sacrifice. But he did not do this.
Well, Guido says, so be it. Let death atone for my
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mistake. At least, in this way, he can drop all his dis­
guises, "turn wolf, be whole, and sate, for once" his wolf's 
nature. He can now "Wallow in what is now a wolfishness."
He can "Grow out of man,/ Glut the wolf-nature." And when he 
does glut his nature, then he will turn into a real man,
"be man indeed and all man." (XI, 2059) It will be the final 
culmination of his growth, "Deformed, transformed, reformed, 
informed, conformedl" (XI, 206l) His honest instinct— to be 
a wolf— he has kept pent up all his life. Death will let 
it surge like a volcano that erupts after years of underground 
rumblings.
As for Pompilia, he knows she had her world just as 
he has his. He is at odds with her world. He hates her com­
pletely, everlastingly, partially because she does not hate 
him. He is the kind of person, he says, who, if he saw his 
chance to escape to heaven, would hesitate if it meant
raising the foot he had been using to keep his foe pinned to
the ground. "So am I made," Guido admits. (XI, 2098) He
sees the contrast between her world and his. Her world is 
of "pure design." Some prefer this, he says, but as for him, 
he will take the "gorge of color." Just in the choice of 
women, Pompilia was too pure; there was too much of the 
"faint fine gauze untouched" about her. (XI, 2129) As for him, 
he will take someone like Lucrezia Borgia. He wants "meat 
and drink" rather than "purity and pallor," He wants an evil 
wife— a woman full-blown in her evil; someone with "sin un-
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imaginable." (XI, 2216)
It is vain, he tells the priests, to come here and 
"try to change, what should not change,/  And cannot." (XI, 
2221-22) He begins to speak somewhat more hurriedly, since 
he knows that his time is short. They should save him not 
Just because they know he is right. Even if he were wrong, 
he deserves to be saved because of the fact that he is what he 
is. Then he changes his attitude and says belligerently,
"Why, you don't think I hope you'll say one word?" He pauses 
and looks anxiously. "Come, I am tired of silence I" He tells 
them. He wants them to talk, "l have gone inside my soul/
And shut its door behind me." Your Church's torch only made 
my place darker. But God, in reality, gives each person 
his instinct for defense. Pompilia's instinct was to be 
"lamblike." Guido's instinct was to break the back of those 
he embraces— "That's the wolf-nature." (XI, 2316)
Things could be a lot worse, he tells them with an
air of bravado. But in his case, it has made him stronger.
"I begin to taste my strength," he tells them. He laughs 
at his two confessors. He reminds the Cardinal of the latter's 
foolish hopes of becoming Pope. "Go eat your heart, you'll 
never be a Pope !" (XI, 2338) And he has heard that the 
Cardinal forsook his one true love for promotion in the Church 
and that she is now dead.
It amuses him, too, that they are all really part of
the same river of life and that they all must die. Guido is
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merely going a minute or two sooner. He thinks he would 
rather go quickly anyway, though he does not know into what 
state his soul will move. He tells them seriously and 
pointedly, "You never know what life means till you die,"
(XI, 2373) He realizes that "Even throughout life, ’t is 
death that makes life live,/ Gives it whatever the signifi­
cance."
For you see, he tells them, even if we look at it 
from your own doctrines and arguments, if life had no death 
to fear, how could man find a possibility of nobleness? 
"What's love, what's faith," he asks, "without a worst to 
dread?" Faith and love, however, "With death behind them 
bidding do or die," (XI, 238I-82) give us the challenge we 
need. If there is a new rule in the next world he goes to, 
they can be sure he will accept it just "as here,/ I recog­
nized no law I could not see/ There, what I see, I shall 
acknowledge too." (XI, 2386-88)
Thus, "All that was, is; and must for ever be."
(XI, 2397) It is not in him to "unhate his hates." in 
fact he has some strength left and he will use it once more 
to strike Pietro, Violante and Pompilia in the face. He 
has no use of sickeningly sweet "cloying cups." No, men like 
him want the "hot bull's-blood." Then he adds proudly, "I 
lived and died a man, and take man's chance." (XI, 24l0)
But suddenly, there in the darkness of his prison 
cell, Guido hears them coming for him. "Who are these you
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have let descend my stair?" he asks with growing fright. He 
becomes panic-stricken. It is "Treachery!" In a wild terror 
he tells them that he did not mean any of what he said, that 
he wants to take it all back, "All was folly," he insists, 
"Sirs, ray first true word, all truth and no lie,/ Is— save 
me notwithstanding," (XI, 2418-19) Save me in spite of every­
thing, he begs. The only truth that exists for him now is
in his staying alive, "Life is alii" he screams, "I was 
just stark mad," but let the madman live. They can put him
in chains and throw him into prison for the rest of his
life if he can only live.
He begs them not to open the gate, "Hold me from them’ 
I am yours," He will be anything they want him to be, "I 
am the Granduke’s son— no, I am the Pope's!" (XI, 2423)
Finally he calls on all the people who are of im­
portance in his life, and he calls on them in a psychologically 
ascending order,^ "Abate,— Cardinal,--Christ,--Maria,— God,
. , ,/ Pompilia." (XI, 2424-25)
"Pompilia," he cries, "will you let them murder me?" 
(XI, 2425)
4
Guido's "real" world depends upon a society that he
has in part helped to create by his own imagination. He is
following Browning's dictum that we must help shape our
iLangbaum, The Poetry of Experience, p. 111,
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realities. He is doing what Pompilia and Caponsacchi did.
But even though he uses his creative abilities, it is for 
the purpose of destroying; at the same time, it is for the 
purpose of continuing to create and extend his own destruc­
tive values. Such a process cannot hope to sustain itself; 
it has its own built-in destruction because what it needs 
in order to create is what it also destroys, Guido is in­
stinctively and whole-heartedly committed to a course of 
evil. He must create in order to externalize what he feels 
inside himself. He must somehow relate his evil to the 
external world, give his evil social application. He must 
dramatize his evil in order to give it significance and in 
order to give him satisfaction. The evil must be related 
to others or else it is evil in a vacuum. It needs things 
outside of itself to feed on.
Thus he is creating rapidly, furiously, frantically. 
But he is a painter who is "obstructed," he tells us. Just 
when he is almost at perfection, some of "hell's lucky 
malice" rebounds on him. The very evil that he believes in, 
turns on him and destroys his old corruptions even as he 
creates his new ones. He calls it sheer bad luck, "the luck 
that lies beyond a man." Unlike Pompilia, who can create 
and reach for her new reality, even though it is beyond her, 
Guido is denied this possibility because, since he creates for 
the purpose of destroying, nothing that he does or is can 
sustain itself.
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Hence his own personality is shattering Into a thou­
sand pieces. He calls his own greatest masterpiece— the murder- 
his greatest failure because of "Artistry's haunting curse—  
the Incomplete," (XI, 1559) This Is something, he Implies, 
that haunts all great artists. Even while he admits that 
other artists have leaped the barrier of the Incomplete and 
produced masterpieces, he cannot explain his Inability to 
do this. He does not see that as he pursues evil. It Is 
doubling back and pursuing him. He does not understand the 
nature of the universe he lives In, He dimly perceives 
that reality as he sees It Is changing, that out of destruc­
tion and the dung-heap of Roman society rises the fragile 
flower of Pompllla. But he does not at first understand 
why this Is,
He does not understand that In order to help create 
Us own reality, he has to have not only the wlll-to-belleve 
but the will to believe In something beyond himself. Guido 
Is not willing to consider this. He argues that we do what 
we do by Instinct— that It Is hopeless to try to be any dif­
ferent— that God or fate or whatever, made us this way and 
we cannot hope to be any other way. He wants to give full 
play to his wolf's nature; he has no wish to believe that 
there Is anything beyond that nature except the mask that 
we all have to put on. He admits that Pompllla Is an excep­
tion but he does not understand why. It Is just her Instinct 
to be this way, and she could not have done other than she
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did. He does not credit Porapilia with reaching beyond herself 
because of her will to believe, and achieving something more 
by applying her creative abilities to help re-shape her 
reality and give form and meaning to her "instincts." He 
wants to "wallow" in his wolf's nature, to sate it, to give 
himself over completely to his own self. Thus what he 
creates is for this end. He makes no distinctions among 
satisfactions. All satisfactions lie in what he calls 
pleasure; they are all sensual and they are the highest 
pleasures we know. Some we cannot have because the Church, 
and agencies like the Church, tell us it is wicked; they 
punish us when we do take those pleasures but the punishment 
is motivated by their own envy.
It would be different if Christianity were a sure 
thing, but it is hot. For Guido, life is the only sure
thing. It is not much, in some respects, but it is all he
has. He believes in it fervently; he uses his artistic imagi­
nation to help create a reality that he will be able to move 
around in while living this life. He argues that he can in 
no way change what he is. Moreover, he feels that he should 
not and would not change his, nature even if he could. He 
blames the state of things for the way he is, yet he sug­
gests that that state of things was in part created by people
who possessed imaginative abilities like his and realized 
that they could help mold the reality in which they lived. 
Nature made him the way he is, he rationalizes, contradicting
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his own assertion that nature is plastic and can be leavened 
and molded by the people who live within its boundaries. Thus 
he denies his argument even while he is asserting it.
Such is his way on every level of experience. Such 
is the way that he creates while he destroys. In murdering 
the Comparini and Pompilia, Guido helps to create and extend 
the boundaries of his evil world. But those boundaries begin 
to constrict once theyostart to push against the boundaries 
of society. Evil is nothing without a society to relate it 
to. Society can accept or reject the evil. If it rejects 
it, then the evil can only rebound back on its original 
source. Guido explains this by an analogy when he says "I 
have gone inside my soul/ And shut its door behind me."
(XI, 2289-90) Once he turns his back on the possibility 
of extending his reality outside of himself, he is destroying 
whatever he creates. His "paintings" will always be spoiled 
in this way. There will always be that line of his painter's 
brush that slurs just where "paint leaves off/ And life begins." 
(XI, 1564-65)
His art cannot live without life. His art is his 
evil as it is dramatized and externalized, and he cannot 
exercise it without including life itsèlfi. Instead, however, 
he goes inside his soul and shuts the door behind him. His 
evil, he believes, will be self-sustaining. And Guido himself 
proves, for a long while, that this is indeed the way it 
works. He has sustained himself, and the myth of himself, by 
destruction. But before, he did it by putting on the mask
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of society and the Church. Now that he has taken off thaet 
mask, he wallows in the lust of his true wolf's nature; he 
maintains that he is the stronger for it, that he is finally 
a real man and "all man," He does not see that it is his 
wolf's nature that ultimately destroyed the elaborate, arti­
ficial mask he has worn for so many years and for which he 
went to such artistic pains to create; he does not see that 
anything he creates like this will always be destroyed by 
the same nature that created it. He confesses that he felt 
instinctively that the kind of situation he created when he 
married Pdmpilia and set up a scheme to cheat her parents 
was going to end in destruction. He felt it at the time.
By marriage, he attempted to extend his own values, but 
they could not be extended to Pompilia. He could never 
destroy her purity. Instead of contaminating her with his 
destruction, she ^corrupted" him with her purity. His evil 
had no place to go but to fly back on him. This is why Guido, 
immediately after he had murdered the three of them, felt 
such a tremendous weight lifted off his shoulders. He felt 
that now his evil had more room in which to extend itself.
To give the chaos of his own soul some semblance of 
order, Guido paints a picture of human motivation and be­
havior which will enable him to satisfy his own corrupt de­
sires, This is a painting he constructs imaginatively in 
his own mind. It is analogous to the false portrait he drew 
of Italian society in his first monologue. But this time 
there is no mask. This is what Guido actually believes.
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Now that we see what he believes, it is obvious 
that he has not been able to help create order and purpose 
in his wolf's lair. "Get pleasure, 'scape pain," no matter 
what the means, is the anarchicprlnciple which he attempts 
to offer as a rationale for his disordered reality. He believes 
that all people are like this, because he is like this. He 
hints that if it were not for the masks that we all put on, 
he would be able to extend his values outwardly from himself 
since all people, being like him, would accept them.
He points out frequently to the priests that they 
know what he means, and he knows they know. If they wish to 
continue to hide behind their masks, well and good, but they 
are not fooling him. He knows that Christianity is simply 
one more mask we put on to achieve our pleasure and profit.
He admits the possibility that long ago there might have been 
a "living faith" but that it is now "ludicrously dead." Now, 
he maintains, we play a "faithful part" because it is con­
venient for us to do so; we act on the "frank faithless prin­
ciple" that we are "Born-baptized-and-bred Christian atheists I" 
(XI, 709) Since that is so, underneath it all, he has just 
as much right to judge as the two priests to whom he is 
speaking. But now they have put a mask over their mask and 
they say thathhe must die.
Gûido argues that he would have accepted Christianity 
seriously except for "a spice of doubt"; Christianity makes 
promises but no one can know if it keeps them, since the dead
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cannot talk. For Guido, it has to be all or nothing. He 
feels that following his own nature to the limits of Its 
possibilities gives him the "all" that he desires. There Is 
no guesswork here. He knows that evil Is more of a certainty 
Inside him than Christianity could ever be. Even though 
that certainty of evil has no purpose It Is Impossible for 
him to deny Its presence. Instead of using his creative 
consciousness to mold and work his evil nattuae Into good, 
Guido rationalizes his behavior by stating that It Is not 
his fault, that God made him the way he Is. He considers 
but dismisses the possibility that his nature could have been 
changed, had he wished to apply his creative abilities In 
that direction. Any time he cannot justify his behavior 
from within himself, he falls back on the notion of deter­
minism; God and the preachers have nobody to blame but them­
selves.
For most people, faith Is an Illusion because, as 
Guido sees It, It Is not In our nattdie to be faithful, parti­
cularly If we are experiencing pain; Insfefead we take the 
"natural" course and attempt to escape pain, no matter what 
the means, and get back on the road to pleasure. Since 
"faith gains most,— feign falthl" (XI, 770)
Such Is the way things are and "brother-like" we all 
passed this word around, recognizing that It was the mask we 
had to put on. Now, Guido claims, he Is being put to death 
for feigning faith and playing the role that was assigned
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to him. Part of his role consisted in giving them a plausible 
story after the murder, and now they tell him that plausi­
bility— which always served in the past— is not enough. The 
story has to be true also. They call his act a crime but 
in reality it was a blunder. Bor Guido, there can be no 
such thing as a crime. Perhaps one could call it a crime 
to not wear one's mask properly, but to call something a 
"crime" was before always one more part of the mask. We 
call something someone does a crime because of the pleasure 
and the profit they get at our expense. If they can get 
away with it, it is their gain. If we punish them, it is 
one more person who is not going to get in the way of our 
pleasures.
5
For some reason the path he took was the wrong one.
He can see that in retrospect. Though on the one hand Sûido 
insists that he did what he did on the basis of the "old 
license" always granted to noblemen, on the other hand he 
nevertheless as good as admits that he somehow violated that 
license. He thus contradicts his own defense.
In going back over his story, he seeks the solution 
to his mistake in again examining the nature of Pompilia.
He does not, in a sense, think it necessary to understand 
Pompilia because they are alike in one respect; they are both 
true to their natures. He feels that this is all the ex­
planation that is necessary. Yet he realizes that in some
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ways she has defeated him. This is what perplexes him. This 
is what enraged him before and caused him to murder her.
He says he felt the inevitability of murder when they 
were first married, a feeling from the start that his nature 
would not be able to tolerate hers. He felt it as a challenge 
to him, a test of his creative efforts, a contest between 
two ways of molding reality. He had to murder her because 
he had to have the concrete symbol of the victory of his 
way of life over hers. Pompilia needed no symbols like this, 
but Guido had nothing else to fall back on. There was nothing 
but destruction behind him, including thirty years of pur­
suing his meaningless pleasures in Rome.
The murder he calls his noble failure, his near­
masterpiece. But he is unable to complete it. Guido does 
not see that, because of the nature of his wolf’s-lair, no 
such thing as artistic completion is possible for him. He 
cannot complete that which by its very nature cannot be com­
pleted. In attempting to forge his artistry through murder, 
Guido gets a sense of momentary completion, a drunken moment 
of triumph in which he feels as if he has completely fulfilled 
his own nature, has given it an order and structure, a kind 
of final solution, that it has never had before.
But it is this very act of creativity which destroys 
him, because in creating (by murdering) he is killing the 
thing he needs, the thing that he feeds on, to sustain his 
reality. In the murder itself, it is not Pietro and Violante
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whom he wants so much as it is Pompilia. It is she who is 
a terrible threat to everything that he stands for. He 
admits that he hated her for the simple reason that it was 
his nature to hate her. It was "pure nature" on his part 
and he saw no reason to master his "natural caprice." (XI, 
1437) He did not wish to have it any other way. He tells 
them plainly that "practice makes man perfect" and that he 
has applied all his creative energies to making himself the 
perfect villain; he has turned it into a kind of art and 
this art is a "fit guide" for all his actions.
In admitting that in some ways he violated the "old 
license" granted to him by wearing the mask, he thinks that 
his first mistake was in not killing Pompilia and Caponsacchi 
when he caught them at the inn. He does not give as his 
reasons that in killing them then he might have lost the 
dowry and the possibility of gaining Pietro's possessions.
This apparently was not a consideration for Guido. He charges 
his oversight again to the notion of the "Incomplete." He 
dimly perceives that the incomplete is part of the nature of 
evil, but he does not see that it has the same sort of in­
evitability as everything else that has happened to him.
Thus, in his mood of exultation immediately after the 
murder, Guido received a momentary sense of order and com­
pletion. He felt that he had at last finished his master­
piece. But he did not complete it, he says, because of "the 
luck that lies beyond a man." He does not see this idea of
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luck as being inevitably bound up with the act itself.
There was a hole in the net that he accidentally overlooked 
and the fish slipped through. This same hole, of course, 
would always be in all the nets he might make. Even the mask 
he wore in Rome for thirty years developed holes. How can 
he ever complete that thing he desires when he has to destroy 
all of the elements that go into its creation, in order to 
complete the creation?
Moreover, he does not see the full significance of 
the plan to murder him which his four assistants devised on 
their way back to Arezzo. He does not see that what he does 
not destroy, when he uses it to assist him in the creation 
of his various masterpieces, will ultimately destroy him.
6
At first, Guido maintains that the whole experience 
has made him stronger. He feels an heroic quality surging 
through him. Now that he has thrown off his mask he can fully 
satiate his wolf's nature and give complete expression to 
his creative-destructive abilities. Only in this way, he 
says, can he "be whole." But in achieving completion in 
this way, Guido must destroy himself. Since evil is finally 
destructive, and can only fulfill itself by destroying,
Guido's evil nature can only fulfill itself by destroying 
itself. By his tone and by his feeling about the wolf's 
nature and the "bull's-blood," Guido seems to sense this
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Imaginatively. By admitting his "wolfishness" he is finally 
a "real man." He is, in other words, true to his life and 
his art. This gives him the same feeling of deep satisfac­
tion that a similar realization brings to Pompilia and 
Caponsacchi. But he knows too, that he must die to complete 
his manhood.
He figuratively describes why destructiveness can 
only find completion in death when he contrasts his way of 
life with Pompilia's. Pompilia's nature is of a "pure de­
sign." He realizes that in purity there is goodness and in 
design there is a structure, an order to this goodness. As 
for himself, he prefers the "gorge of color." There is no 
design here, no shape, only large blobs of red that spread 
out in all directions.
There is no question, however, that Guido's sense of 
fulfillment and manliness is itself a temporary thing. For 
he knows that if he is destroyed, the feeling of manliness 
he gets from admitting his wolf's nature and destroying him­
self will be the last deep satisfaction hé will ever have.
He is a man who has always believed in life— life at any 
cost, and it is not a comforting thought to know that he 
finally must die in order to fulfill his nature.
As he hears the footsteps of the guards coming for 
him, he begins to genuinely panic. For he senses that nothing 
he has said, no matter how true or how false or how ful­
filling, can compare with the feeling of being alive. So
355
it is that he can almost scream out that nothing is the truth 
except life. "Life is allI" he exclaims. All the rest of 
it is talk. His sense of courage and his brief heroic be­
havior are as nothing compared to the state of being alive.
Thus when he calls on those people who have been of importance 
in his life, he calls on them in a psychologically ascending 
order, Pompilia is the last name he calls because he feels 
in the deepest part of himself that she somehow has a better 
chance of saving him than anyone else.
When he cries out "Pompilia, will you let them murder 
me?" (XI, 2425) it is not that he is simply whining because 
-he does not wish to die; nor is it an indication that he is 
repenting. He genuinely has no wish to repent. If he repented 
he would deny the significance of the brief satisfaction 
he çets from giving up life for the sake of his wolf's nature. 
He calls on Pompilia because he now understands that her 
reality and the process of her moral creativity will allow 
her to stoop down and touch his forehead, even though she 
has the full knowledge of his impenitent wolf's nature and 
his absolute commitment to that truth that has always been a 
lie.
CHAPTER XVIII 
THE BOOK AND THE RING 
1
"Here were the end, had anything an end," (XII, 1) 
Browning says.
A rocket was "lit and launched," and it soared up 
and up until it reached the vault of Heaven; there, for one 
breathless moment it seemed to seize heaven and hold it by 
force. Just so, the incredible Guido "caught spark,/ Rushed 
to the height" and hung at the height of his power for an 
instant, "Over men's upturned faces." (XII, 7) But he then 
suffered the inevitable decline. "The act, over and ended, 
falls and fades." For a while it was talked about; it lost 
something each time it was told; then it melted into the 
gray of our memory, and finally died and left everything dark.
"And presently we find the stars again." (XII, I9) 
Guido's blackness, which momentarily eclipsed us all, is gone.
2
Browning tells us that of all the reports that were 
circulated about concerning the day of the execution, he 
thinks only four are significant and worth relating for any
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additional light they might shed on the case.
The first letter, addressed to a friend, is from a 
Venetian nobleman in Rome for the Carnival. The Venetian, 
in a lively style, recounts the important social and poli­
tical goings-on of the day. He wonders and guesses incorrectly 
at who will be the next Pope after Innocent XII, who "‘totters 
on the verge o' the grave,'" dies.
The Venetian says that a week ago the Pope was seen 
walking in the sun along the riverside near the sea he loves. 
But yesterday, because of the "'outrageous rain,'" he was 
trapped inside; on such days he usually has fainting fits 
and "'fumbles at his beads,'" (XII, 58) The Venetian is 
not aware that the Pope spent that entire day and much of 
the night reaching his decision about the murder-case,
The Venetian turns from political and social matters 
to the day's most important cause-celebre, the execution of 
Guido Pranceschini, The execution is over and he has lost 
some money on a wager because he did not think that the Pope 
would not pardon Guido, "'The Pope has done his worst: I have 
to pay/ For the execution of the Count, by Jovel'" (XII,
75-6) Prejudices, the Venetian claims, got the upper hand 
in the Pope and he ignored "'justice, prudence, and esprit 
de corps,'" (XII, 86)
According to the Venetian, two priests, one a Cardinal 
and the other an Abate,— both friends of the Pranceschini—  
went to the prison to take Guido's confession, and give him 
comfort. The Venetian understands that their efforts were
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"’crowned with complete success.'" When Guido and his four 
peasants were led on carts through the streets, there was 
a great oro#d all along the way and much excitement. Guido 
was much admired for his intrepidity, "'nay, nonchalance,'" 
as the procession headed for the People's Square, (XII, 135)
The Pope had directed that the execution take place 
in the People's Square, rather than the customary place--the 
Bridge of Saint Angelo— because he wanted all the noblemen 
to witness the execution as a warning to them. The Venetian 
says this was apparently done out of malice, and as a "'con­
ciliatory sop to the mob,'" but is not such a bad place for 
an execution.
Bleachers were set up in the Square and it was there 
that he and his party heard that one of the carts ran over 
and killed a man as the procession winded its way through 
the streets. There was "'excitement to the last.'" Some of 
the crowd paid to observe the spectacle from windows all 
around the square.
"'With the name of Jesus on his lips,'" Guido "'Re­
ceived the fatal blow.'" The executioner held up Guido's 
head to the crowd and the Venetian admits that he and the 
other foreign visitors were disappointed. They had heard that 
Guido was over six feet tall, and young for his age, "'if not 
handsome, dignified at least.'" (XII, 195) But the head held • 
up before them was indeed, "'no face to please a wifei'"
(XII, 196)
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The second report which Browning mentions is a letter 
from Guido's lawyer Arcangeli to his colleague in Florence, 
Cenceni, who was later responsible for collecting the docu­
ments of the case and turning them into The Old Yellow Book. 
Cenceni had tried to defend Guido with some more points re­
garding clerical privilege but his protestations came too 
late, Arcangeli claims the Count still receives the *'com­
miseration and respect'" of all Rome. Then, the "business" 
part of his letter over, Arcangeli adds a personal message 
to his colleague in which he calls him "'old fox.'" He says 
that twenty pleadings of clerical privilege would have done 
no good when "'Somebody's thick headpiece'" is bent on seeing 
"'Guido's drop in the bag.'" (XII, 300) He blames almost 
all of it on the Pope. "'How these old men like giving youth 
a pushl'" he exclaims. (XII, 301) He bemoans the fact that 
he got little good out of his own "superb" defense. Just as 
dying animals will oftan give one last kick or twitch before 
they die, so the Pope, "'feebleness i' the socket shoots its 
last'" in "'A spite of violence.'" (XII, 316-1?)
He tells Cenceni that he promised his over-indulged 
son that if he failed to save Guido's head, at least the 
boy could go see it get chopped off. When Giacento, his son, 
was sitting in his box at the execution, he defended his 
father's handling of the case against a noblewoman's teasing 
that this time Bottini "ruled the roost." Giacento's in­
genious reply, boasts Arcangeli, was that his father knew
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better than to wage war with the Pope.
Arcangeli admits that he strains "every nerve" in 
working for his son. His next cases will help plaster up 
any part of his head that Bottini has broken by his victory.
Next Browning turns to a letter written by Bottini, 
"to no matter who," in which we discover that Bottini has as 
many reservations about his victory as Arcangeli has about 
his defeat. Arcangeli was certain that Bottini would become 
more overbearing than ever but Bottini frets and is not 
satisfied. He begins confidently by asserting that "'I 
had, as usual, the plain truth to plead.'" (XII, 409) Guido 
was tortured and confessed his crimes; Bottini is certain 
that he repented and "’Died like a saint, poor devilî'"
He imagines that Arcangeli is feeling triumphant 
because the latter held his foe off for a full month of 
wrangling at the trial, then was granted a temporary respite 
while he and Cenceni turned the tables on Bottini and pleaded 
clerical privilege. Bottini soothes some of his resentment 
by claiming that most of the work was done by that "'mannikan 
and dandiprat,'" Spreti, Arcangeli's assistant.
What Bottini resents much more is the sermon which 
Pompilia's confessor. Fra Celestino, preached Sunday, the 
day previous, in the Church of San Lorenzo. And even now 
part of the frihr's speech has been printed and is being 
circulated through Rome. "'That meddler preached to purpose 
yesterday/ At San Lorenzo,'" (XII, 449) and damaged some of
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the best points that Bottini had made at the trial.
Fra Celestino's sermon Is a passionate and somewhat 
bitter plea to the people to realize the full significance 
of the raurder-case. Do people conclude, that because Pompllla*s 
purity prevails, that truth triumphs In the end? When by a 
miracle, the dove returned safely to the ark, it did not 
restore to life all the doves who lay In waste under the 
water, those who were "'Beauty made blank and harmlessness 
destroyed!'" (XII, 486) Drawing the conclusion to his analogy. 
Fra Celestino wants to know how many sisters of Pompllla,
"chaste and noble," could have used a hand to extricate them 
from their horror, and now lie strangled? Pompllla Is like 
the dove; her victory Is the exception. Out of the welter, 
she was plucked from "'the world's calumny/ Stupidity, sim­
plicity,'" the world's attitude of "'who cares?*" (XII, 490-91)
Law failed Pompllla, just as the Church did. The 
best defense Pompllla's lawyer could devise, was that wickedness 
Is part of the flesh and It was part of Pompllla. If God had 
not exposed this particular case to the light, Pompllla's 
fate would have been the same as her sisters'. Her miracle 
was In part due to the "'true Instinct of an old good man'"—  
the Pope, who "'happens to hate darkness and love light,»'"
(XII, 594)
Had not God stepped In,man's speech would have doomed 
Pompllla. This Is the message of Fra Celestino's preaching, 
that "'God Is true,/ And every man a liar.'" (XII, 600-01)
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Anyone who trusts human testimony and takes it as a fact is 
himself betrayed a fool. (XII, 603) Man's speech is false. 
Truth is reserved for heaven, not earth, and man should learn 
"'to love what he may speak some day.'" (XII, 607)
Bottini feels that Fra Celestino's sermon, if it re­
ceives wide enough circulation, will damage his reputation 
and thé status of the legal profession. But by a sheer 
stroke of luck, he has found his final answer to Fra Celestino's 
argument. Those saintly sisters-in-the-cloth to the good 
friar have just retained Bottini to undertake proceedings 
against Pompilia's estate.
For, Bottini argues, though Guido has been proved 
guilty of murder, Pompilia was never proved innocent of 
adultery. By law, the nuns may claim legal rights to the 
possessions of those who die while officially under their care. 
This delights Bottini. "No adequate machinery in law?" he 
chortles to Fra Celestino.
But as Bottini's letter comes to an end. Browning 
interposes with the information that Bottini lost his case 
the following September, due to the Pope's insistence that 
Pompilia's truth be unmolested. Thus, Browning says, here 
we find "Justice done a second time I"
V
3
"And so an end of all i ' the story," Browning says.
(XII, 775) The Old Yellow Book he owes to Cenceni's care and 
he wonders how it will be when this book--"my four year's
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Intimate,"— and he part company. (XII, 228-229) He cannot 
till us what happened to Pompilia‘s son Gaetano, because 
history leaves no record of him. Browning wonders what his 
dreams were "if he grew a man?" (XII, 8l4) Was he proud, 
did he love his mother, did he "fight i' the ranks, unnoticed 
by the world?" (XII, 821-22)
Although this "old woe" has faded from memory Browning 
had found an ember still feebly aglow> and had breathed a 
spark into flame. Now the tale lives again, "If precious 
be the soul of man to man." (XII, 830)
Thus, his "British Public" may like him yet, though 
they have not always liked him in the past. "Learn one lesson" 
at least, he entreats them, which is that our human speech is 
nothing, "Our human testimony false, our fame/ And human 
estimation words and wind." (XII, 835-36)
But why, they might ask, has he taken "the artistic 
way to prove so much?" (XII, 837) The way Browning sees it, 
"Art remains the one way possible/ Of speaking truth, to 
mouths like mine, at least." (XII, 839-40)
The trouble with telling the truth is— when you look 
your brother in the face— the truth you tell, by the time 
it reaches him, "looks false,/ Seems to be just the thing it 
would supplant." (XII, 85O-5I) Under such circumstances, 
falsehood continues to do the work of truth. But in Art, man 
does in no way speak directly to men.
You see. Browning argues, "Art may tell a truth/
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Obliquèly." (XII, 855-56) Art can do the thing that will 
"breed the thought." Nor will art "wrong the thought" or 
distort the thought even though it by-passes the "mediate 
word." So may a painter paint a picture and "twice show 
truth,/ Beyond mere imagery on the wall," (XII, 858-59) So 
may a composer note by note "bring music from your mind" 
deeper than any you have felt.
So a poet. Browning says, may "write a book shall 
mean, beyond the facts,/ Suffice the eye and save the soul 
beside." (XII, 862-63)
"And save the soulI" This has been his intent, not 
only to save ours but his. "If the rough ore be rounded to 
a ring," it will have done the duty "which good ring should 
do." (XII, 865-66)
CHAPTER XIX 
THE RING AND THE BOOK 
1
Browning*s achievement seems even more considerable 
if one contrasts it to the religious* political, economic 
and psychological tensions of his own time.
It has been well established by now that by the middle 
of the nineteenth century much of the old complacency—  
particularly among intellectuals (if indeed they ever had 
any to begin with)— was gone. The "men of light and learn­
ing"— to use Arnold’s term— were faced with the fact of modern 
relativism. Dogmatic rationalism and the romantic tradition 
which was presumed to support it were no longer effective in 
dealing with the new concepts of scientific evolution and 
empirical relativism. Intellectuals, regardless of the field 
they worked in, were faced with great conflicts; some of 
these conflicts seemed quite irreconcilable in their own time. 
Men felt cut off from faith and belief. In the light of the 
new science, orthodox religious beliefs had to be abandoned 
or compromised. Belief itself, and the faith which supports 
it, were for the time being, impossible to attain.
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In the field of literature and letters, the situation 
was no different. The title of E.D.H, Johnson's book. The 
Alien Vision of Victorian Poetry, is itself an indication of 
the conflict which Tennyson, Browning and Arnold faced in 
their own time.
Much of Arnold's poetry, according to Professor 
Johnson, deals with protagonists who are "invariably lonely 
and isolated figures, alien to their environment."1 The con­
flict for Arnold's protagonist was one between "involvement 
in and aloofness from his env ir on me nt . Ar no ld never re­
solved this conflict in his poetry or apparently within him­
self. Instead, he rejected "the content and form of his 
earlier poetry" and turned to "objectivity and architectonice."3 
He began to regard poetry as a cultural agent, but in taking 
up narrative and dramatic forms such as "Tristram and Iseult," 
"Sohrab and Rustum," "Balder Dead," and "Merope" to demonstrate 
his rejection of introspection and his pursuit of objectivity, 
Arnold only succeeded in showing us that "he was temperamentally 
incapable" of making the change. The poems ultimately lapse 
into "the elegiac tone" found in Arnold's "The Scholar-Gypsy," 
which is itself a refutation of his principles regarding 
cultural objectivity. "ArnoldIs myths are really studies in
^Cited in Frederic E. Faverty, ed.. The Victorian 
Poets, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 134.
2lbid. 3lbid.
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alienation," and when he turned to prose to give his age 
"intellectual deliverance" as Arnold the critic rather than 
Arnold the poet, he still preferred discussing the alienation 
of the individual; thus he was just as unsuccessful in re­
solving the conflict in prose as he was in poetry.
There is evidence to suggest that Tennyson suffered 
from a similar conflict, but whereas Arnold’s was alienation 
from the environment, Tennyson’s was alienation from himself. 
Professor Johnson has referred to this as Tennyson’s "divided
O
will," The final impression left by the Idylls, says 
Johnson, is one of "tragic incompatibility between the life 
of the imagination and the ways of the world,
Lionel Stevenson has demonstrated that "The Lady of 
Shalott" is a "’definite allegory of the poet's resolve 'to 
face the painful experiences of real life,’"^ G, Robert 
Stange, in a discussion of Tennyson’s mythology, shows how 
Tennyson modernized classical myths "by reading into them 
his personal doubts and conflicts,"5
The reaction against Tennyson's popularity towards 
the end of his own life, which Tennyson himself commented 
upon, resulted in part from his own failure to portray and 
reflect his age in such a way that his "great mastery of
^Faverty, p, 134, ^Ibid,, p, 50. 
3lbid, ^Cited in Faverty, p, 52.
5lbid,, p, 53.
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language was. . .accompanied by a commensurate power of feel­
ing and ideas.
In the most recent full-length study of Tennyson^, 
Jerome H. Buckley vigorously maintains that Tennyson did not 
fail his age, and that "from the beginning he félt some 
responsibility to the society he lived in, and until the end 
he remained obedient to the one clear call of his own imagina­
tion."^ However, there is little question that Tennyson both 
succeeded and failed in finding the poetic means to reconcile 
private feeling with public knowledge. This conflict seems 
to have been with him off and on throughout his life.
But the times themselves tell the story. C.F. Harrold 
has said that
Merely to glance through the pages of Carlyle, Ruskin, 
or Arnold is to meet the surge and thunder of conflict­
ing ideas; everywhere there are allusions to the ad­
vance of science, the revival of Anglicanism, the 
growth of democracy, the rapid spread of industrialism, 
the developing faith in "progress" and the "march of 
the mind."^
Scientists were "setting forth theories and facts which shook 
the framework of the w o r l d . E v e r y w h e r e ,  men were forced to
llbid.. p. 54.
^Tennyson; The Growth of a Poet (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1961).
3lbid.. p. 255.
^Charles Frederick Harrold and William D. Templeman, 
eds,, English Prose of the Victorian Era (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1954), P. xiii.
5lbid., p. xiv.
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compromise their beliefs. In fact, as Harrold states, "the 
Victorian satisfaction with compromise makes that drama 
seem more and more like a tragedy."^
If Arnold and Tennyson could not find a way to go to
p
the bottom of the age's deepest problems , Browning succeeded 
where they failed. Browning found the means to overcome the 
limitations of relativism by grounding his vision in the very 
empiricism which he needed to break through. He realized 
that, like the scientist, he had to start with the "pure 
crude facts," but that to create his reality he had to go 
beyond the facts.
Browning demonstrates in The Ring and the Book that 
empirical evidence is not enough, that the institutional 
machinery's ethic is always behind the truth that precedes it. 
That is, the machinery we use to "prove" truth shifts from
age to age and truth is never in equilibrium with the
■a
machinery that is supposed to understand it. This is be­
cause of the incomplete nature of empirical evidence. The 
facts are never all in at any given time.
Browning reminds us that individuals create society, 
even while society influences and helps shape the realities of 
individuals. Browning is aware that institutions develop 
a life and ethic of their own beyond what any individual 
might have conceived for them. But this does not free the 
individual from his responsibility to separate himself from
llbid., p. xvii. ^Ibid. ^See p. 16, above.
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that Institution if his imaginative impulse toward right 
action is in conflict with it. This is when he is exer­
cising his creative consciousness.
"Shaping the Ring"
If you can assume that there is a truth; if you can 
assume that there is a goal; if you realize psychologically 
that being educated to truth provides personal and spiritual 
fulfillment; if you can assume these things because of your 
will-to-belleve, of your faith in the possibility, then you 
are faced with "Life’s business." You are faced with "just 
the terrible choice,"
Once you have made that choice— regardless of which 
one it is— you must find the means of achieving that end to 
which you have committed yourself. Instinct is not enough.
You must find the means of proving through action what your 
instincts tell you, or they are no good to you. Thus the 
instinct itself becomes part of the process by which it is 
put into action. That is to say, the instinct, the impulse 
to right action, must find a bridge whereby it can cross over 
to reality. That bridge is what we have described as "creative 
consciousness." Right action, contrary to what Professor 
Johnson has said, is not the direct result of one’s intuition. 
The instinct itself becomes formalized— an entity in itself-- 
only if it passes through the complex and deep-seated imagina-
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tive process of the creative consciousness.
Browning believed that the means lay in what is 
primarily an artistic phenomenon. For art may "tell a truth 
obliquely"— and must, since truth cannot be told directly.
One must learn, through art, to create a reality which is 
based on facts, but which is ultimately beyond the facts.
"Art is the one way possible," Browning maintains; otherwise, 
truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. We all possess 
this creative potential, he would argue. In this thesis, 
that potential has been referred to as the principle of the 
creative consciousness. It is a deep and complex imaginative 
process, attempting to re-order one's experience by exer­
cising one's artistic, creative abilities.
How can one separate himself from the institutional 
machinery that is supposed to be the seat of authority for 
society's ethics and laws? Only by exercising one's compli­
cated imaginative processes, only by putting one's unerringly 
right instincts into action in the face of a society where 
the facts are never all in, where the evidence is never com­
plete.
Caponsacchi and Pompilia have the right instinct.
At first they depend upon the institutional ethic to provide 
their solution for them. But this ethic is at odds with 
their right instincts and they are required to find a way 
of proving their instincts through action. Each does it 
according to his deep-seated imaginative ability. Caponsacchi
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concretizes his instinct about Pompilia through painting a 
picture of her as the donna angelicata. The symbols of 
heaven and self-sacrificing love which he employs in his 
painting of Pompilia give him the inspiration to act,
Pompilia*s instincts become a reality when she imaginatively 
creates a marriage in heaven between herself and Caponsacchi, 
When she feels the first stirrings of life inside her she 
knows she must find a way of directing these instincts— of 
turning her capabilities into abilities, of defiantly assert­
ing her right instincts in the face of a society where the 
institutional machinery is corrupted by the "torpor or 
assurance," Once she creates her marriage in heaven, she 
is able to direct her instincts to action.
Caponsacchi and Pompilia feel the need to fulfill 
themselves by expressing their instincts through an imagina­
tive process which leads to right action. Self-realization 
is thus one of the goals in Browning’s poem. But so, too, 
is the passion for devotion, Caponsacchi realizes his own 
true self through the painting of a window-picture, But the 
controlling symbol in his picture is the "bending down" 
which Pompilia does in order to sacrifice herself for suffering 
humanity. Thus he sees the antagonistic but interdependent 
relationship between self-realization and self-sacrifice. He 
sees that if the symbols of his picture are not to .become too 
rigid or fixed, he must accept the bending down, the reaching 
out towards other souls in order to help fulfill himself.
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Caponsacchi at first does not see that his reaching 
out must have a sense of direction. But the artistic frame­
work of his painting symbolically provides him with the 
controls to manage, direct, and extend his right instincts 
into right action. In short, Caponsacchi morally orients 
himself at the same time that he separates himself from the 
institutional ethic which is presumed to supply this orienta­
tion. He provides a basis for his own self-Judgment. He no 
longer need rely on the ambivalent attitudes of his own time. 
Thus self-realization and the necessity of devotion and self- 
sacrifice become the end values for Browning, the goal we 
strive for as we reach beyond our grasp, give "better than 
our best."
For the reader, such an attitude can be of deep 
significance. The reader himself can find the same moral 
orientation toward self-realization. Browning has aAked 
him to contribute his own complex imaginative abilities to 
the poem, and in this way, the reader reaches out, does his 
own "bending down," as he attempts to provide a basis for 
his own self-judgment, as he attempts to extend his own life 
and living, through his sympathy with the need of others 
to do the same. In this way, readers help to re-create The 
Ring and the Book each time they read it. The readers, like 
the poet, can do the thing "that will breed the thought."
They realize themselves as they reach out to help The Ring 
and the Book realize itself. In this way, like the painter.
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they "twice show truth."
This is the way Browning saw it; this is what can 
be achieved by exercising the principle of the creative con­
sciousness which is within us all.
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